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Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force
and the Force of Law
Maria L. Marcust
I will be master of what is mine own:
She is my goods, my chattels; she is my house,
My household stuff, my field, my barn,
My horse, my ox, my ass, my any thing ....
W. Shakespeare, The Taming of the
Shrew, Act III, Scene 2
An inclination to hit someone can be blocked by principle, or in-
stead by practicality: he might hit back, people might criticize me, the
police might arrest me. In the domestic context, with spouses of une-
qual strength, these potential controls are substantially reduced.
Definition of assault, and identification of the factors which deter-
mine the degree of the crime, has been a relatively easy legislative
task.' No jurisdiction has promulgated a statutory defense based on
the fact that the victim was only a spouse. Yet a privileged status for
domestic attackers has been informally accepted by police, prosecutors,
and courts.2
A somewhat motley collection of presumptions underlies this ac-
ceptance: the classification is supported inter alia by a constitutional
right of privacy and by claims of victim consent. It is the premise of
this Article that while these presumptions cannot be met by invoking
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, they are analyti-
cally defective when measured against even the most comfortable tier
of the equal protection clause tests. Predictably, judicial reluctance to
t Associate Professor of Law, Fordh'am University School of Law. B.A. 1954, Oberlin
College; J.D. 1957, Yale University. The author acknowledges with gratitude the valuable re-
search assistance of Muriel Desloovere and Anne T. Vitale.
1. See, ag., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.00 (McKinney 1975): "A person is guilty of assault in
the third degree when: 1. With intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such
injury. . . " "'Physical injury' means impairment of physical condition or substantial pain."
Id. § 10.00(9).
Throughout this Article the word "assault" includes any act, such as kicking, beating, or
hitting with an object, that carries a high risk of such injury; excluded are slaps and pushes that do
not meet this standard. See Straus, Vife Beating: How Common and Why?, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 443,
445 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Straus, RV/fe Beating]. The word "spouse" refers to either part-
ner of cohabiting, as well as legally married, couples.
2. See notes 134-45 and accompanying text infra. For statistics on the high incidence of
conjugal violence, see note 19 infra.
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confront the entire bundle of interrelated claims head on has shielded
the perpetrator rather than the recipient of the injury.
Consequently, the courts have been compelled to deal with the
cases of homicidal self-help that have followed upon the granting of a
class-based exemption for domestic assailants. Justification for such
homicides has been sought in self-defense and insanity, but the stan-
dards governing these defenses have been erratically interpreted by
trial judges and, where application would be harsh, nullified by juries.
Accompanying this poorly stitched pattern has been a plea for separate
treatment of defendants who kill battering spouses. Ironically, this plea
parallels the advocacy of special status for the batterer, although the
two arguments come from vastly different quarters.3
The present disorder is unsatisfactory from every perspective. The
constitutionally impermissible exception for assailants increases the po-
tential for intrafamily killings and results in further distortion of legal
standards when the killer is prosecuted. The Article concludes that
neither the impartial mission of the rule of law nor the neatly tooled
goal of individual justice has been served by the governmental response
to conjugal violence, and suggests the elements from which a valid ap-
proach may be constructed.
I
THE LAW OF ASSAULT
A. Privacy and Private Wrongs
The claim that enforcement of statutes prohibiting assault should
depend upon the identity of the victim is hardly persuasive as a legal
axiom. How did the present ambivalence concerning application of
these statutes to domestic violence evolve?
British common law provides certain Grand Guignol clues. In the
early centuries after the Norman Conquest, the English Legislature
convened infrequently and the criminal law was originated in large
part by judges. By the 17th century, English jurists had created and
defined the crimes of assault, battery, murder, and manslaughter.4
However, a husband's power over his wife was partially insulated from
3. Compare NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 1978, at 54 (women's groups advocating a broadening of
the rules of self-defense for women who kill their battering husbands) with the statement of a
county chief prosecutor that the criminal code should be discounted in conjugal assault cases, text
accompanying note 194 infra, and Parnas, Prosecutorial and Judicial Handling of amily Violence,
9 CRIm. L. BULL. 733 (1973) (suggesting the ideal response would be to divert cases of domestic
violence from the criminal justice system). See Part I, Section B(2) infra, especially text accompa-
nying notes 134-45, demonstrating that incidents of intrafamilial assault are in fact treated differ-
ently from stranger-precipitated attacks.
4. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 58-59 & n.6 (1972). See
generally Jackson, Common Law Misdemeanors, 6 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 193 (1937).
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the ambit of the assault prohibition. As described in Blackstone's Com-
mentaries: "[A]s he is to answer for her misbehavior, the law thought it
reasonable to entrust him with this power of restraining her, by domes-
tic chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to cor-
rect his apprentices or children . ... I
The wife's preclusion from protection against such "correction"
was coupled with a unique penalty against her if she resorted to violent
self-help. If she killed her husband she was guilty of more than homi-
cide-she was held for the crime of petit treason, which was based
upon the concept of a serious breach of allegiance. This offense was
differentiated from murder in order to apply a peculiar and grotesque
punishment. She was drawn and burned; that is, she was tied to a
horse and dragged along the rough road to be burned at the stake.
While legalized assault had a Medusa aspect which repelled its
adoption in America,7 some courts were able to face the concept when
it appeared in a less direct form. A right of privacy was invoked as an
overriding factor that barred legal intervention on behalf of the victim
while avoiding approval of the violence. This doctrine was memorial-
ized by the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Rhodes:8 "[However great are the evils of ill temper, quarrels, and
even personal conflicts inflicting only temporary pain, they are not
comparable with the evils which would result from raising the curtain,
and exposing to the public curiosity and criticism, the nursery and the
bed chamber."9
Echoes of this approach, minus the court's pear-shaped tones, still
resonate. A New York probation officer refused court access to a wo-
man whose husband had beaten and later threatened her with a knife
in the presence of her four children. Affidavits filed by a social worker
5. 1 v. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444.
6. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *204-05; R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 10 (2d ed.
1969); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 500 (2d ed. 1898). The
allegiance of a wife to her husband was a lesser form of a subject's allegiance to the king. PER-
KINs, supra, at 9-10 (citing 1 HALE P.C. *377). Petit treason was abolished by statute in 1828. Id.
7. As the court commented in Fulgham v. The State, 46 Ala. 143, 147 (1871): "[The com-
mon law of'wife whipping' among 'the lower rank of people' in Great Britain, has never been the
common law of this State. It is, at best, but a low and barbarous custom, and never was a law."
There was apparently no statutory support for the custom. However, in a review of the common
law governing interspousal assault in America, Wharton referred to the husband's right of chas-
tisement, and the bar against prosecuting him for battery unless he was guilty of malignant cruelty
or inflicted permanent injury on his wife:
Nor is this view modified by the fact that the two have agreed to live apart. But the
better opinion is that while a husband has no right to inflict corporal punishment on his
wife, he may defend himself against her, and restrain her from acts of violence toward
himself or others.
1 F. WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW 1120 (12th ed. 1932).
8. 61 N.C. 453 (1868).
9. Id. at 457.
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alleged that the probation officer had stated: "A man's home is his
castle. He had every right to do whatever he wanted in his
apartment."10
If the battering spouse in fact has a legal prerogative of privacy
that defeats the victim's right to invoke the assault law, then domestic
violence becomes solely a social problem to be dealt with on a volun-
tary basis-or ignored-by friends, relatives, and charitable agencies.
However, the concept of privacy has enjoyed considerable judicial at-
tention in the past few decades, and its modem contours provide no
shelter for an assailant.
Justice Brandeis' celebrated dissent in Olmstead v. United States1
is the seminal opinion on the privacy doctrine: "The makers of our
Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of
happiness . . They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as
against the government, the right to be let alone . ,,*"12 The Fram-
ers' concern with the pursuit of happiness and the sanctity of beliefs
and feelings does not evoke a vision of a spouse being kicked, stabbed,
or beaten while the assailant asks to be let alone. In its most compre-
hensive effort to dissect the right of privacy, the Supreme Court re-
cently held in 9halen v. Roe13 that the right attaches to an "individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."1 4 Yet victims in
interspousal assault cases seek legal intervention, the antithesis of pri-
vacy. Effective intervention necessarily mandates disclosure of the mis-
conduct that has occurred.
The assailant's counterargument may be presented in two ways:
(1) I am the head of the household and claim the right of privacy for
all its members, regardless of their wishes. (2) There are competing
interests here, and my right to privacy is superior to my spouse's re-
quest for protection.
10. Affidavit of Virginia Rivera-Sanchez, social worker, at 9, Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d
1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'dinpart, appeal dismissed inpart, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
The New Hampshire Commission on the Status of Women rejected a proposal to assist bat-
tered women, finding itself immobilized by the right of privacy. One commissioner explained that
wife-beating was the product of the rise of feminism. "Those women libbers irritate the hell out of
their husbands." Straus, We Beating, supra note 1, at 444 (quoting from the Portsmouth Herald,
Sept. 13, 1977). It may be noted that this belief is contradictory both to the ancient lineage of the
crime, and to the evidence that "submissive" wives are injured more often than those who retaliate
verbally or physically. See note 66 infra.
11. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
12. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
13. 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of a New York statute that man-
dated maintenance of computerized records of prescriptions for certain dangerous but lawful
drugs, although such records included the patient's identity).
14. Id. at 599.
1660 [Vol. 69:1657
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Either formulation contains a disqualifying concession. Both the
assailant's prerogative to continue his intrafamily activities and his re-
quest for secrecy have been asserted over the objection of the spouse.
Protected conduct, however, must be mutually acceptable rather than
accomplished by force. The courts have unequivocally ruled that the
right of privacy shields acts between two individuals only when both
consent 5 and when such acts do not impair any person's safety and
health.1 6
A partial retreat, salvaging some of the underlying presumptions
of the privacy claim, is that an attack on a spouse is at most a private
wrong with a civil rather than a criminal flavor. 7 The "none of your
business" motif is replaced by a more diplomatic contention that such
an assault is not a matter of public concern, since it injures only some-
one with a special relationship to the attacker.1 8 Such containment is
the antithesis of the violence of a terrorist, which is of maximum con-
cern because it could affect any one of us.
This approach requires a certain myopia about the facts. In-
trafamily battery is widespread; indeed, for female victims, domestic
attacks-even those that do not eventually escalate into homicide-
15. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 946 (1978). See, e.g, Cotner v. Henry, 394
F.2d 873 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); Towler v. Peyton, 303 F. Supp. 581, 582
(W.D. Va. 1969); Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638, 648 (Alaska 1969); Allan v. State, 91 Nev. 650, 541
P.2d 656, 6, (1975). Consent to marriage is not consent to crime. See also notes 47-48 and
accompanying text infra.
16. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).
17. In a speech delivered to an American Bar Association convention, Commander James
Bannon of the Detroit Police Department (now Executive Deputy Chief of the Department) said:
In my view the police attitude, which seems to say that what happens between man and
wife in their own home is beyond the authority or ability of the police to control, is a 'cop
out.' The real reason that police avoid domestic violence situations to the greatest extent
possible is because we do not know how to cope with them. And besides we share socie-
ties [sic] view that domestic violence is an individual problem and not a public issue.
J. Bannon, Law Enforcement Problems with Intra-Family Violence, 2-3 (Aug. 12, 1975).
This view may also subsume attacks by children on their parents. Researchers at the Univer-
sity of Maryland Medical Schoors Institute of Psychiatry and Human Behavior noted that an
almost universal element in families with violent children is a parental denial that the child's or
teenager's aggressive behavior is serious, even if it involves pushing a parent down the stairs,
kicking in the face, or stabbing in the chest. When the researchers asked one set of parents
whether they considered their son's violent actions right or wrong, both replied, "'It was neither
right nor wrong.'" Although their lives were in danger, parents did not always call the police, and
when questioned later they often lied, "Confronting the aberrant behavior of the child implies an
admission of failure. . . " noted the scientists. Hardin & Madden, Battered Parents: A New
Syndrome, 136 AM. J. PSYCH. 1288, 1289-90 (1979). Grandparents have also been victims of
assault, as indicated by a federally financed study of the elderly. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1979, at
Dl 1, col. 2. See also Steinmetz, Battered Parents, 15 Soc. 54 (1978).
18. While some domestic assailants have been viewed as law-abiding in other contexts, see,
e.g., MICHIGAN WOMEN'S COMM'N DOMESTIC ASSAULT 32-34 (Case V) (1977) [hereinafter cited
as MICmGAN HEARINGS], there is also evidence to the contrary, see text accompanying note 54
infra; Faulk, Men Who Assault their Wives, in BATTERED WOMEN 119, 123, 125 (M. Roy ed.
1977).
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cause more serious injuries and occur more frequently than street vio-
lence.1 9 Moreover, the legislature, which makes the initial categoriza-
tion of unlawful conduct as criminal or civil,20 has rejected any
suggestion that assault is trivial or should be relegated to private
resolution.
Both civil and criminal statutes have a moral element; that is, they
seek to encourage conduct that is beneficial to society. You may sue
Jones for colliding with your car or for refusing to deliver the widgets
for which you both contracted; you may have Jones arrested if he tries
to bum down your store. We disapprove of Jones in each context.
However, the two branches of the law are distinguished by a crucial
difference in character. Torts, the civil area most closely related to the
law of crimes, requires a showing of damage but involves a minor em-
phasis on immorality. It is designed to compensate the individual and
is controlled (except for the outcome of the suit) by him. Criminal law,
in contrast, is controlled by the state; it stresses moral culpability and
need not involve any actual damage. If Jones shoots at you while you
are sleeping but the gun fails to fire, there can be no civil suit.21 Yet
this conduct is considered sufficiently reprehensible and dangerous to
constitute a crime.
Not a single jurisdiction has chosen to exempt domestic assaults
from the ambit of the criminal law.' A variety of options remain
19. See D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 12 (1976); M. STRAus, R. GELLES & S. STEINMETZ,
BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 4 (1980); Dobash & Dobash, lfives: The "Appropriate' Victims of/arital
Violence, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 426, 437 (1977-78) [hereinafter cited as Dobash & Dobash]; Police
Foundation, Background Memorandum on Disputes or Disturbances 2 (1972). One study, extra-
polating from its sample, estimated that "in any one year, approximately 1.8 million wives are
beaten by their husbands." Straus, Wfe Beating, supra note I, at 445.
The seriousness of injuries inflicted by domestic assailants is discussed at notes 52-53 and
accompanying text infra. See note 54 and accompanying text infra as to homicides committed by
chronic batterers. It should be noted that interspousal violence commonly occurs in households
with four to six children, note 55 infra, and that the long term adverse effects on such children are
significant, notes 55-56 and accompanying text infra.
20. After the American Revolution the original thirteen states continued to apply English
common law, except where it was unsuited to local conditions. W. LAFAVE & A. ScOn, supra
note 4, at 60. See generally Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L.
REV. 6 (1910). However, the criminal law terrain was soon altered by the appearance of compre-
hensive criminal codes, which included most of the common law crimes as well as new ones that
were not of traditional origin. Some of these statutes expressly stated that crimes not appearing in
the code (or some other enactment) were abolished. The courts also buttressed the primacy of
legislative authority by holding that the enactment of broadly inclusive criminal codes nullified
common law offenses by implication. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 4, at 60.
21. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 38-39 (4th ed. 1971).
22. Some states have provided a combined criminal and civil approach. E.g., N.Y. FAM. CT.
AcT (29A) §§ 811-847 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980-81) (discussed at notes 106-07 and accom-
panying text infra). Jail sentences may be imposed under the Act, note 126 infra.
A few states have imposed additional punishment for domestic violence. E.g., CAL. PENAL
CODE § 273.5 (West Supp. 1981), making an assault on a spouse "resulting in a traumatic condi-
1662
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available to the sentencing judge as a basis for individual disposi-
tions. However, neither the privacy argument nor the attempt to triv-
ialize domestic assaults can overcome the legislative identification of
violence as a public wrong qualitatively different from contract viola-
tions and accidents.
B. Constitutional Implications of Nonenforcement
If the Constitution bars legislators from enacting an assault law
that excludes conjugal victims, would the refusal of executive or judi-
cial officers to apply legal sanctions to interspousal disputes be a less
candid but equally forbidden course? Both the question of legislative
incapacity and the implications of nonenforcement will be considered
below in the context of the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment. After concluding that equal protection
guarantees apply to battered spouses seeking law enforcement, this Ar-
ticle will develop in detail a method by which these guarantees may be
invoked. Within the parameters of the Constitution, however, legisla-
tures may create civil provisions that add to rather than subtract from
the remedies available in conjugal cases.
1. Due Process of Law
"Law is something more than mere will exerted as an act of
tion" a felony punishable with a maximum of one year in jail; S. id. § 241 (simple assault statute
that carries a maximum six months imprisonment). Cf. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1653 to 41-1659
(Supp. 1981) (assaults and batteries on wives only classified as felonies or misdemeanors, depend-
ing on seriousness of injury); Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 2919.25 (Page Supp. 1981) (first offense of
domestic violence is misdemeanor, second is felony in fourth degree); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-9
(Supp. 1980) (although classified as a separate misdemeanor, domestic violence is punished like
simple assault, id. § 11-5-3); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99 (1980) (making general criminal
code sections specifically applicable to domestic violence). The Washington statute expressly ac-
knowledges the criminality of conjugal attacks:
The purpose of this chapter is to recognize the importance of domestic violence as a
serious crime against society and to assure the victim of domestic violence the maximum
protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the law can provide. The
legislature finds that the existing criminal statutes are adequate to provide protection for
victims of domestic violence. However, previous societal attitudes have been reflected in
policies and practices of law enforcement agencies and prosecutors which have resulted
in differing treatment of crimes occurring between cohabitants and of the same crimes
occurring between strangers. Only recently has public perception of the serious conse-
quences of domestic violence to society and to the victims led to the recognition of the
necessity for early intervention by law enforcement agencies. It is the intent of the legis-
lature that the official response to cases of domestic violence shall stress the enforcement
of the laws to protect the victim and shall communicate the attitude that violent behavior
is not excused or tolerated.
Id. § 10.99.010.
A state-by-state summary entitled State Legislation on Domestic Violence, appears in Center
for Women Policy Studies, Washington, D.C., Response to Violence in the Family, Sept.-Oct.
1981 [hereinafter cited as Response].
23. See note 57 and accompanying text infra.
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power. . . . Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the injury of the
persons and property of its subjects, is not law, whether manifested as
the decree of a personal monarch or an impersonal multitude." 24 This
Supreme Court formulation of due process has branched into two sepa-
rate doctrines, one procedural and the other substantive. Procedural
due process delineates the contours of the "right to be heard before
being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind' 2 as a conse-
quence of governmental decisions. Questions of what kind of hearing
is due and when it is due are determined by assessing the weight of the
life, liberty, or property interests at stake and the risk of error in gov-
ernmental disarrangement of these rights. 26
Readily identifiable life and liberty interests are involved when a
victim is subjected to repeated beatings. Can it be argued that the gov-
ernment has contributed to the victim's risk and degree of injury by
rejecting requests to bring the attacker to trial, and has therefore de-
prived the victim of liberty without first according a constitutionally
mandated hearing? The argument lacks a vital connective tissue.
The historic function of procedural due process is to secure the
opportunity to challenge the state's imposition of a penalty or with-
drawal of a benefit. The attacker's trial, however, only decides his guilt
or innocence. It does not determine whether the government may law-
fully withdraw prosecutorial or judicial services. The trial would pro-
vide an answer, but to the wrong question. The occurrence or
nonoccurrence of the trial is therefore irrelevant to the victim's proce-
dural due process rights.
While procedural due process refers to the method by which a
challenged governmental choice is carried out, substantive due process
relates to the nature and reasonableness of the choice itself. The term
"liberty" embedded in the fourteenth amendment unquestionably
guarantees freedom from bodily restraint,27 but the protection accorded
is against state rather than private intrusion. Congress may utilize its
enforcement powers under section five of the fourteenth amendment to
enact legislation affirmatively prohibiting certain private conduct,28 but
24. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1884).
25. Joint Anti-Fascists Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
26. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 335 (1976). The burden placed on the govern-
ment by procedural safeguards is also taken into account. Id. at 335.
27. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (indicating that a penumbra of more
subtle restraints is also protected under the due process clause).
28. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 762, 782 (1966) (holding that Congress pos-
sesses section five authority to punish "all conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of fourteenth
amendment rights, whether or not state officers or others acting under color of state law are impli-
cated in the conspiracy").
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unless and until it has done so, "state action" is necessary to trigger the
constitutional promise.
Presume that a pattern of conjugal assault persists in a particular
household and the victim's attempts to secure legal redress are rebuf-
fed. Elaborating on the chain of causation considered above in the
context of the procedural due process argument, the following two-step
premise for finding unlawful "state action" might be proffered:
(1) withholding the benefit of police protection is a governmental
choice; (2) the choice is unreasonable because it permits future injury
to the complainant and therefore facilitates an infringement of the vic-
tim's liberty.
The fact that the state has merely failed to act, rather than inflicted
an affirmative injury, poses no fatal doctrinal difficulty. The fourteenth
amendment may implicate both acts and omissions.2 9 However, the
attempt to cast the deprivation in substantive due process terms runs
counter to a persistent (though often subterranean) judicial stance. The
Supreme Court's "allergy to substantive due process"3 ° reflects a disin-
clination to imply that judicial relief is appropriate in every instance
where the needs of citizens are unmet.31
The standard that must be satisfied by the state has been charac-
terized as the "narrow" and "constricted" one of "minimal rational-
ity."3 2 With specific reference to police protection, it has been noted
that "[i]f courts were required to consider whether the. . . protection
afforded a particular property owner was 'adequate,' they would be re-
quired to make judgments which are best left to officials directly re-
sponsible to the electorate." 33 While the Court's concern was with a
single occasion of police failure and with compensation for property
damage only, the respect accorded to police discretion in utilizing a
29. L. TitiE, supra note 15, at 502.
30. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 689 (1962) (White, J., dissenting). See also Hen-
kin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term-Foreword& On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 66
(1968).
31. See L. TmaE, supra note 15, at 919. It should be noted that affirmative duties are gener-
ally expressed through provision of various procedural safeguards before withdrawal of services
or benefits.
State law often similarly reflects the principle that a duty owing to the public as a whole does
not run to individuals unless explicitly provided by statute. Eg., Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295
N.Y. 51, 54, 64 N.E.2d 704, 705-06 (1945); accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288
(1965) (neglect in the performance of such requirements creates no civil liability to individuals);
see Henkin, supra note 30, at 72-76.
32. Snell v. Wyman, 281 F. Supp. 853, 863, 862 n.19 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aj'd, 393 U.S. 323
(1969). Stricter standards requiring special scrutiny are applicable in cases involving "fundamen-
tal" interests. See notes 35, 41-44 and accompanying text infra.
33. YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 95 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring). The prosecu-
tor's generally unreviewable discretion is even broader. See notes 182-84 and accompanying text
infra.
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scarce resource suggests limits to the application of due process to po-
lice inaction.
However, as will be seen below, a wholly different choir of consid-
erations has sounded where the governmental choice at stake unreason-
ably excludes one class of persons from benefits or services.
2. Equal Protection
a The Validity of the Classjfcation Itself
"A person is guilty of assault when with intent to cause serious
physical injury to a person other than his spouse, he causes such in-
jury." If such a statute were proposed to a legislature, it would be met
with instinctive rejection. Without the filter of a "Rule of Thumb"34 or
a solemn invocation of privacy, it is a politically unsalable denigration
of the family. This hypothetical provision must be the centerpiece of
our equal protection inquiry, however, for if the classification on which
it rests does not offend the Constitution, then questions concerning se-
lective enforcement of existing assault laws need not be reached.
The Supreme Court has developed a varied panoply of standards
against which a challenged classification may be measured, each con-
taining its own discomfort index for the state. Access to police protec-
tion has not yet been characterized by the Supreme Court as a
"fundamental" right triggering a "strict scrutiny" standard whenever
there is a departure from equality in its availability.3S One suspects
that this fact is historical rather than doctrinal; the cases considering
police inaction have involved particular failures to provide protec-
tion,36 rather than denial of police services on the basis of a broad clas-
sification.37 And although a right to equal court access has been
recognized in civil cases where a judicial proceeding is the only effec-
34. This legendary English rule, a symbol of the right of "moderate correction," purportedly
allowed a husband to beat his wife so long as the stick was "no thicker than his thumb." W.
PROSSER, supra note 21, at 136.
35. The right to vote, for example, has been held to be fundamental. See Sailors v. Board of
Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967) and Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966),
which, read'together, indicate that although the states are not required to hold elections for any
particular office, the equal protection clause applies once the franchise is granted. Police protec-
tion is not a "preferred" right, another category requiring strict scrutiny. Preferred rights have
been found in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (law that requires Amish children to
attend high school is invalid because enforcement would endanger the free exercise of the Amish
religious way of life), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (unemployment benefits may not be
conditioned upon recipient's willingness to violate religious principles by requiring Seventh-Day
Adventist to work on Saturday), and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (statute authorizing
county attorney to obtain an injunction against publication of a newspaper that was malicious,
scandalous, and defamatory held unconstitutional as an infringement of freedom of the press).
36. See, eg., YMCA v. United States, 395 U.S. 85 (1969).
37. In San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973), where
the challenged deprivation involved educational services, the Court indicated that if the facts had
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tive method of resolving the dispute,3 8 its application to the criminal
law has thus far been limited to insuring that basic trial and appellate
procedures do not discriminate against certain types of defendants.3 9
Yet, it is anomalous to conclude that governmental services vital to
our physical security should be put into the same category as granting a
driver's license. Blackstone's classic analysis of the rights of individu-
als gave the highest priority to protection from murder or mutilation
and "security from the corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating
and wounding.' 40
If the right to nondiscriminatory police protection is fundamental,
withdrawal of such services must be justified by a compelling state in-
terest.4 1 However, a classification based on the victim's marital or co-
habiting status,42 rather than on the assailant's intent and the victim's
shown "an absolute denial of educational opportunities ... "there might have been an interfer-
ence with fundamental rights [emphasis added].
38. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375-76 (1971) (holding unconstitutional a state
law that conditioned a judicial decree of divorce on claimant's ability to pay court costs and fees).
39. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (striking down a provision that would
disadvantage an indigent defendant). See also text accompanying notes 158-59 infra.
40. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134. Next in importance after personal security,
Blackstone ranked personal liberty and personal property. Id. at *129.
41. See, eg., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (state law demanding one year's
residency for welfare applicants struck down as it infringed the fundamental right to travel). But
cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (one year residency. requirement in divorce actions sus-
tained by compelling state interests in protecting marriage and the family).
42. Since it can be statistically demonstrated that most victims of domestic assault are wo-
men, Straus, Wfe Beating, supra note 1, at 449, it may also be argued that the effect of such a
classification is to discriminate on the basis of sex. The historical antecedents of a conjugal exclu-
sion from the assault laws are explicitly sex-based. See text accompanying notes 5-6 supra. More-
over, recent studies provide disquieting support for the conclusion that contemporary society
continues to some degree to categorize women as more child-like and less deserving of autonomy
than men. Straus, Sexual Inequality, Cultural Norm, and Wife-Beating, I VICTIMOLOGY 54, 65
(1976). Many witnesses who failed to assist or call for help during the Kitty Genovese murder
stated that they had inferred that she was being attacked by her husband. A.M. ROSENTHAL,
THIRTY-EIGHT WITNEssEs 41 (1964). Apparently, this was sufficient reason to ignore her screams.
A Michigan State University study that staged a series of fights to be witnessed by unsuspecting
passers-by found that "male witnesses rushed to the aid of men being assaulted by either women
or men, and that men helped women being hit by other women. But not one male bystander
interfered when a male actor apparently beat up a woman." Pogrebin, Do Women Make Men
Violent? MS., Nov. 1974, at 49, 55.
Several Supreme Court Justices have indicated that sex discrimination constitutes a "suspect
classification" requiring the state to meet a higher standard of justification. Eg., Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). This view has not yet been endorsed by a majority of the Court,
but recently, the Court adopted a "judicial standard of review based on intermediate scrutiny
.... " L. TRIBE, supra note 15, at 1066. In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), the Court
declared that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 197. See B. SCHWARTZ, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 373-74 & nn.18-24 (2d ed. 1979).
Application of this Supreme Court standard to conjugal cases is problematical, however. A
claim that officials who refuse to intervene in domestic assaults are deliberately and consciously
discriminating against women would be countered by arguments that privacy concerns were the
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resulting injuries, would founder even under the "rational relation"
test. This test, which is much more deferential to the state than the
"compelling interest" requirement, has been described as imposing on
the courts the duty to decide if a challenged classification is "reason-
able in light of its purpose."'43
In interpreting this duty, the Court often considers whether some
state of facts "reasonably can be conceived" 44 to justify the legislative
measure. The analysis below will therefore include the relation of a
marital violence exemption to the purpose of the assault laws, and the
factual justifications that have been offered to sustain this exemption.
i Claims of affirmative benefit resulting from the classofcation.
Even if the universal prohibition against assault were merely designed
to deter a breach of the peace, an exclusion for conjugal attacks would
not be consonant with that goal. While most domestic violence occurs
in the home, with no spectators except the children, neighbors are fre-
quently disturbed by the sounds and cries that accompany the beat-
ing.45 Moreover, the major purpose of the prohibition is to preserve
personal security, not the public peace.46 That objective is indisputably
dominant motive. See notes 8 & 17 and accompanying text supra. The Supreme Court has re-
jected claims of sex-based discrimination where the challenged provisions adversely affected men
as well as women, even where the negative effect on women was disproportionate. Personnel
Adm'r. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). Although women have more frequently been victims, any
marital exemption is equally objectionable when it operates to deprive battered husbands of police
or prosecutorial protection.
43. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964). More must be shown under this stan-
dard than the mere congruence of the provision and the legislative intent. If, for example, the goal
of a law were to prevent persons over 65 from driving a car, a provision precluding this group
from obtaining or retaining motor vehicle licenses would accomplish this end-but this tautology
would be of no assistance in assessing the validity of the law under the equal protection clause.
Substantive evaluation of the legislative goal is necessary to determine whether the state's objec-
tive is based on a legitimate conception or societal value. See the seminal work of Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
44. Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959). From the 1930's to the 1960's, the
Supreme Court rarely employed the rationality requirement as a basis for striking down legisla-
tion. Some commentators, however, continue to view rationality as a requirement capable of
voiding legislation as unconstitutional. See Bennett, "Mere" Rationaliy in Constitutional Law:
JudicialReview and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1049 (1979). Others have attempted to
articulate alternate guidelines for review. See Tribe, he Supreme Court, 1972 Term - Fore word
Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Lfe and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).
45. Neighbors may "turn up the TV to block out the shouting and sobbing next door so that
they can no longer hear it." E. PIZZEY, SCREAM QUIETLY OR THE NEIGHBORS WILL HEAR 30
(1977).
46. See generally 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *122-40 in which he identifies three
primary rights that Englishmen enjoy: the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty,
and the right of private property. "Mhe principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the
enjoyment of those absolute rights. . . .' Id. at *124. See also J. Bannon, supra note 17, at 2:
As it turns out we [the police] reject the rule of law which makes it a crime to assault
anothertperson regardless of our relationship to them or degree of injury. . . . Most
frequently the factor which will cause police intervention is a family fight which disrupts
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disserved by the exclusion.
Is the desire to maintain the family unit a competing value that
may be fostered by refusing to extend governmental' protection to
spouses? The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to a "pri-
vate realm of family life" is fundamental, but in the same decision
made clear that this right gives no family member the authority of a
tyrant over the others.47 A husband may not prevent his wife from
obtaining a legal abortion."8 Nor can the state deny court access on
discriminatory grounds to a spouse who seeks to dissolve the mar-
riage,49 whether the other spouse contests that decision or not.
The argument that the state cannot protect a domestic assault vic-
tim because of the sanctity of marriage is uncomfortably reminiscent of
the plea of the patricide that he should be exempt from prosecution
because he is an orphan. It is the violence, not the cessation of vio-
lence, which threatens the family.50 The Supreme Court, although up-
holding legislative discretion to preclude tort actions between husband
and wife, emphasized that the victim of a domestic assault had a right
of access to the criminal courts, which would "inflict punishment com-
mensurate with the offense committed."5
the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood. . . . [This is] of course irrelevant to the
substantive charge of assault.
47. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (holding that a guardian may not di-
rect her niece to distribute religious literature in violation of a state law forbidding child labor).
48. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-71 (1976); S( Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977) (holding that the equal protection clause does not require a state to pay expenses inci-
dent to nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women merely because it has made a policy choice
to pay for expenses incident to childbirth, and that such a policy does not impinge on a woman's
fundamental right to privacy).
49. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
50. The New York Legislature has given appropriate recognition to this point by redefining
the purpose of a family court proceeding. A previous reference to "keeping the family unit intact"
was amended to emphasize that the purpose is "attempting to stop the violence, end the family
disruption, and obtain protection." Marjorie D. Fields, co-chairman of the Governor's Task
Force on Domestic Violence, commented: "We take the view that by ending disruptive violence
with orders of protection and by having the court mandate an educational program for the abuser
you have an atmosphere more conducive to preserving the family." N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1981,
§ B, at 4, col. 2-5.
51. Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 619 (1910). Presumably this right flowed from
the State's general assault and battery statutes. Although a diminishing number of jurisdictions
have retained interspousal immunity, Note, The Case for Legal Remediesfor Abused Women, 6
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 135, 157 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Casefor LegalRemedies],
the trend is towards abandonment of the doctrine, particularly where the infliction of intentional
harm destroys the "harmony" of the home and reduces the risk of collusion between the parties at
the expense of the insurance company, see, eg., Mosier v. Carney, 375 Mich. 532, 566-73, 138
N.W.2d 343, 355-58 (1965); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (1973); Goode v. Martinis,
58 Wash. 2d 229, 361 P.2d 941 (1961); Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632 (1955 & Supp.); Comment, ;We
Abase The Failure ofLegal Remedies, 11 J. MARR. PRAc. & PRoc. 549, 570-73 (1978).
Professor Prosser has pointed out the irony of retaining the immunity in some cases but abro-
gating it in others:
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An assault is not a mere family quarrel. A comparison of assaults
by spouses with other kinds of attacks demonstrates that domestic vic-
tims are much more likely to be seriously injured, to require medical
attention and hospitalization, and to be incapacitated from working for
longer periods.5 2 One quarter of the victims are pregnant at the time of
the attack.53 It is also significant that twenty-five percent of all homi-
cide offenders have a prior history of serious assaults, particularly
against spouses.5 4 This statistic underlines the necessity for dealing
with the offender at the outset.
Children in the household who witness the attacks or become ad-
ditional targets themselves frequently develop psychosomatic illnesses,
depression and suicidal behavior, or patterns of stealing and truancy.55
Families reported for abuse account for a disproportionate number of
delinquent children, as a pattern of uncontrolled and violent conduct is
imitated in the next generational cycle or emerges as a result of the
trauma of the beatings.5 6
A corollary of the "family unit" argument is the suggestion that if
the husband is the assailant, the problem should be ignored because the
family breadwinner might be jailed. This rather nearsighted view fails
to focus on several salient factors. The criminal law provides more
than a choice of either jail or benign neglect. Its dispositional flexibility
has been repeatedly demonstrated in such approaches as preconviction
probation, referral to treatment agencies, or dismissal after a period of
supervised "good behavior."5 The critical point is that the disposition
[Interspousal immunity in personal torts is based] on the bald theory that after a hus-
band has beaten his wife, there is a state of peace and harmony left to be disturbed; and
that if she is sufficiently injured or angry to sue him for it, she will be soothed and
deterred from reprisals by denying her the legal remedy--and this even though she has
left him or divorced him for that very ground, and though the same courts refuse to find
any disruption of domestic tranquility if she sues him for a tort to her property ....
W. PROSSER, supra note 21, at 863 (footnotes omitted).
52. Gaquin, Spouse Abuse: Datafrom the National Crime Survey, 2 VICnrMOLOoY 632, 640-
41 (1978). The decline of the "extended family" in which relatives living in close proximity could
help each other, has contributed to the danger. E. PizzEy, supra note 45, at 30.
53. M. STRAus, R. GELLES, & S. STEINMErZ, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 187 (1980). Attacking
a pregnant wife may be a husband's attempt to terminate the pregnancy and relieve himself of the
impending stress of yet another child. R. GELLES, FAMILY VIOLENCE 116 (1979).
54. Field & Field, Marital Violence and the Criminal Process: Neither Justice nor Peace, 47
Soc. SERv. REv. 221, 223 (1973).
55. Hilberman, Overview: The "Mfe-Beater's Wife" Reconsidered, 137 AM. J. PSYCH. 1336,
1340 (1980); Roy,,, Current Survey o(150 Cases, in BATrERED WOMEN 25, 33 (M. Roy ed. 1977).
Interspousal violence is most common among young families with four to six small children. M.
STRAus, R. GELLES, & S. STEiNMETz, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 119 (1980).
56. Elliot, The Neurology of Explosive Rage: The Dyscontrol Syndrome, in BATrERED Wo-
MEN 98, 101 (M. Roy ed. 1977); N.Y. State Assembly Select Committee on Child Abuse, Summary
Report on the Relationship Between Child Abuse and Neglect and Later Socially Deviant Behav-
ior 7, 11, 16 (Mar. 1978).
57. A recent study of the Criminal Court in New York City found that only 30% of the
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be tailored to the individual defendant and provide sufficient restraint
or deterrence to prevent future assaults. As a report of the United
States Commission on Civil Rights concluded:
The benevolent nonarrest policy might be satisfactory in some in-
stances if the husband/assailant responded to leniency and kindness by
resolving never to resort to violence again. Unfortunately, the man is
more apt to see this leniency as reinforcement for his abusive behavior.
He quickly learns that lesser injuries, like a broken nose, are tolerated
by the system and the probability of his being taken into custody is
remote.
58
Moreover, concern for family finances should not cause the vic-
tim's views to be paternalistically discounted. The wife who seeks po-
lice and prosecutorial aid has opted for health and safety regardless of
the economic risk involved. Burglars and batterers may not use dimi-
nution of their family's income as a basis for immunity if their victims
are strangers; it would be a curious paradox if economic protection of
the wife were invoked only where her own loss of physical security is at
stake.59
Another affirmative goal, unrelated to the purpose of the assault
laws but sometimes cited to support an exclusion for domestic violence
is protection of police officers from injury. Requests for aid in dealing
with threatened or present violence in the home represent a substantial
portion of the police docket in most localities, sometimes ranging as
convicted defendants were given jail terms. The remainder were conditionally discharged, placed
on probation, or fined. Vera Institute of Justice, Preliminary Evaluation of the 43rd Precinct
Felony Case Preparation Project 43 (1980). See generall, R. NImmER, DIVERSION: THE SEARCH
FOR ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF PROSECUToN (1974). In New York, a successful approach has been
to sentence an offender to serve his jail term on evenings and weekends, so that he can continue in
his employment. Lt. George Rosko of the San Francisco Police Department has suggested that a
first-time wife-beater should be remanded to a counseling center, but warned explicitly that if he
ever assaults his wife again he will be sent to jail; ifjudges took that position and adhered to it, the
problem of wife battering might be solved. Statement of Lt. Rosko as cited in Eisenberg, An
Overview ofLegalemedlerforfBattered Women, 15 TRIAL 28, 29 (Aug. 1979). An Oregon district
attorney handles misdemeanor domestic assault by requesting that the defendant be placed on
supervised probation for 18-24 months, conditional on spending 2-15 days in jail and entering a
program of alcohol and family counseling. This is coupled with a recommendation to the court
that if the defendant is employed, he should be allowed to serve his jail sentence at a time when it
will not cause the loss of his job. Response, supra note 22, July-Aug. 1981, at 9 [hereinafter cited
as Response]. See notes 100-25 and accompanying text infra for discussion of civil adjuncts to the
assault laws.
58. Martin, Overview-Scope of the Problem, in U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BAT-
TERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 3, 9 (1978). Indeed, the policy of leaving the problem
unchecked may cause a permanent dissolution of the family, through the lawful means of divorce
or, in extreme cases, the unlawful means of homicide. See Part I infra.
59. See Note, The Hall of Mirrors: WIfeAbuse andthe Law in an Era of Social Change, 1 W.
NEw ENG. L. REv. 565 (1979) [hereinafter cited as HallofMirrors]. In addition, further constitu-
tional problems would be apparent if the exclusion were fragmented into categories such as hus-
band-assailant or wife-assailant, breadwinner, sole-breadwinner, or joint-breadwinner.
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high as sixty percent.60  The total calls in this category is greater than
for all other violent felonies combined.61 It is therefore not surprising
that the number of officers injured in responding to domestic violence
calls is significant, though the majority of such injuries occur in other
situations.62
While reduction of risk to police personnel must be a continuing
governmental objective, it cannot be accomplished merely by writing
off one group of victims as too undeserving to warrant such a risk.63
Rather, the state should provide well-designed training programs to as-
sist officers in utilizing crisis prevention techniques" and distinguishing
60. Guthrie, The Battered Wfe: A Victim ofMost Under-Reported Crime, Clev. Press, Nov.
3, 1976, § C, at 4, col. 3, cited in Casefor Legal Remedies, supra note 51, at 136; Fields, W/fe-
Beating: The Hidden Offense, N.Y.LJ., April 29, 1976, at 1, col. 1, cited in Casefor Legal Reme-
dies, supra note 51, at 137.
61. Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 914, 914 n.2
[hereinafter cited as Police Response].
62. FBI figures indicate that 30% of the assaults on police officers occur when they respond
to disturbance calls. It should be noted, however, that the FBI includes in the "disturbance"
category "man with gun" calls and bar fights, as well as family disturbances. In 1978, 10 of 93
officers killed in the line of duty died after responding to disturbance calls. However, a higher
number (15 out of 93) were killed enforcing traffic violations. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 301, 307 (1979). See Police Response,
supra note 61, at 920 n.25.
63. Violence against organized crime figures is apparently investigated and prosecuted with
the same diligence as crime directed against storekeepers, farmers, or civil servants. For example,
after the murder of Carmine Galante, a reputed leader of an organized crime family, the Brook-
lyn, N.Y., district attorney established a task force of 20 investigators from his office, the Police
Department's 14th Homicide Zone, the Police Intelligence Division, and the Organized Crime
Control Bureau to track down the killers. N.Y. Times, Jul. 17, 1979, § B, at 5, col. 2.
64. An excellent step-by-step blueprint on the handling of such crises has been issued. See
POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH FORUM, RESPONDING TO SPOUSE ABUSE & WIFE BEATING (1980),
especially at 83-109 [hereinafter cited as POLICE FORUM]. The Police Executive Research Forum
is a national membership organization composed of chief executives from municipal, county, and
state law enforcement agencies.
There is evidence that some police officers feel unequipped to deal with the emotionally
charged atmosphere that accompanies family conflicts. D. MARTIN, supra note 19, at 97. Family
crisis intervention programs have been instituted in several major cities; they do not only train
officers in psychological and mediation techniques, but also emphasize knowledge of existing so-
cial services and safety precautions. See Police Response, supra note 61, at 949-59; Bard, Famly,
Intervention Police Teams as a Community Health Resource, 60 J. CIuM. L.C. & P.S. 247 (1969);
Bard & Zacker, How to Handle Explosive Squabbles, PSYCH. TODAY, Nov., 1976, at 73-75; Parnas,
Police Discretion and Diversion ofIncidents of Intra-Family Violence, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD.
539, 549-58 (1971). Hearing on Marital and Family Violence Before the Cal Sen. Subcomm. on
Nutrition & Wefare Comm. 47-50 (July 21, 1975) (statement of M.S. Ashley) [hereinafter cited as
Cal Hearings]. Although a shortage of funds has led to the curtailment of many of these pro-
grams, id, they have apparently reduced the number of police injuries and homicides. M. BARD,
FAMILY CRISIS INTERVENTION: FROM CONCEPT TO IMPLEMENTATION 5 (1973), cited in Casefor
Legal Remedies, supra note 51, at 148 n.90. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has also estab-
lished a training program on police handling of domestic violence, which is given at the FBI
national academy. Local police officers who participated in the program noted that new proce-
dures instituted as a result of their training will reduce the incidence of police injury and of do-
mestic assaults. Response, supra note 22, at 6.
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between those cases necessitating only mediation and those requiring
investigation and arrest. A recent change in the International Associa-
tion of Chiefs of Police Training Key notes:
A critical difference exists between the police response to family
disturbances where no physical violence has occurred and a wifebeat-
ing. .... Although the application of crisis intervention skills are re-
quired in both cases, the primary purpose of mediation is to prevent
violence and therefore make arrest unnecessary. Where an attack has
already taken place, however, the police officer must be prepared to
conduct an assault investigation .... 'Family disturbances' and 'wife
beatings' should not be viewed synonymously; nor should wife abuse
be considered a victimless crime. . . . A wife beating is [first and] fore-
most an assault ....
i Claims of consent. In addition to affirmative objectives such as
fostering family unity and minimizing police risks, negative factors
have been cited as justifications for a conjugal violence exemption to
the assault laws. One is the presumption that since the abused spouse
who stays in the situation must like it or deserve it,66 there is no need to
expend government resources to stop the attacks. The other is the pre-
diction that the victim would be too passive or fearful to press charges
and that arrest and commencement of prosecution would therefore be
administratively unwarranted.
Is the victim courting or at least consenting to the attacks, and
could such consent immunize the assailant from legal intervention? It
must first be noted that many battered spouses do not remain with their
attackers, but the assaults continue despite requests for police protec-
65. International Association of Chiefs of Police, Training Key #245, in BATrERED WOMEN
144, 149 (M. Roy ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Training Key #245]. See POLICE FORUM, supra
note 64, at xiii. For contrasting police responses, see notes 69-70, 134-37 and accompanying text
infra. The argument that "family disturbances" should be kept off the crowded criminal calen-
dars can be met by alternatively excluding from the docket actual victimless and nonviolent
crimes such as gambling. See the recommendation of a special committee of New York City law
enforcement officials that enforcement of laws prohibiting victimless crimes be de-emphasized,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1979, § B, at 3, coL 1.
66. This claim parallels a similar assumption about rape victims. Interspousal rape, which
involves a somewhat different constellation of considerations than nonsexual assault, is beyond
the scope of this Article. For a powerful and persuasive analysis of the law of rape, see Berger,
Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1977).
Empirical studies do not support the view that if women became more meek and therefore
ceased to "irritate" their spouses, domestic violence would be abated without legal intervention.
Star, Comparing Battered and Non-Battered Women, 3 VICTIMOLOGY 32, 42 (1978). Moreover,
blaming the victim and overlooking the law-breaker has other infirmities. The available evidence
indicates that most domestic assaults are unexpected, occurring without a significant triggering
incident. Eisenberg & Micklow, TheAssaulted H/ie: "Catch 22"Revisited, 3 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L.
REP. 138, 144 (1977); D. MARTIN, supra note 19, at 49. Mediation that focuses on the wife's
"failings" has been ineffective in reducing domestic violence. See note 120 and accompanying
text infra.
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tion. It is from these metals that the links to conjugal homicide are
forged, as the victim is transformed into the defendant.67
The terror of those who stay has been described as immobilizing:
"Very few people understand this kind of fear. .. . In the mind of
[a wife] who has been badly beaten, this fear blots out all reason.
The man seems to be omnipotent."
68
Affidavits filed in an omnibus lawsuit seeking effective enforce-
ment of the New York Family Offenses Law illustrate the point:
[A]t about 11:00 P.M., my husband came home from visiting his
mother. As soon as he walked into the house, he began to hit me with
his fists .... [H]e had hit me in the head so many times that it made
me sleepy. As my eyes closed, my husband said, 'don't close your eyes
or you are not going to open them tomorrow morning.' I finally fell off
to sleep. I awakened at about 10:30 A.M..... He started slapping
and punching me all over in my stomach, face, and head. He pulled
out a chunk of hair from my head. He went into the kitchen and took
out two big carving knives and a set of steak knives. He made me sit in
the corner of the bedroom on a chair. He sat in bed with knives which
he put under the covers. He said, 'I'll have to kill you, and then I will
have to kill myself.' Then the telephone rang. It was my mother. I
told her in Italian, which my husband does not understand, to call the
cops because my husband had the knives and was going to kill me.69
The wife's parents arrived; the police merely told the husband to go for
a walk. As soon as the officers left, the husband forced his way into the
apartment, knocked out four of the wife's teeth, and stabbed her
mother in the arm. As the police returned after being summoned by
neighbors, the husband pushed her father (who was much smaller in
stature) against the police car and began hitting him. The husband was
arrested and received a sixty-day sentence for stabbing his wife's
mother, but continued to threaten his wife. The affidavit states that
when she attempted to get a protective order from the Family Court, an
information desk attendant handed her a copy of the Police Depart-
ment Rules and said:
67. See, e.g., State v. Guido, 40 N.J. 191, 191 A.2d 45 (1963); People v. Eleuterio, 47 A.D.2d
803, 365 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1975); Part II infra.
68. E. PIZZEY, supra note 45, at 39. The police cannot provide a constant escort, and the
victim may be unaware of any effective legal remedies or dubious of their availability. See Affida-
vit of Marguerite Scott at 13-14, Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct.
1977), rev'd in part, appeal dismissed in part, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), aJ'd, 47
N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979). In a study of battered women conducted
by Dr. Elaine Hilberman of the University of North Carolina's School of Medicine, one of the
findings was that "these women were a study in paralyzing terror that was reminiscent of the rape
trauma syndrome" except that the traumatic events continue. Hilberman, supra note 55, at 1341.
69. Affidavit of Tina Candiano Mandola at 163-64, Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396
N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'dinpart, appeal dismissed inpart, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d
165 (1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
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'[Tihis is all you are getting.' He said, 'I don't care who sent you
here. If you don't want this paper then go home.' I said, what am I
supposed to do wait until he kills me to get an order of protection. The
man answered 'yes.'7 °
The belief that a battered spouse must derive pleasure from being
beaten apparently emanates from psychoanalytical theorizing about
wealthy European women in the early 1900's.7 1 Extensive recent stud-
ies rebut this supposition72 and identify certain consistent elements in
the battered women syndrome that can be empirically validated. The
victim initially believes that the assaultive spouse will change. 3 Subse-
quently, a major factor is "learned helplessness,"7 4 chronic depression
70. Id. at 166.
71. Affidavit of Dr. Clara Mayo in Support of Motion to Vacate Judgment at 3, People v.
Powell, No. 78-63 (Tompkins County CL, N.Y., filed Oct. 2, 1979). Dr. Mayo is a professor of
psychology at Boston University and a former president of the New England Psychological Asso-
ciation. The motion was denied without a hearing. The conviction of Mrs. Powell for killing her
husband was therefore left undisturbed. People v. Powell, No. 78-63, at 18 (Tompkins County Ct.,
N.Y., Jan. 15, 1980).
72. E.g., Hilberman, supra note 55, at 1339; D. MARTIN, supra note 19, at 79; L. WALKER,
THE BATTERED WOMAN 45-47 (1979); Rounsaville, Theories in Marital Vtolence: Evidencefrom a
Study ofBattered Women, 3 VIcriMoLoGY 11, 16,28 (1978). Dr. Bruce Rounsaville, Professor of
Psychiatry at Yale University, interviewed 37% of a group of battered women identified at the
Yale New Haven Hospital emergency room and the Counecticut Mental Health Center. There
has been judicial recognition of these studies. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, No. 12614 (D.C.
Oct. 15, 1979). But f H. DEUTSCH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 245-85 (1944) (arguments
supporting the position that women have a physiological need for punishment); S. FREUD, Analy-
sis Terminable and Interminable, in 23 THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND
FREUD 209 (J. Strachey ed. 1964).
73. D. MARTIN, supra note 19, at 79; Eisenberg & Seymour, The Self-Defense Plea andBat-
tered Women, 14 TRIAL 34,36 (July, 1978). One commentator has described the general phenom-
enon of ambivalence in terms of Dr. B.F. Skinners theory of random reinforcement:
In the face of a low but random payoff, the individual now and then receives some
reward, so that he is never quite willing to abandon the enterprise entirely. In any inti-
mate relationship, even one that has become corrosive and hateful in many respects, the
habitual patterns of interaction do yield from one day to the next a few rewards-a
memory of fun shared together once, a quick understanding when some outsider makes
a foolish statement, a casual pat on the shoulder. These do not outweigh the hurt and
the sense of injustice, but they continue to give some type of hope that things might be
improved. Few intimates can be so totally bent on constantly hurting the other that they
will not stop from time to time to support the continuance of the relationship for yet a
while.
Goode, Violence Among Intimates, in 13 CRIMES OF VIOLENCE: STAFF REPORT TO THE NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 941, 959 (1969). A more
elfin explanation of why women stay with abusive husbands is that women "believe that the love
of a good woman can save any man, that the ugly frog will turn into a prince once the princess
takes him into her bed and kisses him." E. PIZZEY, supra note 45, at 41. Significant economic
reasons are also a factor in the wives' decision to remain. See note 84 infra.
74. This is a condition first described by Dr. Martin Seligman in relation to his research with
dogs who were confined in cages and electrically shocked on an arbitrary and random basis. They
were taught that no matter what responses they made, the shocks could not be avoided. They
eventually stopped trying to escape; even when the cages were finally opened, they did not go out.
Recent research has linked the same principle to human subjects who are chronically depressed.
Weissman & Klerman, Sex Differences andthe Epidemology ofDepression, 34 ARCHIVES OF GEN-
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resulting from the inability to avert repetition of traumatic events.
Other victims of past violence show a similar pattern, except that in this
context the stress is "unending and the threat of assault ever present."' 5
In particular, observation of hundreds of battered women demon-
strated that when their attempts to avoid their husbands' violent and
irrational behavior proved useless (and outside help sporadic or alto-
gether unavailable), they eventually gave up the effort to control the
situation.76 The vast majority of such women had no history of depres-
sion prior to being abused by their partners and had not repeatedly
been drawn to physical or mental abuse as a life pattern."
One element in this passivity, accompanying the belief in the bat-
terer's omnipotence, may be a negative self-image-I shouldn't expect
any better, perhaps I don't deserve any better, I must put up with it.78
This is not the equivalent of seeking out trauma or desiring it. Another
element, or omen, is the complete repression of the victim's own rage.79
While the large-scale studies of interspousal assaults have concen-
trated primarily on the female victim, there are male victims as well.
The percentage of battered husbands is smaller, and they are injured
less severely and frequently than battered wives."' This appears to be a
ERAL PSYCHIATRY 98-111 (1977). See also L. WALKER, supra note 72, at 45-47; Prescott & Letko,
Battered Womew A Social Psychological Perspective, in BATrERED WOMEN 72, 84 (M. Roy ed.
1977).
75. Hilberman, supra note 55, at 1341. See Gil, A Conceptual Model of ChildAbuse and Its
Implicationsfor Social Policy, in BEHIND CLOSED DOOR: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY
205 (S. Steinmetz & M. Straus eds. 1974); Rounsaville, supra note 72, at 18; Weissman & Klerman,
supra note 74.
76. L. WALKER, supra note 72, at 47-5 1; Hilberman, supra note 55, at 1341. A large number
of victims have commented that the severity of the beating increased in proportion to the amount
of physical resistance shown. See Eisenberg & Micklow, supra note 66, at 145.
77. Rounsaville, supra note 72, at 16, 18. Dr. Lenore Walker has isolated three stages in the
cycle of battery that help explain why some women remain in the situation. The first stage is the
tension-building period that leads up to a major incident. In the second phase, the acute battering
occurs. After this, the batterer may be aware that he went too far and fear that his wife may leave
him. He becomes charming and exaggerated in his affection. It is this stage, not the abuse, which
the victim enjoys and hopes will remain predominant. L. WALKER, supra note 72, at 55-70.
78. See Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259, 260 (1971).
79. Hilberman, supra note 55, at 1342. Dr. Hilberman concluded:
Like rape victims, battered women rarely experienced their anger directly.... It is
probable that the constellation of passivity, guilt, intense fear of the unexpected, and
violent nightmares reflected not only fear of another assault but a constant struggle with
the self to contain and control aggressive impulses. The violent encounter with another
person's loss of control of aggression precipitates great anxiety about one's own control.
...Passivity and deninl of anger do not imply that the battered woman is adjusted to or
likes her situation. These are the last desperate defenses against homicidal rage.
Id.
80. The Attorney General cites us to statistics from the Staff Report submitted to the
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Vol. 2, p. 301) which
indicate that [conjugal] assaults committed by husbands upon wives as opposed to as-
saults committed by wives upon husbands approach the ratio of 15 to one (93.3% to
6.7%).
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consequence of the generally greater size, weight, and muscle develop-
ment of men rather than any male-female differential in attitude to-
wards the use of violence.8 1
There are, however, additional factors that weigh more heavily on
women seeking to extricate themselves from violent marriages than on
their male counterparts. These include the prevalent belief that it is
appropriate to permit husbands to prove masculinity by dominating
other family members," early socialization of women concerning de-
pendence, the social pressure on wives to "make the marriage work,"
People v. Cameron, 53 Cal. App. 3d 786, 796, 126 Cal. Rptr. 44, 50 (5th Dist. 1975). But see
Straus, *fe Beating, supra note I, at 446-49 (sample showed only a "slightly higher" incidence of
violent acts for husbands than for wives). One study supplies a graphic example of a battered
husband, a wealthy banker whose age and frailty made him the victim of a wife 31 years his
junior. The husband bore constant scars and bruises, his ear had once been shredded by his wife's
teeth, and one eye had been seriously injured. He obtained a divorce after 14 years. Steinmetz,
Wifebeating, Husbandbeating-A Comparison f the Use ofPhysical lence Between Spouses to
Resolve Marital Fights, in BATrERED WOMEN 63, 69-70 (M. Roy ed. 1977).
Data on female violence indicate a higher rate for acts not dependent on superior physical
strength, such as throwing objects. The data do not show, however, what proportion of the violent
acts by wives were in response to blows initiated by the husband. Straus, hre Beating, supra note
1, at 449 (citing Wolfgang, Victim-Precifitated Criminal Homicide, 48 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 1-11
(1957), reprinted in STUDIES IN HOMICIDE 72-87 (M. Wolfgang ed. 1967)).
81. "National statistics show that the average adult male is 28 pounds heavier and five
inches taller than the average adult female." People v. Cameron, 53 Cal. App. 3d 786, 791, 126
Cal. Rptr. 44, 47 (5th Dist. 1975).
Men can strike harder, pound for pound, than women can. They are far more skilled in
the use of all tools, have had far more training in combat and body contact sports from
their early childhood. More of them can shoot accurately and even own guns. Any
attack by a woman is much less likely to issue in a court case, even when her emotions
are as extreme, her urge to destroy as intense, simply because what she does is futile or
ineffective.
Goode, sulpra note 73, at 963. See comments of Straus cited in note 80 supra.
82. Participants in the National Conference for Family Violence Researchers noted that a
principal cause of family violence of all types is the abuse of power, the effort of a physically
stronger member to control the weaker ones. Dr. Murray A. Straus pointed out that "[i]t is easier
to control than to negotiate because to negotiate takes skills. If the dominant figure says this is the
way it is going to be, there is nothing his wife or child can say about it. All he has to do is back it
up with force." N.Y. Times, July 26, 1981, at 43, col. 4.
Abuse of power occurs because
[Ilamily statuses and roles are, to a very considerable extent, assigned on the basis of...
biological characteristics rather than on the basis of interest and competence. . . . Mhe
conflict potential is high because it is inevitable that not all husbands have the compe-
tence needed to fulfill the culturally prescribed leadership role ....
Straus, WI.fe Beating, supra note 1, at 452. See Allen & Straus, Resources, Power, and Husband-
W/#e Violence (1975) (paper presented at the National Council on Family Relations 1975 Annual
Meeting), reprinted in M. STRAus & G. HOTALING, THE SOCIAL CAUSES OF HUSBAND AND WIFE
VIOLENCE (1980); Kolb & Straus, Marital Power and Marital Happiness in Relation to Problem-
Solving,4biiity, 36 J. MARm. & FAM. 756, 761 (1974). However, the "ultimate resource" of physi-
cal force is available to maintain a superior position. 'Straus, Sexual Inequality, Cultural Norms,
and Wife Beating, I VICTIMOLOGY 54, 63 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Straus, Sexual Inequality],
reprinted in VICTIMS AND SOCIETY (E. Viano ed. 1976) and in WOMEN INTO WivEs (J. Chapman
& M. Gates eds. 1977). See Dobash & Dobash, supra note 19, at 434; Goode, Force and Violence
in the Family, 33 J. MARR. & FAM. 624 (1971); Straus, Cultural and Social Organizational Influ-
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and the wife's primary child-caring role. 83 The economic barriers may
also be formidable. The present statistical reality is that women have
fewer marketable job skills than men; that even if employed, they earn
only fifty-seven cents for every dollar earned by men for the same
work; and that women with children have particular difficulty in find-
ing day-care facilities and supporting themselves as single parents.8 4
And without effective protection from a husband who is physically
stronger and seeks retaliation, this economic deprivation would not be
offset by the subordinating benefit of safety.
Even assuming, however, that spouses who do not leave have
thereby consented to being assaulted-an assumption that seems some-
what tortured in light of the fact that most victims attempt to get pro-
tection very soon after the pattern of attacks begins8S--consent would
not immunize the attacker from prosecution. Just as there can be no
privilege to kill even on demand, there is no legally valid permission to
inflict serious physical injury on a consenting victim. 6 The fact that a
ences on Violence Between Family Members, in CONFIGURATIONS 53 (R. Prince & D. Barrier eds.
1974).
The presumption of male leadership is also embedded in legal principles. Husbands are con-
sidered the head of the household and the wife's domicile follows theirs. See Straus, A Soclologl-
cal Persective on the Prevention and Treatment of Wfebeating, in BATTERED WOMEN 194, 209 (M.
Roy ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Straus, Sociological Perspective].
83. D. MARTIN, supra note 19, at 45; L. WALKER, supra note 72, at 35; Dobash & Dobash,
supra note 19, at 426-32; Straus, Sexual Inequality, supra note 82, at 62-66; Straus, Societal Mor-
phogenesis andlntra-Family Volence in Cross-Cultural Perspective, 285 ANNALS N.Y. AcAD. Sci.
719, 720-24 (1977); Straus, SociologicalPerspective, supra note 82, at 208-19; Straus, W#fe Beating,
supra note 1, at 450.
84. Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 7, 16
(1978). "We found that women who were unemployed, had not completed high school... and
had younger children, were less likely to seek a divorce or outside assistance after being beaten."
Gelles, No Place to Go: The Social Dynamics of Marital Violence, in BATTERED WOMEN 46, 60
(M. Roy ed. 1977). See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION, WO-
MEN'S BUREAU, THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN MEN AND WOMEN 1 (1976); Casefor LegalReme-
dies, supra note 51, at 139-40.
A witness at public hearings on the problems of domestic violence in Michigan testified: "It's
not that easy to get out when you have kids and no job, no car, no money, and nowhere to go..
You're changing your whole life. It's not that easy." MICHIGAN HEARINGS, supra note 18, at 123.
The demand for space in the shelters for battered women which provide temporary housing,
protection and counseling far exceeds the supply. Roy, A Current Survey of 150 Cases, in BAT-
TERED WOMEN 25, 32 (M. Roy ed. 1977); Woods, supra, at 32. In New York City the three
shelters for battered women and their children served a total of approximately 1,300 families in
1978. COMMUNITY COUNCIL OF GREATER NEW YORK, TRENDS AND FORECASTS: A REPORT ON
HUMAN SERVICES IN NEW YORK CITY 2 (1979).
85. Roy, A Current Survey of 150 Cases, in BATTERED WOMEN 25, 32 (M. Roy ed. 1977).
86. R. PERKINs, supra note 6, at 962. Cf. Breaker v. State, 103 Ohio St. 670, 671-72, 134 N.E.
479, 480 (1967), stating:
A statutory crime is not a private wrong, but a public wrong.... It is the state that is
prosecuting the violation of its statute, on its own behalf and not on behalf of the victim
.... A father would naturally not be inclined to prosecute his own son.., but it
would be none the less a crime, and the state's obligation would be none the less to
prosecute.
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masochist has acquiesced in receiving a severe beating by a sadist is no
defense to an assault charge.87 A defendant who cut off the hand of a
"lustie rogue" to enable him to be a more appealing beggar was guilty
of mayhem despite the rogue's request88 Participants engaging in an
angry fist fight by mutual consent, exchanging blows intended or likely
to cause serious bodily injury, are both guilty of assault and battery. 89
The only exceptions to this rule are actions that, though injurious, are
carried out for a valid purpose, such as a surgical amputation or a box-
ing match played in accordance with the rules governing the game.90
Thus, the presumption of consent on the part of a domestic violence
victim cannot serve to legitimate a marital exclusion from the assault
law.
Tributary to the consent theory is the contention that since the vic-
tim will reconcile with the assailant before the time comes to testify,
violence in the home need not be treated as an assault. This argument
has both factual and legal deficiencies. It is evident that victims of
crimes are more likely to testify against a stranger than against some-
one they know.91 However, that fact alone does not authenticate the
further presumption that spouses are reluctant because a reconciliation
has taken place. In domestic violence cases, prosecutors may establish
a gauntlet of procedures that discourage spouses from pressing for
prosecution. The "Catch 22" explanation for this is that since victims
will not follow through on the case, they must be diverted into nonen-
See note 17 supra with respect to the incidence of teenage children injuring their parents, and
intrafamilial injuries to the elderly.
Unreported crimes may never be uncovered by the state, but this is a fact rather than a legal
prerogative of the victim. Although the crime of assault is conveniently classified as an offense
"against the person," this is merely a convenient shorthand for "an offense against the State in the
form of injury to the person." Therefore, a private individual generally has no authority to settle
or condone such a public wrong, even if he is the victim of it. R. PERKINS, supra note 6, at 975.
Exceptions to this principle must be specifically provided for by statute, as, for example, Califor-
nia's enactment permitting the compromise of a misdemeanor for which the injured person has a
civil action. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1377-1379 (West 1970 & Supp. 1980) (note that § 1377 pre-
cludes compromise of most violations of an order of protection). See VA. CODE § 19.2-151 (1975).
Even these provisions bar condonation where there are aggravated circumstances.
87. People v. Samuels, 250 Cal. App. 2d 501, 58 Cal. Rptr. 439 (Ist Dist. 1967); Common-
wealth v. Farrell, 322 Mass. 606, 621, 78 N.E.2d 697, 705 (1948), quoted with approval from The
King v. Donovan, [1934] 2 K.B. 498, 507, that such an assault was prohibited if it caused any
injury which would interfere with the victim's health or comfort, and that the injury need not be
permanent but must be more than merely transient or trifling.
88. Wright's Case, Co. Litt. 127a (1604).
89. State v. Newland, 27 Kan. 764 (1882); Commonwealth v. Collberg, 119 Mass. 350 (1876);
The King v. Donovan, [1934] 2 K.B. 498; Regina v. Coney, 8 Q.B.D. 534 (1882).
90. People v. Fitzsimmons, 34 N.Y.S. 1102, 1108-09 (Onondaga County Court of Sessions
1895). See 81 HAav. L. Rav. 1339, 1339 (1968) (differentiating surgery and sporting events from
conduct "with no apparent social utility").
91. F. CANNAVALE & W. FALcoN, WrrIss COOPERATION 71 (1976); Vera Institute of Jus-
tice, Felony Arrests: Their Prosecution and Disposition in New York City's Courts 31 (1977).
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forcement channels.92 Furthermore, the claim that the victim has will-
ingly withdrawn from the action is scarcely persuasive if the dormant
state of the prosecution leaves the assailant free to threaten retaliation
for proceeding.93 By contrast, in some of the jurisdictions where prose-
cutors have treated interspousal attacks as crimes against the state and
were firm in pursuing them, the complaining witnesses cooperated in
more than ninety percent of the cases where charges were filed. 4
Regardless of the reasons for the inaction of some spouses, a clas-
sification that exempts all domestic assaults cannot be justified by a
conclusive presumption that no spouse will testify in such a case. In a
series of decisions spanning many substantive areas, the Supreme
Court has required that those faced with a deprivation of government
services be given an opportunity to demonstrate that their motives and
capabilities entitle them to be treated like other potential recipients.95
Consideration of whether Jones will testify in a particular prosecution
is appropriate; an irrebuttable presumption that Smith will withdraw
because Jones did is not.
The consent argument fails because it seeks to distinguish assaults
92. R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS 179-80 (1977). See Com-
ment, h' !fe Beating: Law and Society Confront the Castle Door, 15 GONZ. L. REV. 171 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Castle Door]; Casefor Legal Remedies, supra note 51, at 149 & n.99; Hall of
Mirrors, supra note 59, at 582. Preliminary referrals to bureaus within the prosecutor's office for
hearings, or to outside agencies for counseling are among these devices. Parnas, Prosecutorial and
Judicial Handling of Famiol Violence, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 733, 735-47 (1973); Casefor Legal Reme-
&ies, supra note 51, at 149-50. Yet, as noted in the recently revised Training Key #245, supra note
65, at 150, some prosecutions can proceed without testimony from the victim or from witnesses
present during the assault itself. "Felony cases.. can be pursued if there exists strong circum-
stantial and physical evidence."
93. Prosecutors have become increasingly aware of the victim's vulnerability to intimidation
and to the discouraging effects of trial delays and adjournments. New York law now explicitly
permits courts to keep the location of a witness secret as a protective measure. N.Y. Times, Aug.
7, 1981, § B, at 2, col. 5. The National District Attorneys Association has recommended that cases
which involve serious threat of future harm be expedited, and that a victim-support or advocate
program be instituted in prosecutors' offices to inform victims about the criminal process and to
refer them to necessary support services. Fromson, The Prosecutor'r Responsibilities in Spouse
Abuse Cases, in NATIONAL DISTRICT ATrORNEYS ASSOCIATION, THE VICTIM ADVOCATE (Orange
Cover) 11 (1978). In addition to fear of reprisal, witnesses sometimes fail to appear because too
much time would be lost from work for repeated court appearances or because child care would
have to be arranged for such appearances. Response, supra note 22, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 3. Acceler-
ation of the proceeding would meet these problems.
94. For a detailed exposition of the procedures utilized by such prosecutors, see Response,
supra note 22, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 5-9. Conviction rates have been high; in Westchester County, for
example, 119 batterers were convicted during the first six months of 1980. Only three were acquit-
ted. Id. at 5.
95. Eg., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (public employment); United States
Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (food stamps); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441
(1973) (reduced tuition fees for state residents); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972) (state workmen's compensation benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (wel-
fare benefits).
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that are permitted or forgiven from all others, and because it seeks to
characterize all domestic attacks as permitted or forgiven. As we have
seen, consent to a beating has no legal significance, nor can a priori
assertions of forgiveness preclude an entire class of citizens from access
to the criminal justice apparatus.
Refusal to arrest and prosecute conjugal assailants is justified
neither by claims that family sanctity will be enhanced nor by claims of
consent. While equal protection demands no "mathematical nicety,"9 6
the equation of a spouse's broken arm with that of any other victim
hardly requires fastidious precision. Since the two kinds of victims are
graphically similar in their situation, any classification penalizing only
nonfamilial assault is underinclusive.97 The fourteenth amendment
may be viewed as guaranteeing the right to equal treatment, 98 includ-
ing access to municipal and judicial services. Or it may be interpreted
as encompassing the right to treatment as an equal-governmental de-
cisions must accord a spouse the same regard as a person that is ac-
corded nonspouses.9 9 Under either formulation, exemption of
domestic violence from the assault laws would be prohibited.
b. Civil Adjuncts to Assault Statutes
Does equal protection permit any variants in approaching conju-
gal attacks? May such violence be dealt with by levying more severe
criminal penalties than for nonfamilial assaults or by provision of con-
current civil remedies?
A few jurisdictions"° have made spouse battery a separate felony,
96. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
97. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949).
98. See, eg., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (a citizen has a constitutionally
protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens); Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) ("all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right to vote").
With reference to equal access to municipal services, see Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, Miss., 437
F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) which reversed the district court's dismissal of a class action suit by
black residents of the town for an injunction restraining town officials from discriminating be-
cause of race in providing inhabitants with municipal services.
99. See L. TRmE, supra note 15, at 992-93; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down a
mandatory provision of Idaho's Probate Code which gave preference to men over women as ad-
ministrators of estates). "[W]hatever may be said as to the positive values of avoiding intrafamily
controversy, the choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on the basis of sex.'
Id. at 76-77.
100. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West Supp. 1980), which reads as follows:
(a) Any person who willfully inflicts upon his or her spouse, or any person who willfully
inflicts upon any person of the opposite sex with whom he or she is cohabiting, corporal
injury resulting in a traumatic condition, is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction
thereof shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 2, 3, or 4 years, or in
the county jail for not more than one year.
(b) Holding oneself out to be the husband or wife of the person with whom one is co-
habiting is not necessary to constitute cohabitation as the term is used in this section.
From 1945, when this law was first enacted, until its amendment in 1977, it referred not to "any
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engendering challenges under the eighth amendment based on the
"cruel and unusual" length of sentence, and under the fourteenth
amendment because of more favorable treatment for nonspouse assail-
ants. In People v. Cameron 101 the California Supreme Court persua-
sively justified the differential between spouses and nonspouses by
citing deficiencies in the assault law's application to domestic violence.
Unlike most assaults, the court held, interspousal attacks are
usually accomplished with fists and kicking as in this case.102 The se-
verity of the injuries are therefore not always capable of instant diagno-
sis .... [Ain officer responding to a wifebeating case would
ordinarily, in the exercise of caution and to avoid a charge of false ar-
rest, only arrest the husband under the provisions of. . .[the assault
law] in extreme cases. Even the infliction upon a wife of considerable
traumatic injury would tend to be treated by the arresting officer as a
misdemeanor which would produce the consequences of the wife's be-
ing left in the home to face possible further aggression.'0 3 But an of-
ficer given the alternative of arresting for a felony under the ...
[spouse abuse law] may do so when he observes traumatic injury. n
While there appears to be little impetus towards passage of more
specialized criminal statutes,0" a substantial number of jurisdictions
have created civil adjuncts to the existing laws, or provided that the
person," but to "any husband" inflicting injury "on his wife." Additionally, until a 1976 amend-
ment, it provided for a maximum often years in prison. See other statutes listed in note 22 supra.
101. 53 Cal. App. 3d 786, 126 Cal. Rptr. 44 (5th Dist. 1975). Defendant based his appeal
primarily on the grounds that the spouse abuse statute under which he was convicted was uncon-
stitutional because it denied him equal protection of the law in that it applied only to husbands
and not to wives. See note 100 supra.
102. The facts in Cameron were that the wife, Joyce, was asleep and
was awakened by her husband who had seized her by a breast and was twisting it. Jack
[her husband] told Joyce that he intended to hurt her and thereupon slapped and kicked
her and threw her off the bed. He told Joyce that he had once knocked a woman's teeth
out because she talked too much and since she (Joyce) did not listen he was going to
have to 'fix' her ears so she would never hear again. Defendant continued to strike and
shake Joyce and kicked her after he had jerked her off the bed onto the floor. In the
course of the melee Joyce's nose was broken, her left ear was cut requiring considerable
surgical intervention. Her face and body bore marks of trauma.
The affray concluded by defendant's forcibly dragging his wife into the bathroom
and placing her under the shower after having torn off her nightgown.
Joyce's eleven-year-old daughter, who had been awakened by the commotion, ran
next door to get help for her mother. The authorities were called and defendant was
arrested.
Id. at 788, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
103. The officer would not be empowered to make an arrest unless the misdemeanor were
committed in his presence, and a citizen's arrest by the wife was considered "unlikely." The wife
may be unable to leave her children, or have no other refuge. Id. at 792, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 47-48.
104. id. at 793, 126 CaL Rptr. at 48.
105. A Maryland proposal making spouse abuse a separate crime punishable by imprison-
ment and fines was defeated in the House. Md. H. 1775, 1976 Sess. In Georgia, a specific wife
beating statute was repealed, with the intent that the area be covered by the general law. GA.
CODE ANN. § 26-1305, Commentary at 101 (1972), citedin Note, WifeAbuse: The Failure ofLegal
Remedies, 11 J. MAmu. PRAc. & PROC. 549, 551 n.ll (1978).
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family court and the criminal courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction
over assaults between spouses.1 6 If these enactments precluded the
possibility of imposing the same criminal penalties for breaking a
spouse's hip as for breaking a stranger's, they could not survive the
fourteenth amendment's mandate. However, the civil alternatives pres-
ently in existence do not appear to effect such a preclusion, although
some require the complainant to elect either a criminal or civil ap-
proach, or require the prosecutor to do so after careful evaluation of
the individual facts in the case. 10 7 Rather, these additional provisions
have two purposes: 1) to shore up defects in the application of the
assault statutes to the unique aspect of domestic violence-continuing
attacks in jointly occupied premises, and 2) to provide greater flex-
ibility in the range and nature of available penalties.10
The most significant feature of the adjunct statutes is their concen-
tration on effective orders of protection. Pennsylvania's Protection
From Abuse Act, for example, establishes a civil procedure which
"shall be in addition to any other available civil or criminal reme-
dies."' 0 9 After a hearing, which must be held within ten days after the
filing of a petition by an abused spouse, the court may direct the de-
fendant to refrain from attacking the plaintiff, grant temporary posses-
sion of the residence to plaintiff (or by consent decree allow defendant
to provide suitable alternative housing), and award temporary custody
of minor children.' 10 Temporary ex parte orders of protection may be
granted upon a showing of immediate and present danger of abuse,'
and if court is not in session, a district justice is empowered to grant
such relief. 1
2
106. Eg., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (29A) § 812 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
107. Eg., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (29A) § 812(2)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1980-81); D.C. CODE EN-
CYCL. § 16-1002 (West Bound Supp. 1970). The New York Court hearing the civil case may
transfer the matter to criminal court even after such an election, on consent of the victim. N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT (29A) § 813 (McKinney Supp. 1980-8 1), and the D.C. Family Division may dismiss
prior to the taking of evidence and refer the matter back to the United States attorney for possible
action. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-1006 (West Bound Supp. 1970). A subsequent offense is not, of
course, bound by the prior election.
108. These approaches have been extensively chronicled. See, e.g., Woods, supra note 84;
Hall of Mirrors, supra note 59; Castle Door, supra note 92.
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10189 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1980).
110. Id. §§ 10185(a), 10186. As amended, § 10186(a)(5) authorizes the court to direct defend-
ant to pay temporary support and child care. A Massachusetts statute includes similar relief pro-
visions with the addition of "monetary compensation for losses suffered as a direct result of the
abuse. Compensatory losses shall include, but not be limited to, loss of earnings or support, out-
of-pocket losses for injuries sustained, moving expenses and reasonable attorney fees." MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 3(e) (West Supp. 1980).
111. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of such orders, see Taub, Exparte
Proceedings in Domestic Violence Situations: Alternative Frameworksfor Constitutional Scrutiny, 9
HOFSTRA L. Rv. 95 (1980).
112. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 10185(b), 10188(a) (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1980). Legislative
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Thus, civil provisions may not only supply essential synapses in
the existing assault laws but also, as the court in Montalvo v. Mon-
talvo I 3 noted in relation to the New York statute, create "a construc-
tive middle way, short of either criminally prosecuting or ignoring the
violation of law." This middle road "might be helpful to the family in
the sense that the husband's presence in the community under an order
of protection and his continuance in his employment without a crimi-
nal record might be important to his children." '14 This is a valuable
alternative; indeed, as previously indicated, the criminal law similarly
offers dispositional flexibility-based on case-by-case analysis-which
may avoid interruption of employment or stigmatization as a misde-
meanant or felon. 1 5
The limitations of a civil or "treatment" model should be recog-
nized, however. Resources for diagnostic, curative, and follow-up serv-
ices to violent spouses are presently inadequate," 16 and there is little
evidence that taxpayers or private donors will be disposed to expand
them. Moreover, this approach cannot reach uncooperative assailants
who interpret a referral to a social agency or expert as an indication
that society does not view attacks against a spouse as serious.' 17
consideration has also been given to making such orders operative. Pennsylvania requires that
copies be served on the plaintiff, the defendant, and the local police department. Id. § 10187.
Special notification requirements of this nature are particularly appropriate because unlike most
assaults, domestic violence occurs repeatedly between the same parties, and this prior history must
dictate the arresting officer's course of conduct. The Protection from Abuse Act authorizes a po-
lice officer to arrest without a warrant if he has probable cause to believe that a person has vio-
lated an order of protection, whether or not the violation is committed in his presence. Id.
§ 10190.
113. 55 Misc. 2d 699, 704, 286 N.Y.S.2d 605, 611 (Faro. Ct. 1968).
114. Id. at 702-03, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 610.
115. See note 57 and accompanying text supra. A sound decision depends upon the judge
having complete information on the nature of the injury inflicted and the past history of injuries.
116. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration's Family Violence Program is being
phased out in fiscal year 1981 due to a severe cutback in the agency's funding, and local financing
is scarce.
Some of the Family Violence Program grantees are still looking for funds to stay in
operation when their LEAA money runs out. Many project staffs report that because
state and local governments have cut human services budgets this year, they are unable
to support the services battered women need. As one project director put it, 'There's not
a whole lot of money out there-everyone's grasping at straws. And there's very intense
competition for the funds that do exist.'
Response, supra note 22, Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 4. See J. FLEMING, STOPPINo WIFE ABUsE 296
(1979); Parnas, JudicialReponse to Intra-Family Violence, 54 MINN. L. REV. 585, 591 (1970); Case
for LegalRemedes, supra note 51, at 148 n.90. Existing therapy programs are described in Flem-
ing's work at 296-309. See Dullea, A Center Where W!fe Beaters Receive Counseling Man to Man,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1980, § 1, at 24, coL 1. Dr. Hilberman notes that a violent spouse is more
likely to seek help when he no longer has access to the victim. Hilberman, supra note 55, at 1345.
117. See text accompanying note 58 supra; POLICE FORUM, supra note 64, at 61. A study of
battering men involved in a pilot treatment program at American Lake Veterans Hospital in Ta-
coma, Washington, found.
One characteristic that seems common in most men who batter is a pattern of minimi-
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Domestic assault cannot be fully analyzed by focusing on treat-
ment of individuals or couples, nor is it necessarily indicative of mental
illness. There is considerable evidence that social conditioning is an
important factor in the increase or decrease of violence.'1 8  "Accept-
able" levels of such violence, even for those who claim to have lost
control of themselves, are often culturally determined.119 The penalty
accorded is part of this determination.
The law must have teeth as well as tongue.120 Assaults have been
punishable as crimes throughout our history not only because a gross
violation of personal security has been perceived as a threat second
only to homicide, but also because persuasion and supervision are in-
sufficient without the ultimate sanction of incarceration. 12 1 Professor
ing and denying. They tend to minimize the seriousness of their violent behavior to
themselves as well as to others. Although at one time they may answer in detail specific
questions about their severe beatings, they may then turn around and say "it wasn't that
ad." Even in a treatment program they will alternate between full recognition of their
violence to a denial that they have any problem with it.
A. Ganley & L. Harris, Domestic Violence: Issues in Designing and Implementing Programs for
Male Batterers (1978), cited in POLICE FORUM, supra note 64, at 22.
118. Rounsaville, supra note 72, at 18.
119. See Straus, SexualInequality, supra note 82, at 58. See also M. STRAUS, R. GELLES & S.
STEINmETZ, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 237 (1980); Goode, supra note 73, at 951; Straus, Culturaland
Social Organizational Influences on Violence Between Family Members, in CONFIGURATIONS 53,
53 (R. Prince & D. Barrier eds. 1974).
120. Mediation, which often involves only one session with a third person who has no author-
ity over either party, appears to be the least effective method of reducing violence. A 1980 evalua-
tion of the Neighborhood Justice Centers, a group of government-funded mediation projects,
concluded that this approach had generally been unsuccessful in family battery cases. Relegation
of such cases to mediation trivializes the physical injuries involved and permits a battering hus-
band to focus on the victim's failure to please him. For example, mediation agreements often
include the wife's commitment to "have dinner ready on time, . . . clean the house more thor-
oughly, and not ... nag her mate about his drinking problem." In contrast, prosecution tells the
abuser that he is committing a crime and he faces incarceration if he does not stop-a critical
message because domestic assailants tend to rely on external controls to provide limits on what is
permissible. Response, supra note 22, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 16-17. See also notes 117-19 and accom-
panying text supra and note 124 infra. Mediators have no power to enforce agreements or jail
assailants.
121. See text accompanying note 123 infra. This is not to suggest that the social phenomenon
of spouse battering should be countered only through legislation or litigation. While long term
sociological approaches are beyond the scope of this Article, a number of commentators have
supplied valuable hypotheses as to the causes of family violence: (1) "compulsive masculinity,"
the complex of traits popularly known as "machismo," Bacon, Child & Barry, A Cross-Cultural
Study of Correlates of Crime, 66 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 291, 293, 298 (1963); Straus, Sexual
Inequality, supra note 82, at 63; Straus, Societal Morphogenesis and Intrafamily Violence in Cross-
CulturalPerspective, 285 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. ScI. 719,722 (1977); Toby, Violence and the Mascu-
line Ideal: Some Qualitative Data, 364 ANNALS Am. ACAD. POL ScI. & Soc. ScI. 19, 20-21 (1966),
reprinted in S. STEINMETZ & M. STRAUS, VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY 58 (1974); see note 82 supra;
(2) the level of violence in society, Straus, A Sociological Perspective, supra note 82, at 199-202;
(3) stress created by low income and a low status occupation, Straus, Social Stress and Marital
Violence in a National Sample ofAmerican Families, 347 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 247 (1980);
(4) generational imitation, Steinmetz, Mfebeath& Husbandbeating-A Comparison of the Use of
Physical Violence Between Spouses to Resolve Marital Fights, in BATTERED WOMEN 63, 70 (M.
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H.L.A. Hart has observed that many theories for justifying punishment
"are in spite of their protestations disguised forms of Utilitarianism."122
The notion that penalties must achieve a practical result is of ancient
origin. Seneca taught that the criminal law aims at three ends: "Either
that it may correct him whom it punishes, or that his punishment may
render other men better, or that, by bad men being put out of the way,
the rest may live without fear."' 23
Certainty of punishment is critical to its impact. 124 Some defend-
ants may be deterred by an immediate arrest, a judicial warning that
jail will be the next stop if the attack is repeated, and issuance of an
order of protection-without the wink or yawn that has accompanied
such measures in the past.1 25  For others, even a brief prison term
Roy ed. 1977); (5) economics, O'Brien, Violence in Divorce Prone Families, J. MARR. & FAM. 692,
695-96 (1971); and (6) alcoholism, Roy,, Current Survey of 150 Cases in BATTERED WOMEN 25,
42 (M. Roy ed. 1977); Goode, supra note 73, at 954; SAN DIEOO POLICE DEP'T, POLICE TACTICS IN
HAzARDous SrrUATIONS 194-95 (1976).
122. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 9 (1968).
123. L. SENECA, On Mercy I xxii, I, in MORAL ESSAYS.
124. The prime penological goal of deterrence is premised on such certainty. Smith refrains
from committing an unlawful act because he believes it is probable that if he does it, he will be
caught and imprisoned. With respect to most crimes, the threshold difficulty lies in detection and
capture. A bank robber's comment is typical: "They didn't catch me, they're not aware that I'm
working on it, and everything goes smoothly .... Another robber noted: "I think this is every-
body's feeling--that they'll never get caught." C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 82 (1978). In domestic assault cases, identification of Smith is easy. It is Smith's arrest,
prosecution, and sentencing that is improbable.
-Evidence of a correlation between certainty and deterrence is circumstantial but rather dra-
matic. The number of felonious assaults declined almost 30% in one New York City precinct
where police personnel were doubled for a four-month period. Sellin, The Law and Some Aspects
of Criminal Conduct, in AIMS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 113, 119-20 (Conard ed. 1955).
Nationally, scientific advances in detecting poisons were followed by a decrease in the incidence
of poisonings. Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects oftPunishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949,
962 (1966). At the other end of the spectrum, immobilization of the police force during the his-
toric crises in Europe was accompanied by widespread increases in crime. Id. at 961-62.
With specific reference to spouse battering, counsel in Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396
N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd in part, appeal dismissedinpart, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d
165 (1978), aft'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979), have been advised that
some assailants had stopped attacking their spouses as a consequence of being arrested or of read-
ing about the new arrest policy of the New York City Police Department arrived at by consent
decree. See Woods, supra note 84, at 31. A New York Post headline, Wife-Beaters Beware, Ar.
rests on Way, June 27, 1978, at 4, was one source of information as to the policy.
125. See suggestion of Lt. Rosko discussed in note 57 supra. In spouse abuse cases there has
never been certainty of punishment or full enforcement of the assault laws. See notes 58, 69-70
and accompanying text supra.
Few batterers voluntarily participate in counseling. However, some jurisdictions have insti-
tuted court-ordered diversion programs in which an assailant faced with criminal prosecution
elects to enter long term group therapy with other batterers. Diversion is utilized only if the
defendant is sincerely attempting to change rather than manipulate the system. Data emerging
from such programs indicates that behavioral improvement is more likely when the following
factors are present: (1) defendant has had no prior arrest for a violent crime; (2) treatment com-
mences within 24 hours of a battering incident, so that defendant finds it difficult to deny his
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meted out under civil provisions 26 fails to prevent recidivism, and the
longer period of restraint authorized by the assault law is the only effec-
tive shield against further crimes. 127
c. Nonenforcement as a Violation of Equal Protection
Z Thepattern of executive andjudicial action. It is a familiar ab-
straction that "[iln our tripartite system of government, the three
branches are co-equal, and the Constitution is superior to each branch.
The supremacy of the Constitution, the supremacy of the consent of the
governed, requires that each branch adhere to constitutional principles
in the exercise of its powers."' 28 One might therefore construct the fol-
lowing progression. A legislative enactment punishing only an assail-
ant who seriously injures "a person other than his spouse" would create
an irrational classification. The executive and judicial branches, fet-
tered by a parallel incapacity under the equal protection clause, may
not create such a classification. Furthermore, nonenforcement of the
assault laws against domestic violators is constitutionally indistinguish-
able from affirmative promulgation of an unlawful category.
The third step in the syllogism can neither be summarily rejected,
nor accepted without exploration of its ramifications. Can discrimina-
tion be inferred from a pattern of nonenforcement? Can such discrimi-
nation be adjudicated by the victim of a third party's unlawful
conduct? Does equal protection require enforcement of the criminal
laws against every violator?
As to the first of these questions, consider the vintage case of Yick
Wo v. Hopkins.129 The Supreme Court there reversed a conviction
under a municipal ordinance "fair on its face and impartial in appear-
ance"' 30 that prohibited the construction of wooden laundries without
a license. All but one of the eighty non-Chinese applicants had re-
ceived licenses, while all two hundred Chinese applicants had been re-
recent conduct; and (3) defendant is aware that prosecution will recommence and that he risks
incarceration if he commits another assault or drops out of the diversion program. Response,
supra note 22, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 11-14.
126. The New York Family Court Act, for example, authorizes a sentence of up to six months
for one who willfully disobeys a court-imposed order of protection. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (29A)
§ 846-a (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
127. See notes 117, 120, & 124 supra. As the court noted in Montalvo v. Montalvo, 55 Misc.
2d 699, 704, 286 N.Y.S.2d 605, 611 (Fam. Ct. 1968): "This court must be mindful of the value of
criminal prosecution as a deterrent to violence in the community, and of the retributive function
of the criminal law in cases of willful serious injuries."
128. United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1978) (conviction for failure to
file income tax return upheld because defendant did not establish prima facie that he was singled
out for prosecution because of his prominence in tax protest movement and that others similarly
situated were not generally prosecuted).
129. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
130. Id. at 373.
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jected by discretionary decision of the licensors. The Court concluded
on the basis of these undisputed facts that the municipality had based
its determinations on an impermissible category. Subsequent cases in-
terpreted Yick Wo as having established that the fourteenth amend-
ment "covers the unequal enforcement of valid laws, as well as any
enforcement of invalid laws."' 13' These decisions have generally fo-
cused on the invalidity of enforcing the prohibition against group A but
not group B, rather than the impropriety of denying enforcement as to
B.
There is extensive legislative history, however, demonstrating that
the fourteenth amendment and its implementation in the 1871 Civil
Rights Act 32 were grounded upon concern over police refusal to en-
force facially nondiscriminatory criminal statutes so as to protect black
victims as a class against Ku Klux Klan assaults. The congressional
authority for passage of the act stemmed from the fourteenth amend-
ment's prohibition against "systematic failure to make arrests, to put on
trial, to convict, or to punish" "for the protection of some class of per-
sons" when such enforcement is accorded to another class. 33
Discriminatory enforcement policies as to conjugal violence can be
found in official statements as well as individual cases. 134 The Michi-
131. East Coast Lumber Terminal v. Town of Babylon, 174 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1949)
(where state affords adequate remedy against unjust application of its laws by its officials, ag-
grieved person must exhaust those remedies before invoking fourteenth amendment); Great Am.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 384 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring); Personnel
Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72 (1979) (veteran preference in civil service positions not a
violation of equal protection).
132. Section I of the Act, originally called the Ku Klux Act, 17 Stat. 13 (1871), is now at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). In arguing for passage of the act, Congressman Perry of Ohio eloquently
described the reasons for its necessity:
Sheriffs having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear not; witnesses con-
ceal the truth or falsify it; grand and petit juries act as if they might be accomplices. In
the presence of these gangs all the apparatus and machinery of civil government, all the
processes of justice, skulk away as if government and justice were crimes and feared
detection.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. at App. 78.
133. Id. at 459, 334. See also id. at 416, 482, 505-06, 606-08, 697, App. 251-52, App. 315. It is
interesting to note that, in the view of the 42nd Congress, "denial" of rights--the phrase used in
the equal protection clause--could be effected by omission, while "deprivation"-the term in the
due process clause-required affirmative action. Thus, the scope of the enforcement power under
the equal protection clause was interpreted as broader than under other parts of the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 459, 482, 505-06, 514, 607-08, 697, App. 251, App. 315.
134. A victim testified at a Michigan hearing:
The first time I called the sheriff, my husband... threw me out the back door and down
the steps, and told me he was going to bash the baby's head in. He had a monkey
wrench in his hand, and he said if I came near the house again, he would kill the baby.
So I went across to the neighbor's, called the sheriff, and in turn was told, "We cannot
help you."
MICHIGAN HEARINGS, supra note 18, at 45. An attorney stated that his client
called me from the emergency room of the hospital. She was so severely battered that
she was one bruise from head to toe, and she said her husband was outside harassing her.
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gan Police Training Academy procedure, for example, differentiates
domestic assaults from others and directs officers to try to avoid arrest-
ing the attacker. Victims are told that courts are not in session and that
no judge is available.'35 These directions, which are similar to proce-
dures in other jurisdicitions, "I are remarkable for their failure to pred-
icate arrest on relevant criteria such as seriousness of the injury, use of
weapons, acts of violence committed in the officer's presence, or out-
standing orders of protection indicating repeated prior attacks. 137
I called the police department. They would do nothing about it I called the sheriff's
department and learned that an officer was at the hospital on another case. I called him
there and read him the terms of a prior protective order. He hung up on me.
Id. at 77. See also Sorichetti v. City of New York, 95 Misc. 2d 451 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Bruno v.
Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 1048-50, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 975-77 (Sup. Ct 1977), rev'd in part, appeal
dismissed in part, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), afi'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976,
419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
Domestic violence calls are assigned a low priority status regardless of the possible severity of
the injuries. Casefor Legal Remedies, supra note 51, at 144. Some requests for help are simply
"screened out" by police personnel, and neither responded to nor officially recorded. J. Bannon,
supra note 17, at 6. A recent federally funded report has recommended substantial changes in
police operators' handling of such calls. Police are to gather as much information as possible
about the case to relay to the responding officers, including when the assault occurred, whether a
weapon was used, the whereabouts of the victim and assailant, the seriousness of any injuries,
whether children are present, and if either party has been drinking alcohol. POLICE FORUM, supra
note 64, at 83.
135. Officers are also to advise the defendant and the victim as follows: "State that your only
interest is to prevent a breach of the peace." Casefor Legal Remedies, supra note 51, at 145.
James Bannon, Executive Deputy Chief of the Detroit Police Department, has noted that some
police share society's view of females in general as secondary. J. Bannon, supra note 17, at 4.
"The man is the boss, the owner, the female the subordinate." Id. at 2. It has also been found that
since officers are "trained, socialized, and rewarded" for apprehending and arresting nondomestic
felons, "they often resent the victim for distracting them from their preferred crime-fighting activi-
ties." POLICE FORUM, supra note 64, at 4. In addition, these law enforcement decisions are influ-
enced by the unwillingness of district attorneys and judges to prosecute and sentence domestic
assailants. Id. at 47.
136. Eg., City of Oakland, Calif., Police Services, Techniques of Dispute Intervention 2-3
(1975), cited in Martin, Battered Wome" Society's Problem, in THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN
116 (J. Chapman & M. Gates eds. 1978) (recently modified, see POLICE FORUM, supra note 64, at
77 n.16); International Association of Chiefs of Police, Disorderly Conduct and Domestic Com-
plaints, Handling Domestic Complaints, POLICE REFERENCE NOTEBOOK Unit 4A5 (2d ed. 1969),
cited in Woods, supra note 84 at 9 nn.15 & 16; New York City Police Department, Police Patrol
Guide §§ 110-1 to -38 (Oct. 1, 1972), eitedinWoods, supra note 84; New York City Police Depart-
ment, Police Response to Family Disputes i-ii (Procedural Supp. No. 1, Sept. 1969), cited in
Woods, supra note 84, in effect prior to the lawsuit in Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396
N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd inpart, appeal dismissed in part, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d
165 (1978), affd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
137. Nor do such procedures generally provide for assisting the victim in getting medical aid
or in making a citizen's arrest in the event of a misdemeanor assault committed before the officer's
arrival. The common law, modified in some states by statute, allows any person to make a war-
rantless arrest of another person who has committed a misdemeanor or felony in the arrester's
presence. The arrester must take the arrested person to a magistrate or to a police officer as
quickly as possible after making the arrest. The procedure then follows the same channel as if a
police officer had made the arrest. 5 AM. JuR. 2d Arrest § 34 (1962); see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 834, 837, 847, 849 (West 1970 & Supp. 1980); ILL. AN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 107-3, 109-1 (Smith-
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Prosecutors have required extra elements before proceeding with
domestic assault prosecutions, including witnesses other than the victim
and children, a record of prior attacks, a police report already on file,
and serious visible injuries."1 Even when the victim is ready to tes-
tify139 and the additional criteria are met, such cases may be rejected
automatically on the theory that securing a conviction is more difficult
than in nonfamilial cases.' 4
0
Hurd 1980); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 764.14, 764.16 (West 1968); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§§ 140.30, 140.35, 140.40 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1979-80). Accurate reports that would permit
monitoring of particular households are generally not required. Trent, Wf Beating: A Psycho.
LegalAnalysis, 84 CASE & COMMENT 14, 20 (Nov.-Dec. 1979), reprintedfrom 65 WOMEN L.J. 9
(Spring 1979).
There is no effort to clarify the proper role of mediation, which is largely ineffective where
attacks rather than verbal disputes are at issue. See note 120 supra. The officer warns the victim
that the attacker may retaliate if arrested, rather than warning the attacker that such retaliation
would lead to swift penalty. See generally Trent, supra, at 23. In contrast, the consent decree in
Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd in part, appeal dismissed
in part, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), aft'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419
N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979), requires that an arrest must be made where there is reasonable cause to
believe that a felony has been committed, or that the assailant has violated a prior order of protec-
tion; that victims be advised of their legal rights; that the officer remain at the scene temporarily to
prevent further attack; and that if the assailant has left the house and the victim requests an arrest,
the same procedures be used to locate the assailant as in any nonfamilial assault case.
138. Trent, supra note 137, at 20; D. MARTIN, supra note 19, at 109-10 (referring particularly
to the San Francisco district attorney's office). Proof of such injuries is complicated by the fact
that "the experienced wife-beater. . . goes for places that don't show, like the scalp, the stomach,
especially during pregnancy, and the lower spine." Cal Hearings, supra note 64, at 18. Medical
records may not be available if the victim is too ashamed to seek assistance directly after the
attacks. Truninger, supra note 78, at 264. This requirement also discounts the fact that the latest
injury may be one of a series and cannot be considered in isolation.
139. Legal Aid counsel described a woman whose husband had inflicted knife cuts all over
her arms. She sought counsel after being told by the prosecutor's office that no charges would be
pressed. MICHIGAN HEARINGS, supra note 18, at 73. Another wife, who had gone to the prosecu-
tor's office to request that he issue a warrant after a series of attacks, testified that her husband's
boss remained in the room during the conversation. "I objected. . . and said that if I had known
he would be there, I would have brought my boss .... The assistant prosecutor then accused me
of being an argumentative woman and said ... that he had talked to my husband and his em-
ployer,. . . that my husband was a very sincere man, .. and that my husband had probable
cause to beat me." Id. at 34.
140. Trent, supra note 137, at 22; D. MARTIN, supra note 19, at 100. This theory is refuted by
high rates of conviction in jurisdictions where prosecutors have firmly pursued domestic assaults
as crimes against the state. See note 94 and accompanying text supra. Moreover, this policy
overlooks the deterrent effect that enduring a trial may have on the defendant and other potential
violators.
The societal attitudes that affect refusals to convict are not beyond alteration. In the analo-
gous area of rape, one commentator has pointed out dramatic changes:
[P]olice are actively investigating and arresting suspects in rape cases; district attorneys
are taking rape cases to court and winning; judges are imposing harsh sentences for men
convicted of rape. It is important that society give the criminal justice system the same
type of clear message that battering women is not acceptable in order that it might begin
changing the manner in which it deals with the plight of battered women.
Paterson, How the Legal System Responds, in BATTERED WOMEN 79, 94 (D. Moore ed. 1979). See
note 124 supra.
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Studies conducted in several jurisdictions indicate that judges may
refuse to accord hearings mandated under state law,'14  or may blame
the victim 142 and utilize paper sanctions that accomplish little in the
reduction of recidivism. 143 Some apply a "divorce" test before granting
legal relief to a battered spouse.'" Moreover, while several states have
provided family court options for abused spouses, the statutory mecha-
nisms that would permit the victim to obtain direct judicial access .with-
out counsel may be blocked by probation employees or petition
clerks. 145
141. TEX. CAnM. PRO. CODE ANN. arts. 7.01-.17 (Vernon 1977) requires that whenever a mag-
istrate is informed that an offense is about to be committed against a person, he issue an arrest
warrant and hold a hearing as to whether to issue a peace bond. A mandamus action against a
justice of the peace who refused to apply the law to a marital assault culminated in the defendant's
agreement to conform to the statute. Rodriguez v. Garza, No. C-1765-78-A (92d Dist. Ct., Hi-
dalgo County 1978), cited in Woods, supra note 84, at 14 nn.51-53.
142. When Sylvia Weaver, an Ohio complainant, appeared in court to testify about her hus-
band's attacks on her, the judge instructed her to study the Bible, attend the local fundamentalist
church, and learn to be a good wife. Telling her that he did not want to see her in court again, he
dismissed the charges against her husband. Jensen, Battered Women and the Law, 2 Vic-
TIMOLOGY 585, 589 (1977-78).
143. D. MARTIN, supra note 19, at 109-14; Fields, Jtf~e Beating. Government Intervention Poli-
cies and Practices, in U.S. COMM'N ON Cwnr RIGHTs, BATrERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC
POLICY 257-59 (1978); Parnas, Prosecutorial and Judicial Handling of Family Violence, 9 CRiM. L.
BULL. 733, 747-49 (1973). Such sanctions are usually in the form of a "peace bond"--a sum of
money to be posted by the defendant that can be revoked for later misconduct. Professor Ray-
mond Parnas observes that these peace bonds are often "unlilled-out, unsecured, unrecorded, but
threateningly imposed.... All of the magistrates interviewed [in Chicago's Court of Domestic
Relations] acknowledged the 'sham,' extralegal nature of the peace bond but, nonetheless, were
unanimous as to its effectiveness." Id. at 748. As these cases are routinely marked "discharged for
want of prosecution" in the official docket and there is no further contact between the defendants
and the court, id., it is difficult to understand how the magistrates could be so certain as to the
effectiveness of the peace bonds. It must be remembered that these cases are the most serious
ones, which have survived the prosecutor's initial screening and diversions. Id. at 735-47. Civil
remedies such as restraining and protective orders have been characterized by police officers as
mieffective. POLICE FORUM, supra note 64, at xiii.
A Washington, D.C. attorney, Carol Murray, has offered this explanation of judicial reluc-
tance to imprison violent husbands: "Ajudge isn't going to put a guy who makes a living injail
and his wife on welfare.... In terms of the respective values of our society, his earning money
outweighs her possible physical injury." Gingold, The Truth About Battered Wives, MS., Aug.
1976, at 94.
144. The judge will remain unconvinced of the wife's right to redress unless she is in the
process of obtaining a divorce or is divorced. R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE
SILENT CRIsIs 176 (1975). A woman may not desire a divorce, for religious or social reasons; it
may be too expensive or take too much time. In addition, the divorce requirement is inapplicable
to those women who are not legally married to their batterers. Case for Legal Remedies, supra
note 51, at 152-53. Cf. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.99.040(l)(a)-(b) (West 1980) (mandating that
the court "[s]hall not dismiss any charge or delay disposition because of concurrent dissolution or
other civil proceedings; [and] [s]hall not require proof that either party is seeking a dissolution of
marriage prior to instigation of criminal proceedings").
145. New York provides that a victim may either choose to receive conciliation counseling or
to file a court petition. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (29A) § 821(b) (McKinney 1975). Petition clerks must
type the petition and schedule a court appearance if an immediate temporary order of protection
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i. Compelling enforcement through invocation of the Civil Rights
Act. One of the most crowded gateways to the federal courts is pro-
vided by section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, supplemented by its juris-
dictional coordinates. 146 Since section 1983 applies directly to equal
protection violations by states and emanates from the 1871 statute en-
acted to remedy refusals to enforce criminal laws, 47 it can be invoked
to compel nondiscriminatory application of assault statutes to domestic
violence. Perhaps because of the time and resources required for a
broad-gauged federal lawsuit in which sophisticated constitutional,
statutory, and common law defenses are available, it has seldom been
invoked. 148 Nor have the courts thus far rendered a definitive decision
on the merits in such a suit.
.Commencement of an omnibus action presents a number of strate-
gic choices as to which parties and claims should be joined.149 Al-
though the inclusion of several categories of defendants in the same
lawsuit compounds the complexity of the counterarguments, it has the
advantage of providing the court with an overview of how each compo-
nent in the criminal justice system may contribute to the challenged
nonenforcement.' 5 Possible defendants in a suit for declaratory and
is requested. Id. § 823(b). However, affidavits filed in Bruno v. Codd state that probation employ-
ees do not tell victims that they have a right to file a petition at the outset and to request an
immediate protective order, but instead assign the case to a conference weeks or months later.
Petition clerks have told women that "nothing can be done [sooner]" and when the women have
insisted on requesting immediate temporary orders of protection, they have been brushed off with
the comment, "Don't hassle me." Affidavit of Gloria Mercado at 23, Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d
1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd in part, appealdismissedinpart, 64 A.D.2d 582, 407
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), afd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
146. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(3) & 1343(4) (1976 & Supp. 1981). Section 1983 prohibits
"[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory... [from] subject[ing], or causling] to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
147. See notes 132-33 and accompanying text supra.
148. Two major lawsuits in addition to the Bruno case are Scott v. Hart, No. C76-2395 (N.D.
Cal., filed Oct. 28, 1976) and Raguz v. Chandler, No. C74-1064 (N.D. Ohio, fied Feb. 4, 1974).
The Raguz plaintiffs cited the due process clause and the first amendment right to petition for
redress of grievances as well as the equal protection clause.
While the equal protection claim has both analytical and historical validity, reliance on due
process arguments is, as previously indicated, more tenuous. See Part I, Section B(I) supra. The
right to petition the government for redress of grievances might apply in suits against court em-
ployees who block access to the judiciary, see note 145 and accompanying text supra, but would
not be relevant to suits against other categories of defendants; the first amendment protects the
right to ask, but does not guarantee any governmental response. Smith v. Arkansas Highway
Employees Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463 (1979).
149. For comprehensive and well-conceived suggestions on how to prepare and conduct such
suits, see Woods, supra note 84, at 16-22.
150. In a § 1983 case, there is no duty to exhaust state judicial remedies prior to suit in a
federal court. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961). But see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475 (1973) (petitioners for habeas corpus relief must exhaust state remedies despite § 1983 claim
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injunctive relief would include named police officers who have refused
to assist or make arrests in marital assault cases, and their supervisors
at middle and high levels;1 51 prosecutors who automatically decline to
proceed where domestic attacks are involved, rather than consider each
case on its own merits and according to the same criteria as nonspousal
cases; 152 and court personnel who refuse victims access to judges and
misinform or mislead them as to available court procedures.1 53
The federal courts are not necessarily the most advantageous fo-
rum for plaintiffs. Where state law or regulation explicitly creates
mandatory duties on the part of executive officials, an action in the
state courts seeking enforcement of statutory rights neatly avoids de-
fenses involving official discretion. As the New York Court of Appeals
has noted: "[J]usticiability can hardly be denied when what is at stake
is not the righting of social injustices, deeply disturbing though they
may be, but the enforcement of clear, nondiscretionary and easily de-
finable statutes and rules adopted for the governance of a judicial en-
when only more speedy release is sought). Courts are divided as to whether exhaustion of state
administrative remedies is required. Compare Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 569 (2d Cir. 1969)
(exhaustion of state administrative remedies required) with McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S.
668, 671-76 (1963) (exhaustion of state administrative remedies not required where such remedy is
inadequate) and Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 640 (1968) (exhaustion of state administrative
remedies not required where it would be futile). The requirement of showing a live controversy
between the parties, eg., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 502-03 (1961), may necessitate advising
defendants and their supervisors of the problems being encountered and asking for prompt reme-
dial action.
151. See Scott v. Hart, No. C76-2395 (N.D. Cal., filed Oct. 28, 1976). Plaintiffs, battered
women who had unsuccessfully sought police aid, sued the chief of police, the watch commander,
the supervisor of the radio room, the officer in charge of handling complaints, and the Oakland
City Council, which has ultimate responsibility for police actions, alleging that defendants had a
policy and practice of discouraging arrests in domestic violence cases. Although state claims were
included in the complaint, the emphasis was on federal claims.
The suit ended in an out-of-court settlement in which the police department agreed to treat
domestic assaults as it would other criminal conduct, including making arrests where appropriate.
It also agreed to develop new training materials and issue new implementing orders. As a part of
these orders, police officers are to distribute a resource brochure for battered women. Settlement
Decree, Scott v. Hart, No. C76-2395 (N.D. Cal., filed Nov. 9, 1979).
152. See Raguz v. Chandler, No. C74-1064 (N.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 4, 1974), in which defend-
ant prosecutors entered into a consent decree agreeing inter alia to advise police that domestic
assaults would be prosecuted, to permit the victim to request review of the prosecutor's determina-
tion not to prosecute, and to advise the victim of the right to such review.
153. See Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd in part,
appealdismissedinpart, 64 A.D.2d 582,407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), afl'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d
976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979) (court personnel were sued in the New York state courts). It may be
noted that New York now gives victims seeking orders of protection in the Family Court the right
to a court-appointed lawyer. N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1981, § B, at 4, cols. 2-5. Apparently no suit
against the judges themselves has been filed in such n omnibus action because of the historic
reluctance of the federal courts to supervise their state counterparts. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) (dismissing a complaint by blacks seeking to enjoin state court judges
from discriminating on racial grounds in imposing sentences and setting bail, citing lack of ripe-
ness as well as the problem of continuous oversight).
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tity."'1 54 The court unfortunately did not go on to adjudicate the issues,
but instead preferred to declare the action moot on the basis of official
assurances that the laws invoked would be enforced.
155
(a) Standing. Absent a legislative basis for a claim that ministe-
rial official duties are being withheld, plaintiffs in an enforcement ac-
tion must surmount doctrinal obstacles such as standing, comity, and
discretion. Presume that a class 156 of plaintiffs who have been victims
of domestic violence commences a federal district court action alleging
that defendant officials 157 have denied them equality of treatment with
nonfamilial assault victims, in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Defendants might respond that the suit is barred at the outset by the
Supreme Court's holding in Linda AS. v. Richard D.158 that "a citizen
lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting authority when
he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecution."
154. Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 588, 393 N.E.2d 976, 979, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (1979).
There were multiple categories of named defendants in Bruno: the police commissioners, the state
and city directors of probation, and the chief clerk of the Family Court. Woods, supra note 84, at
17. Plaintiffs only raised state law claims, expressly reserving all federal claims, so that if the state
court determined that the case was a class action and then ruled in favor of the defendants on the
merits, future plaintiffs in a federal action would not be precluded by res judicata or collateral
estoppel. Id. at 21. The state law claims were based inter alia on police failure to respond to calls
for help despite statutory direction to do so. City law makes it the duty of the police to protect the
safety of the public and enforce the law. I N.Y.C. CHARTER & CODE § 435(a) (1976). In addition,
state law authorizes that an arrest be made where there is probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed, N.Y. C im. PROc. LAW §§ 140.10 & 140.15 (McKinney 1971), and requires
that citizens be assisted in making a civilian arrest. Id. §§ 140.30(1) & 140.40(1) (McKinney 1971
& Supp. 1980-81). The complaint also alleged that family court clerks and probation department
employees had denied battered wives access to the court. N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT (29A) §§ 811, 821,
823(b), 828 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980-81). See Woods, supra note 84, at 21-25.
In the consent decree, the New York City Police Department agreed to make changes in
written training materials and training programs. The department acknowledged its duty to re-
spond to requests for assistance or protection from battered women and to arrest the husband
rather than attempt to reconcile the parties where reasonable cause exists to believe that the hus-
band has committed a crime or a violation of an order of protection. The police department also
agreed to advise women of all their rights under the Family Court Act and to assist them in
obtaining medical care when requested. Id. at 31-33.
155. Plaintiffs had not only supplied extensive documentation of past refusals and failures to
enforce existing statutes, but had also brought to the court's attention evidence that such practices
continued even after suit was ified. Woods, supra note 84, at 25.
156. A suit on behalf of a class is the usual vehicle for establishing the parameters of a consti-
tutional right because it obviates the need for multiple lawsuits. However, an adverse decision
may preclude a subsequent suit predicated on the same grounds. State law may also inhibit use of
the class device in suits against government officials, citing the presumption that defendants will
voluntarily apply a court directive to all similarly situated persons. See Woods, supra note 84, at
25 n.124.
157. We will presume further that all three categories of defendants-police, prosecutors, and
court employees-are included. Inclusion of the latter could be based on a pendent state claim
that such employees have breached statutory duties.
158. 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
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This contention would have no application to cases against police
officers and court employees where nonarrest and denial of court access
rather than prosecutorial policies are challenged. Moreover, full analy-
sis of the basis and context of Linda AS. demonstrates that the holding
is inapposite to our model suit. The decision concerned a Texas statute
providing that any parent who willfully deserted or refused to support
minor children would be guilty of a misdemeanor. This provision had
been consistently interpreted to refer only to parents of legitimate chil-
dren; plaintiff was the mother of an illegitimate child seeking applica-
tion of the statute to the child's father.
The Court's dissatisfaction with plaintiffs standing was grounded
upon the core defect of lack of injury:
Here, appellant has made no showing that her failure to secure
support payments results from the nonenforcement .... The prospect
that prosecution will, at least in the future, result in payment of support
can, at best, be termed only speculative. Certainly the "direct" rela-
tionship between the alleged injury and the claim sought to be adjudi-
cated ... is absent in this case. 159
By contrast, such a direct relationship is highly visible in a suit by
assault victims for enforcement. In addition to the deterrent effect of
prosecution,1 60 the dangerous defendant can be restrained by incarcera-
tion from continuing a pattern of assaults on a spouse. As the Second
Circuit held in Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller: 61
[Tihe present case is in some respects distinguishable from Linda AS.
Unlike the mother there the inmates might be said to have sustained or
be immediately in danger of sustaining direct personal injury as a result
of nonenforcement of the criminal laws against the accused state of-
ficers.... Where a successful prosecution ... would serve to deter
the accused from harming the complainant rather than merely supply a
penal inducement to perform a duty to provide assistance, the com-
plaining person does show a more direct nexus between his personal
interest in protection from harm and the prosecution.1 62
(b) Comity and discretion. Once the standing objection is met,
and plaintiffs have made the factual showing' 63 that links defendants'
159. Id. at 618.
160. See note 124 supra.
161. 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973). Inmates sought to compel investigation and prosecution of
alleged criminal violations against them by state officers during and following an uprising at the
prison.
162. Id. at 378.
163. This showing would include the specific acts perpetrated by named defendants in viola-
tion of plaintiffs' constitutional rights, the facts supporting the existence of a policy or pattern of
conduct violative of the Constitution, and the relation of this policy or practice to misconduct by
unnamed defendants. If there is evidence that defendants' conduct was based upon "archaic and
overbroad" assumptions about a husband's right to "punish" his wife (Sf Weinberger v. Wiesen-
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policy or practice to plaintiffs' injury, the problem of the relief re-
quested becomes critical. The obstacles to such relief will relate to the
type of official being sued.
(1) Police. A key element of an injunction against police defend-
ants would generally be the mandate that where there is reasonable
cause to believe that an assailant has committed a felony or violated an
order of protection, an immediate arrest will be made. Further, where
a misdemeanor is involved, the officer will not refuse to arrest merely
because the parties are married, or because no order of protection has
been previously obtained, or because the officer prefers to "mediate"
even though the victim requests an arrest." 4
Police defendants may characterize this request as an unwarranted
intrusion into the authority vested in them by state and local law. This
contention has two intertwined branches-the doctrine of comity,
which cautions the federal judiciary against upsetting the delicate rela-
tionship between the national and state governments, and the concept
of manageability, which cautions against undertaking continuous sur-
veillance over discretionary duties. 165
Comity is a judge-made rather than a statutory creation which re-
cedes in proportion to the imminence of the controversy between the
parties and the nature of plaintiffs' injury. Where that injury is great,
immediate, and irreparable, the judiciary may not decline to remedy
the constitutional violation even on the grounds of courtesy towards
another sovereign. 166 Proof that plaintiffs will be physically beaten un-
less the assault laws are enforced would certainly reach the required
magnitude.
feld, 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975) (striking down a provision of the Social Security Act that gave
survivor benefits to the widow and children of a deceased male worker, but only to the children of
a deceased female worker, a provision resting on "archaic and overbroad" assumptions and viola-
tive of the equal protection secured by the due process clause of the fifth amendment)), such facts
can supplement the proof of unlawful discrimination between familial and nonfamilial assault
victims.
164. See note 137 supra as to the officer's authority to arrest or to facilitate a citizen's arrest in
misdemeanor cases. Other injunctive provisions obtained in the Bruno v. Codd consent decree are
summarized at note 154 supra.
165. Comity has been described as:
a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that
the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways .... mhe concept... repre-
sent[s] ... a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State
and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to
do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). See discussion of manageability in O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488, 500-02 (1974).
166. See, ag., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
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The manageability concept contains both policy and practical
components.1 67 The judiciary has historically been wary of encroach-
ing on the territory committed by the Constitution to other branches of
government, and understandably reluctant to issue broad symbolic or-
ders that are too rigid for day-to-day application. In Rizzo v. Goode, 6 '
for example, two classes of plaintiffs-minority citizens and "all Phila-
delphia residents in general"r' 69-- sued the mayor, the city managing
director, the police commissioner, and other Philadelphia officials,
charging a pervasive pattern of mistreatment by police officers. The
five-man Supreme Court majority, quoting with approval from O'Shea
v. Littleton,'71 held that "[plast exposure to illegal conduct does not in
itself show a present case or controversy. .. if unaccompanied by any
continuing, present adverse effects."'171 It also found no "adoption and
enforcement of deliberate policies" that defendants would continue to
apply "against the members of this discrete group."' T
A policy of refusing to arrest in domestic assault cases despite inju-
ries that would have led to arrest in nonfamilial attacks involves pre-
cisely the elements missing in Rizzo. The victim of the violence is
living with the assailant or is being pursued because of a past relation-
ship, and the withholding of police protection therefore has present ad-
verse consequences. This is not the random possibility that a particular
plaintiff might become a victim, but rather the unadorned fact that the
class members are continuing targets.
Nor does formulation of a remedy present an insoluble difficulty.
As the trial court noted in Bruno v. Codd:73
Plaintiffi do not seek to abolish the traditional discretionary pow-
ers of the police; they merely seek to compel the police to exercise their
discretion in each "particular situation," and not to automatically de-
167. It may be noted that although the doctrine of comity evolved from fear of federal-state
friction, see note 165 supra, and is therefore peculiarly applicable to suits commenced in the fed-
eral court, the concept of manageability is relevant to state court suits as well. As was pointed out
by the New York Court of Appeals in Bruno v. Codd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 588, 393 N.E.2d 976, 979,
419 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (1979), for example, "the judicial process may not be designed to assume
the management and operation of an executive enterprise or to correct broad legislative and ad-
ministrative policy, which ultimately may be dependent on the political process.' However, such
separation of powers concerns may be overcome by the state courts' responsibility to enforce the
United States Constitution, which corresponds to that of the federal judiciary. U.S. CoNsr. art.
VI.
168. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
169. Id. at 366-67.
170. 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974).
171. 423 U.S. at 372.
172. Id. at 374.
173. 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977), rev'd inpart, appealdismissed inpart,
64 A.D.2d 582, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1978), aft'd, 47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901
(1979). The police defendants did not pursue an appeal from the trial court's decision.
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cine to make an arrest solely because the assaulter and his victim are
married to each other.'
74
Such declinations may be interpreted as either an abuse of discretion or
an unlawful refusal to exercise that discretion. 175
The Police Executive Research Forum has pointed out that "pro-
fessional policing. . .[mandates that] managers. . designate cases in
which a particular method of disposition is required and... define the
acceptable range of actions officers may take in each of these cases."
1 76
Within these parameters, officers exercise discretion in assessing each
individual situation and placing it in its proper category. An arrest
should be made where there are serious injuries, use of a deadly
weapon, or violation of a prior restraining order. 177 Misdemeanor as-
saults allow a broader range of law enforcement remedies including
arrest, issuance of a summons, referral to social agencies,'and assisting
the complainant in making a citizen's arrest.' 78 The Police Forum re-
port notes further that officers often request "more specific guidance
from top brass" on how to handle conjugal violence.' 79
The Supreme Court has recognized that where "a right and a vio-
lation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers
...is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable reme-
dies."'180 Once the federal trial court has fashioned a standard prohibit-
ing refusal to arrest where there is reasonable cause to believe that a
felony has occurred and addressing other specific illegalities in the local
pattern, the police department may itself evolve rules to implement the
decree.' 8 '
174. Id. at 1049, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
175. See K. DAVIS, 1970 SUPPLEMENT TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 982-83, 986
(1970); Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir.
1966); DeVito v. Shultz, 300 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1969); Manjares v. Newton, 64 Cal. 2d 365, 411
P.2d 901, 49 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1966); In re Veterans' Indus., Inc., 8 Cal. App. 3d 902, 88 Cal. Rptr.
303 (2d Dist. 1970).
176. POLICE FORUM, supra note 64, at iv. See note 64 supra for a description of the Forum
and of the study that led to the report.
177. POLICE FORUM, supra note 64, at HLi, 61. See Baker v. City of New York, 25 A.D.2d 770,
771, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515, 517 (1966); Sorichetti v. City of New York, 95 Misc. 2d 451,408 N.Y.S.2d
219 (Sup. Ct. 1978), aj'd, 70 A.D.2d 573, 417 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1979).
178. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.40 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81); People v. Foster,
10 N.Y.2d 99, 176 N.E.2d 397, 217 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1961). Cf. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.99.030(3)(a) (West 1980) (directing a peace officer to "notify the victim of the victim's right to
initiate a criminal proceeding in all cases where the officer has not exercised arrest powers or
decided to initiate criminal proceedings by citation or otherwise").
179. POLICE FORUM, supra note 64, at 82. Patrol officers did not regard specific procedures
negatively, but instead seemed to welcome advice and guidance. Some officers reported that they
felt ill-equipped with only "seat of the pants" skills and were eager to receive any available mater-
ials on how to handle domestic violence calls. Id.
180. Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
181. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis, for example, has suggested that elimination of arbitrary
police discretion should be effectuated by judicially required rulemaking "formulated by the po-
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(2) Prosecutors. Suits against prosecutors who decline to proceed
where attacks are interspousal must meet formidable defenses. Since
the 1868 decision in Confiscation Cases, 82 it has been the conventional
wisdom that prosecutors have unreviewable discretion. In the context
of federal prosecutions, some courts have opined that "as an incident of
the constitutional separation of powers" the judiciary cannot interfere
with any discretionary prosecutorial act,183 while others have declared
that "[flew subjects are less adapted to judicial review. . .. [W]hile
this discretion is subject to abuse or misuse just as is judicial discretion,
deviations from [the United States Attorney's] duty as an agent of the
Executive are to be dealt with by his superiors."'' 8 4
Separation of powers barriers would affect the federal judiciary
vis-a-vis federal rather than state executive officials.'85 The managea-
bility claim is based on a consciousness of the many complex variables
that figure in a prosecutor's decisions. Yet, as Professor Davis notes,
the tradition of unreviewability "became settled before. . . the twenti-
eth-century discovery that the courts can interfere with executive action
to protect against abuses but at the same time can avoid taking over the
executive function."' 86
One trigger for such a limited review would be a pattern of
prosecutorial decisions that admittedly treat members of a particular
group differently from others affected by a penal statute.' 87  The
Supreme Court stated in Oyler v. Boles 8 8 that "[tihe conscious exercise
lice, and continually reworked by the police on the basis of experience. . . ." Davis, An Ap-
proach to Legal Control ofthe Police, 52 TEx. L. REv. 703, 712 (1974). See also Sofaer, Judicial
Control of Informal DiscretionaryA4da'cation and Enforcement 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (1972).
Such rules could provide a mechanism for supervisory control over the practices of subordinate
officers. See note 167 supra. The court would therefore not be involved in day-to-day monitoring
of the decree.
182. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1869).
183. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
184. These are the words of Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger in Newman v. United States,
382 F.2d 479, 480, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1967). State prosecutors may have no coordinate "superior."
185. See L. TmE, supra note 15, at 17.
186. K. DAvis, supra note 175, at 988. Judicial review, where undertaken, has not proved
unfeasible. The State of Michigan provides that any decision not to prosecute after investigation
must be followed by a written statement of the reasons "in fact and in law," and that if the court is
dissatisfied with the statement, it may order that the case be prosecuted. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 767.41 (West Supp. 1980).
Some European jurisdictions, for example West Germany, have permitted judicial supervi-
sion. K. DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JUsTIcE A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 191-93 (1969). Section
152(2) of Germany's Code of Criminal Procedure requires the public prosecutor to "take action
against all judicially punishable. . . acts, to the extent that there is a sufficient factual basis."
GERMAN CRIM. PROC. CODE § 152(2), reprinted in Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion
in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 439, 443 (1974).
187. Wong Wing Hang v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 360 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir.
1966); K. DAvIs, supra note 175, at 985.
188. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
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of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitu-
tional violation," but went on to contrast such instances with unlawful
selection "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as
race, religion or other arbitrary classification."' 9 A differentiation
based upon first amendment activities is another species of arbitrary
prosecutorial classification. °90 It is interesting to note that, inter alia
because of the congressional mandate in section 1983, there has been
less hesitance in scrutinizing discriminatory standards where the de-
fendant is a state rather than a federal prosecutor. 19'
Given these constitutional restrictions on prosecutors, can an auto-
matic refusal to accord equal treatment to domestic and nondomestic
attacks be insulated from judicial inquiry? Let us posit a conjugal case
of probable criminal liability, with sufficient evidence to meet the dis-
trict attorney's criteria in prosecuting crimes between strangers. There
is a credible witness to the crime 192 or other persuasive proof of the
defendant's culpability.' 93 A bald invocation of a domestic exclusion,
such as a Michigan prosecutor's assertion that "the sanctity of the mar-
riage is more sacred than the criminal law and the one-punch fight...
[and] overrides the criminal code,"' 9a should be subject to review.
The district attorney may proffer a more sophisticated plea for dis-
cretion, however. The office is understaffed and overburdened, and
lacks the resources to prosecute every crime even where the evidence is
available. Therefore he must concentrate on the cases which, in his
judgment, are the most important. 19
This "scarce resources" argument has encountered equal protec-
tion challenges even when applied to nonviolent crimes such as selling
goods on Sunday. 96 Splitting off "unimportant" assault cases, rather
189. Id. at 456. See People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1960).
190. United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973). See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d
1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
191. See, eg., Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1970) where the Sixth Circuit cited a
separation of powers rationale and the lack of an appropriate statutory base in declining to review
the discretion of a United States attorney and the Attorney General who had allegedly failed to
prosecute civil rights violators. In the same decision, the court assessed the actions of the state
prosecutors to determine whether they were "arbitrary or discriminatory." Id. at 578.
192. For a discussion of the specific problems of victim cooperation and their successful reso-
lution, see at notes 91-94 and accompanying text supra.
193. Such proof can be either physical or circumstantial. See note 92 supra.
194. Statement of William Delhey, Chief Prosecutor of Washtenaw County, Michigan, ol/ed
in R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT CRIsis 157-58 (1977).
195. The district attorney may state by way of analogy that in barroom brawls where two
equally matched combatants eagerly entered the fray, inflicted minor bruises on each other, and
are unlikely to meet again, he declines to prosecute because of the nature of the injuries.
196. For example, in the Philadelphia area, a policy of prosecuting only large violators of the
Sunday Blue Laws was held unconstitutional by a trial court. Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. v.
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than for example gambling matters, would be a curious inversion of
priorities, 97 particularly where recidivistic assailants are involved. 98
When the split is based on the marital status of the victim rather than
on the nature of the injuries inflicted and the danger of continuing at-
tacks, the defect rises to consititutional dimension.
What kind of decree could be formulated to require rather than to
prohibit prosecution of a class of cases? 199 The central mandate would
be to consider each case on its own merits, a provision no more general
than National Labor Relations Board orders compelling management
and labor to bargain in good faith.2 ° This would establish a policy of
nondiscrimination in marital cases; its execution would be left to the
prosecutor as an officer of the court. Other possible components, which
have recently been recommended or consented to by prosecutors, could
be the requirement that nonfrivolous complaints be investigated even if
no arrest has been made, that police be advised of the policy of prose-
cuting domestic assaults, and that cases be expedited to reduce the dan-
ger of witness intimidation.2 °1
It has been noted that the power to initiate and discontinue a pro-
Dilworth, 29 U.S.L.W. 2002 (Pa. Ct. Com. PIs., June 10, 1960), ard without reaching this question,
Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439 (1962).
197. It should be noted that less drastic methods of supplementing resources may be avail-
able. Some jurisdictions permit the district attorney to appoint special prosecutors, which are
generally drawn from a panel of attorneys serving on a rotating basis. See, e.g., People v. Van
Sickle, 13 N.Y.2d 61, 192 N.E.2d 9,242 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1963); N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 701 (McKinney
1972). A private organization may also appear as an amicus curiae to assist the district attorney,
and with the court's consent may argue as well as merely file briefs. People v. Mandel, 61 A.D.2d
563, 403 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1978); Blumberg & Bohmer, The Rape Victim and Due Process, 80 CASE &
COMMENT 3, 16 (Nov.-Dec. 1975); Note, Amicus Curiae Participation-At the Court's Discretion,
55 Ky. LJ. 864 (1967).
198. Interspousal battery is generally a pattern of behavior, rather than an isolated incident.
Straus, ife. Beating, supra note 1, at 445-46.
199. Cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975) (holding reviewable a decision not to
bring a civil prosecution under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959).
200. Comment, Discretion to Prosecute Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 74 YALE L.J. 1297, 1310
(1965). See Labor-Management Relations Act §§ 8(a)(5), 8(d) & 9(a) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a), 158(d), & 159(a) (1976)); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964);
Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426 (1941). Such
orders do not require supervision of each step in the proceeding, or day-to-day monitoring. Cf.
Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (voicing concerns that the court would
have to become involved in such monitoring); Boyne v. Ryan, 100 Cal. 265, 267, 34 P. 707, 708
(1893) (same).
201. The first two measures were consented to by the defendants in Raguz v. Chandler, No.
C74-1064 (N.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 4, 1974). See note 152 supra. The latter provision was recom-
mended at a 1978 conference of the National District Attorneys Association. Fromson, TheProse-
cutor's Responsibilities in Spouse Abuse Cases in NATIONAL DIsTRIcr ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION,
THE VICTIM ADVOCATE (Orange Cover) 11 (1978). Other proposals set forth at the conference
included retention of jurisdiction for one year in cases where counseling of the defendant is at-
tempted, so that prosecution would follow if the violence has continued. Id. at 21-22. See also
recommendations (which have been adopted in some jurisdictions) that prosecutors should sign
complaints filed against batterers, send subpoenas to victims prior to trial, and refuse to drop
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ceeding gives a prosecutor "more control over an individual's liberty
and reputation than any other public official. '20 2  This power is a
unique feature of American criminal justice. Despite the common law
underpinnings of our jurisprudence, American law differs from the
English model as to the locus of control over criminal proceedings. In
203England, prosecutions are regarded as private in character, with offi-
cial proceedings limited to a relatively small number of cases brought
by the director of public prosecutions. Cases initiated on police com-
plaints are in theory brought by a private citizen, though in uniform.
Under the prevailing system, "private citizens not in uniform can (and
do) prosecute even cases of serious crime.""
This option is not available to an American conjugal assault vic-
tim. The state determines the rules and holds all the cards, denominat-
ing those to be included in the game and choosing the suits to be
favored. The constitutional infirmity is not that a private actor has
caused physical harm to a citizen without governmental interference.
Rather, equal protection is infringed because governmental fiat has cre-
ated a monopoly over the criminal process while designating a class of
citizens as ineligible for protection.205 Ironically, this deprivation exists
side by side with intricately structured requirements and penalties that
provide the maximum deterrence to vigilante activity or self-help.20 6
II
THE LAW OF HOMICIDE
The denial of legal protection to assault victims has a critical im-
charges after filing unless there are exceptional circumstances. Response, supra note 22, Jan.-Feb.
1981, at 19 &passim.
202. Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REy. 1057, 1057 (1955) (footnote omitted).
203. Wales and Ulster have also retained the private model. P. DEVLIN, CRIMINAL PROSECU-
TION IN ENGLAND 19-27 (1960). It has been suggested that the prosecutor's traditional protection
from review emanated from his restricted common law role, and was fortuitously grafted onto the
exclusive American approach. S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
1126 (3d ed. 1975).
204. Langbein, supra note 186, at 441 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 440-43. In France,
the state controls 'Taction publique," but the action may also be initiated by the victim in order to
establish a basis for a private damage claim. Id. at 44142; C. PRO. PEN. art. 1, 85, reprinted in
Langbein, supra note 186, at 441 n.5. While the American model of centralizing prosecutorial
power may provide the benefit of a more orderly procedure, it also facilitates class discrimination
that should be subject to judicial correction.
205. Officials who withhold such benefits while functioning in their official capacity are
deemed to be acting under color of state law and subject to constitutional strictures even where
their conduct is unauthorized by the legislature. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Home
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
206. The requirements for justifying a homicide are discussed in Part II, Section A infra. The
hiring of a private security guard to assist in temporarily subduing an assailant would restrict
protection to the rich, while still failing to meet the problem of prosecutorial rejection.
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pact not only on the rate of intrafamily killings,20 7 but also on the con-
tinued viability of the rationales underlying traditional homicide
doctrines. The consequences of homicide have been ranked along a
sliding scale: full penalty because no valid defense was demonstrated;
reduced sanction because of mitigating circumstances; no punishment
because the defendant was justified or insane. Cautious definition of
what constitutes justification for killing an assailant is predicated on the
assumption that police aid may be substituted for private retaliation.
However, there are signals of a new doctrinal development. It has
been asserted that "[d]efinitions of self-defense and victim provocation
are being expanded to provide the basis for acquittal. . . when hus-
band murders are committed by wives who have been the victims of
years of wife beating. ' 20 8 While there have been no studies that pro-
vide a systematic comparison between the outcome in such domestic
homicide prosecutions and self-defense cases in other contexts,20 9 a
number of well-publicized acquittals indicate a de facto attenuation of
legal strictures.210
At the other end of the spectrum, cases involving unexpectedly
harsh sentences imposed despite the presence of traditional mitigating
or justifying factors21 are further indication of judicial confusion ds to
207. In one city it has been shown that in 85% of the cases, when a homicide occurred in
the course of domestic violence, the police had been summoned at least once before the
killing occurred, and in 50% of the cases the police were called five or more times before
the actual murder.
Schneider & Jordan, Representation of Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or
SexualAssault, 4 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 149, 152 n.39 (1978) (citing DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND THE POLICE: STUDmS IN DETROr AND KANSAS CITY (1977)).
208. Fields, WJ/e Beating: Government Intervention Policies and Practices, in U.S. COMM'N ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 228, 264 (1978).
209. But see notes 307-09 and accompanying text infra.
210. Among these published reports is the case of Jeannette Smith who had gone to her hus-
band's house to discuss separation arrangements. She found her 66-year-old husband with his 17-
year-old pregnant housekeeper-secretary, both of whom started to beat her. Mrs. Smith sum-
moned the police to remove the younger woman and, as they were doing so, Mr. Smith stumbled
onto the porch with a knife in his back. Mrs. Smith was acquitted of the stabbing on the grounds
of self-defense after testifying that her husband had come after her threatening to kill her. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 15, 1979, § 1, at 28, col. 1.
Other cases involved acquittal by reason of insanity. For example, Francine Hughes, who
poured gasoline under the bed of her sleeping ex-husband and set it on fire, was found not guilty
by reason of temporary insanity. Two weeks later state doctors found her to be sane and released
her from the mental hospital. NEWSWEEK, Nov. 14, 1977, at 45, col. 3; Detroit Free Press, Nov.
22, 1977, § C, at 5; Detroit Free Press, Dec. 18, 1977, (Detroit Magazine) at 20-21, 25. Another
case that received wide media coverage was that of Roxanne Gay, because the victim was profes-
sional football player Blenda Gay. She was also acquitted on the ground of insanity for fatally
stabbing her husband while he was asleep. N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1978, § A, at 27, col. 3. See
Note, Does Wife Abuse Justfy Homicide., 24 WAYNE L. Rv. 1705, 1716-19 (1978).
211. See, eg., People v. Jones, 191 Cal. App. 2d 478, 12 Cal. Rptr. 777 (2d Dist. 1961); State
v. Guido, 40 N.J. 191, 191 A.2d 45, 47 (1963); People v. Eleuterio, 47 A.D.2d 803, 365 N.Y.S.2d 94
(1975), discussed at notes 328-32 and accompanying text infra; State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d
19811 1703
CALIFONIA LAW REVIEW
which legal standards should be utilized when the domestic worm
turns.
Conceptual analysis of self-defense, insanity, and provocation as
set out in Part II demonstrates that no separate legal enclave for conju-
gal hostilities is warranted. To the extent that the erratic case law un-
duly penalizes defendants, it reflects a curable misapplication of key
elements in all three defenses. Armed self-help against an unarmed
attacker is not invariably precluded; evidence of a disturbed mental
state falling short of insanity may require acquittal where it is probative
of lack of mens rea, and a cumulative series of assaults can constitute a
mitigating provocation even if the latest battery was less serious.
Judicial failure to issue proper jury instructions on these elements
may result either in an erroneous conviction and sentence or in jury
nullification of the court's charge. The occurrence of such nullification
leading to acquittal, however, has not been limited to prosecutions
where the law was misrepresented to the jurors.2 12 Thus, a correct
analysis of self-defense and insanity pleas is only a partial solution to
the problem of runaway verdicts. Such verdicts will continue to issue
in conjugal cases as long as recourse to law and order is blocked at the
prehomicide phase.
A. Self-Defense
When we speak of justifying a homicide, we are describing the
unblemished moral position of the slayer as well as the culmination of
any legal action flowing from the killing.213 Each requirement of the
self-defense plea constitutes a separate assurance that the homicide was
unavoidable: the defendant did not use excessive force, ignore a re-
quirement to retreat, or act before a crisis of appropriate magnitude
was imminent.
L The Proportionality of Self-Hep
The regulations governing legalized boxing (no horse-shoes in the
glove, no hitting below the belt) have some parallel in the rules applica-
ble to repelling unlawful force. Overreaction is out of bounds. The
right to kill in self-defense requires that the victim reasonably believe
that an attacker will inflict fatal or serious physical injury and that only
518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981) (defendant received sentence of 15 years to life despite undisputed
testimony that deceased was shot when he threatened to beat or kill defendant and that deceased
had beaten defendant on prior occasions).
212. See notes 310-18 and accompanying text infra.
213. Ajustified homicide results in dismissal of charges or acquittal. R. PERKINS, supra note
6, at 1012.
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deadly force will repel this attack.2" 4 Does this requirement, in the
light of the applicable definitions, unduly burden a battered spouse fac-
ing a renewal of the danger?
As to minor assaults, the unadorned description of some commen-
tators is that "one must submit to an ordinary battery and have his
remedy in court rather than endanger the life of his assailant. '215 The
formula would not preclude defense by nondeadly means-A hits B, B
hits back-but in a combat between spouses of unequal size and
strength rather than matched boxers, this right may have as little prac-
tical significance as the assumption that "a remedy in court" will be
forthcoming. 21 6
Homicide is justifiable only in repelling "deadly force." The im-
age evoked is that of a man waving a gun, but neither the historical nor
the statutory base for the term is so restrictive.217 The phrase generally
includes force that could cause protracted impairment of health or seri-
ous disfigurement.218 A broken jaw, limb, or rib, or an injury that af-
fects the victim's hearing over an extended period of time are examples.
Some assailants would undoubtedly be capable of meting out this kind
of injury without any weapon, and therefore a homicidal response to
such an assailant may be permissible.
Misinterpretation of this standard has led to bizarre inequities. In
People v. Jones,219 defendant was charged with murdering her hus-
band. She introduced testimony that during their married life, he had
assaulted her on numerous occasions. On the night of the homicide,
the deceased had apparently been drinking. He threatened to beat de-
fendant when the children went to bed, and later picked up a table
knife and said that he would kill her. As he advanced upon her with
the knife, she turned towards the buffet, picked up a gun purchased a
few weeks earlier, and fired a warning shot into the ceiling. He contin-
ued to come towards her; she testified that "I was afraid he was going
to jump on me or kill me or beat me or something; and I just couldn't
214. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 4, at 393. In assessing the defendant's fear, the
assailant's entire past history of violence is a critical factor. C. McCoRMicK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 193 (1972); Response of Juanita Kidd Stout, in U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 288, 296-97 (1978). Judicial failure to
recognize this factor in the domestic context is discussed at note 301 infra.
215. R. PERKINS, supra note 6, at 1013 (citing 1 J. BISHOP, NEw CRIMINAL LAW § 840 (8th ed.
1892)).
216. See notes 141-45 and accompanying text supra.
217. Blackstone comments: "[A] man may protect himself from an assault or the like, in the
course of a sudden broil or quarrel, by killing him who assaults him." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoM-
MENTARIES *184. See also R. PERKINS, supra note 6, at 997-1004.
218. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 10.00(11), 10.00(10) (McKinney 1975).
219. 191 Cal. App. 2d 478, 12 Cal. Rptr. 777 (2d Dist. 1961).
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take no more beating."220  She then shot and killed him. The jury
found defendant guilty of manslaughter.
In seeking reversal, defendant contended that the court erred in
instructing the jury. The appellate court sustained the instruction on
justifiable homicide, which was that a person may lawfully defend him-
self "when he has reasonable ground to apprehend that he is in danger
of death or great bodily injury ..... "221 There is some indication,
however, that the judge's answers to the jury's questions (including the
crucial "Please define for us the term in the instructions 'great bodily
harm' ",)222 were confusing and imprecise.
This kind of contretemps does not necessitate a change in stan-
dards, merely greater care in explaining the nexus between the defini-
tions and the situation at hand. Presume that a homicide has taken
place and that the facts are identical to those in Jones except that the
husband H approached his wife W without a knife. How is the reason-
ableness of W's fear to be determined-reasonable if the juror consid-
ering the evidence would have felt threatened by H's acts, or
reasonable from her perspective? Is it necessary to label the test "ob-
jective" or "subjective," and to abide the vastly different consequences
that could flow from the label? General guidelines are available:
If the . .. [defenders], at the time of the alleged assault upon
them, as reasonably and ordinarily cautious and prudent men, honestly
believed they were in danger of great bodily harm, they would have the
right to resort to self-defense, and their conduct is to be judged by the
condition appearing to them at the time, not by the condition as it
might appear to the jury in the light of testimony before it.223
Both subjective and objective elements figure here.224 W must be-
have prudently; she cannot react to a "threat" that is frivolous. How-
ever, her actions are not to be judged by hindsight, nor by discounting
her perspective and prior experiences with H.22 5
Recitation of general rules on the assessment of danger does not
220. Id. at 479, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 778. A self-defense plea is not available to an aggressor who
began the fray by inflicting an unlawful blow, or entered into a brawl by mutual agreement, or
who caused someone to fear an immediate peril to life. See R. PERKINS, supra note 6, at 1005.
Here, however, the deceased's threats caused defendant to experience precisely that fear, so that
she was responding to the physical confrontation rather than initiating it. Mere taunts or insults
would not have been sufficient for a violent response. See WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 125, at
129 (14th ed. C. Torcia 1979).
221. 191 Cal. App. 2d at 480, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 779.
222. Id. at 482, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 781.
223. State v. Miller, 141 Wash. 104, 105, 250 P. 645, 645 (1926). See also note 214 supra.
224. "The test of self-defense is not what the jury thinks a reasonable man would believe but
rather what the defendant, as a reasonable man, believed." People v. Johnson, 2 II. 2d 165, 172,
117 N.E.2d 91, 95 (1954). See also Marts v. State, 26 Ohio St. 162 (1875); Nelson v. State, 42 Ohio
App. 252, 181 N.E. 448 (1932).
225. See note 214 supra.
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insure jury comprehension. The court should issue an instruction that
refers to and explains the significance of individual factors concerning
the parties. Disparity in strength between H and W, for example, is a
critical factor. 2 6 The jury should be asked to consider whether some-
one with Ws particular characteristics could have fought offH's attack
without the use of a gun. In State v. Wanrow, 27 an analogous
nonfamilial case, an appellate court in reversing defendant's conviction
graphically depicted the consequences of imprecision in a trial judge's
charge: "The impression created--that a 5'4" woman with a cast on
her leg and using a crutch must, under the law, somehow repel an as-
sault by a 6'2" intoxicated man without employing weapons in her de-
fense" was a misstatement of the law which was underlined by "the
persistent use of the masculine gender leav[ing] the jury with the im-
pression [that] the objective standard. . . is that applicable to an alter-
cation between two men."22 8
Judicial notice has been taken of the fact that women in American
society are not generally given the kind of physical training that could
make them readily capable of repelling a male assailant.22 9 Prize fight
images must be replaced by scrutiny of H and Ws relative height,
weight, and skills. Standards based on hypothetical combatants supply
only first-stage guidelines for the critical issue of whether to convict.
2 The Duty to Retreat
The "no retreat" position permits the use of deadly defensive force
by a victim who has not attempted to flee from his assailant.23 ° Should
this rule be uniformly applied to all homicides, including those be-
tween spouses?
226. See note 81 supra.
227. 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977). Deceased, a large man who was visibly intoxi-
cated and was allegedly a former mental patient, entered a home where eight young children and
three mothers were present and declined to leave when he was ordered out. He had allegedly
molested defendant's child and other neighborhood children on prior occasions. A young child
awoke ctying, the deceased approached him, there was screaming, and defendant went to the front
door to shout for help. Turning around, she suddenly found the deceased standing directly be-
hind her. She was frightened and shot the deceased in a kind of reflex action. Deceased was
unarmed at the time. Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and her conviction was
reversed and remanded on appeal. Id. at 226, 559 P.2d at 551.
228. Id. at 240, 559 P.2d at 558.
229. Id. at 239, 559 P.2d at 558. For an original and provocative article on the effect of sex-
based stereotypes on jury assessments of reasonableness, and how to counter such stereotypes, see
Schneider & Jordan, supra note 207. The authors point out that women are "socialized to be less
active physically, not to display aggression, and to be more afraid of physical pain than men." Id.
at 157. See Bardwick & Douvan, Ambivalenc" 2he Socializalon of Women, in READINGS ON
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 52-58 (J. Bardwick ed. 1972).
230. The common law required those pleading self-defense to retreat from any setting other
than the home in preference to using deadly force. R. PErKiNs, supra note 6, at 1009.
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The right to remain even when withdrawal would be safe has gen-
erally been buttressed by the rationale that liberty itself is imperiled if a
law-abiding citizen can be compelled to leave a place where he has the
right to be.231 The emphasis is not on the victim's loss of face, but
rather on placing his personal freedom above the expediency of permit-
ting an assailant to drive him away.232
The issue of personal freedom assumes its greatest significance,
and the "no retreat" position appears in its most becoming colors, when
the victim is at home at the time of the attack. 3  The doctrine that no
flight from one's "castle" could ever be required was given the broadest
possible scope at common law,234 and has been universally adopted in
American jurisdictions. 3 This doctrine is perhaps the clearest point of
collision between the societal aim of preferring the rights of the victim
to protection of the attacker and the more general goal of preventing all
unnecessary killings.
In the conjugal context, however, both the assailant and the de-
fender are in their own dwelling. A few states have concluded that
parties sharing a home are not using the domicile as a refuge from each
other. "Rights of a householder against a violent intruder have no rele-
vancy," noted the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.236 More often, how-
ever, this contention has been rejected on the grounds that retreat
would merely be a temporary respite. "Whither shall he flee, and how
far, and when may he be permitted to return?" 7
231. State v. Bartlett, 170 Mo. 658, 669, 71 S.W. 148, 151 (1902); R. PERKINS, supra note 6, at
1005.
232. Other rationales have worn a somewhat apologetic air. The major common law privi-
lege of crime prevention appears most appropriate where retreat by the.defender would leave a
third person still in peril; however, English jurists did not distinguish this situation from one
where departure of the only victim might, at least temporarily, end the encounter. R. PERKINS,
supra note 6, at 1004. Another basis was the preservation of honor, which precludes the defender
from manifesting cowardice by retreating; critics of this theory have characterized it as permitting
a "remedy ... [that is] worse than the disease." Beale, Retreat From a Murderous Assault, 16
HAv. L. Rav. 567, 581 (1903).
233. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 4, at 396; R. PERIs, supra note 6, at 998.
234. The "castle" doctrine applied even to a willing participant in a brawl whose antagonist
had aggravated the conflict by initiating the use of deadly force. R. PERKINS, supra note 6, at
1010.
235. This is true even in states that generally require retreat. R. PERKINS, supra note 6, at
1010. Indeed, the concept of home is being broadened to encompass places of employment. E.g.,
PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, § 505 (Purdon 1973). In a few jurisdictions, expansion to cover any place
where the citizen has a right to be has brought the retreat rule full circle into the "no retreat"
camp. R. PERKINS, supra, at 1011; Note, Limits on the Use of Defensive Force to Prevent In-
tranarital Assaults, 10 RuT.-CAM. LU. 643, 654 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Limits oForce].
236. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 213 Pa. 432,434,62 A. 1064, 1064-65 (1906), quotedin Limits
of Force, supra note 235, at 655 n.72.
237. Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8, 16 (1884), quotedin Limits of Force, supra note 235, at 655 n.70.
See Eisenberg & Seymour, supra note 73, at 42. One jurisdiction has attempted a case-by-case
approach which provides little guidance or deterrence to potential defendants. Massachusetts pro-
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These antipodes raise issues on several levels. Should the legisla-
ture base its approach on long term considerations: will the conflict
recur, and must the victim be ousted from home whenever the assailant
pleases? Repeated flight or permanent ejection at the attacker's option
would directly breach the values of personal liberty underlying the
"castle" doctrine. 8 Should the focus be on the short term situation:
can the victim get out safely now? Even the question of immediate
safety cannot be analyzed solely by considering whether the battered
spouse can reach the front door. As a recent California decision noted:
The wife's options are not very satisfactory .... [H]er opportunities to
flee are usually severely limited. The husband may have the car; there
may be children in the home to be considered; and the unaccompanied
female at night is greeted with suspicion if not refusal of admission by
hotel and motel clerks who fear not only her possible profession but if
convinced of her true plight are fearful of her being followed by a
vengeful husband who would create a scene.239
Moreover, an erroneous prediction as to the feasibility of flight
may merely export the conflict into the street. While this increases the
possibility of aid, it also creates new and further risks. Third parties
who have neither the weapons nor the training of police officers may be
injured as bystanders2' or intervenors.
Thus, practicality as well as the historic preference for victim free-
dom over protection of the attacker supports the consistent application
of the "castle" doctrine to all homicides. Refusal to permit self-defense
in the home because the assailant is a cotenant would have an unwar-
ranted and disproportionate impact on interspousal cases.
3. The Immediacy of the Threat
A critical element in a successful self-defense plea is the belief that
an attack is imminent and can only be staved off with deadly force.241
The belief must be reasonable, but not necessarily correct; as Justice
Holmes' frequently quoted aphorism puts it, "detached reflection can-
vides that deadly force is unlawful if retreat in the particular situation is "reasonable." It has been
noted that the Massachusetts courts appear to have required retreat whenever such a course was
physically possible, even where a woman would be compelled to leave her children in order to
escape-hardly an appropriate application of a rule of reason. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 367
Mass. 508, 511, 326 N.E.2d 880, 883 (1975).
238. The economic and social obstacles to flight are discussed at notes 83-84 and accompany-
ing text supra.
239. People v. Cameron, 53 Cal. App. 3d 786, 792, 126 Cal. Rptr. 44, 48 (5th Dist. 1975).
240. See discussion of Parrish v. State, 97 So. 2d 356 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) in S. KADISH
& M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITs PRocEssas 251 (3d ed. 1975).
241. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, supra note 4, at 394; R. PERKINs, supra note 6, at 994; N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 1975).
1981] 1709
CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
not be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife."242
Dissatisfaction with the imminence standard in the domestic as-
sault context has centered on the general theme of inflexibility. It may
be certain that a deadly attack will occur on the present occasion. If the
assailant is not yet ready to commence but is summoning reinforcement
that will make him invincible, the imminent harm requirement could
compel the defender to wait until the "sole opportunity" to take protec-
tive action has passed.243
This argument assumes that the attacker could not overcome the
victim without first increasing his fighting capabilities and that the de-
fender must therefore act quickly before a Goliath makes his appear-
ance. Such a hypothetical is somewhat incongruous in application to
interspousal battery. The combatants are generally not equally
matched,2 " and the assailant does not need (or wish) to request the aid
of a friend in carrying out the attack.
Yet there is a more troubling aspect of the immediacy requirement
that directly affects conjugal slayings. Consider the fundamental pur-
pose to be served by restricting the availability of self-defense pleas.
Limitation of the plea assures that homicide, the most irrevocable of all
crimes, will be punished unless its commission was essential for self-
protection. In view of this noncontroversial mission, can resort to
deadly defensive force be justified if the danger to be countered is not
occurring now?
The historical response has been in the negative, for two generally
sound reasons: the assailant might change his mind, or he might be
legally prevented from carrying out his intentions.24 The first prong of
the rationale goes to the uncertainty of the threat; the argument is more
easily applicable to chance encounters leading to a quarrel, than to
ongoing relationships between spouses where a recidivistic pattern of
violence has already been established. Blackstone has elaborated on
the second prong:
This right of natural defense does not imply a right of attacking; for,
instead of attacking one another for injuries past or impending, men
need only have recourse to the proper tribunals ofjustice. They cannot,
therefore, legally exercise this right of preventive defense, but in sudden
242. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).
243. See Limits of Force, supra note 235, at 652. The drafters of the Model Penal Code have
raised this question as to all defensive homicides, and suggest that a legislative change is advisable
to insure that where the injury will occur on the present occasion and protective action is immedi-
ately necessary, no liability attach. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04, Comment at 17 (Tent. Draft No.
8, 1958); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (Proposed Off. Draft 1962).
244. See note 81 supra.
245. Assistance could also come from private citizens, but in intrafamily violence there are
seldom witnesses and neighbors generally avoid involvement. See note 45 supra.
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and violent cases; when certain and immediate suffering would be the
consequence of waiting for the assistance of the law.
246
This rationale does not encompass the situation in which severe
injury is virtually certain, but the "assistance of the law" is withheld.
The argument that the imminence requirement be replaced by a stan-
dard of demonstrable harm in the future merits further analysis. The
dangers of such a standard and the role of the jury in its absence will be
considered in detail in the final section of this Article.
B. Evidence of Defendant's Mental State: Two Possible
Acquittal Routes
In the spectrum of consequences incident to a domestic killing, we
have at one extreme a murder accompanied by maximum penalties and
at the other a justified act of self-defense. Operating in theory on a
parallel track is a homicide caused by an insane defendant-a mental
health hazard, rather than a penal problem. If a strangler believes he is
merely squeezing a lemon, he is neither justified nor culpable.2 47
Although insanity provides a complete defense, this plea has be-
come increasingly distasteful to counsel for battered spouses who
kill.248 Lack of justification means stigma, though the brand has a dif-
ferent configuration than criminality. Lack of culpability protects the
defendant from penal incarceration, but not necessarily from compul-
246. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *184. While the statement was made in the context
of a "chance medley" or accidental encounter, the rationale is equally applicable to interspousal
violence.
247. A few preliminary observations will put the insanity defense into perspective. Contrary
to popular assumptions, insanity is raised only in a very small percentage of cases, which does not
fully reflect the incidence of mental aberrations among defendants.
Overwhelmingly, criminal matters are disposed of by pleas of guilty and by bench trials.
Only the exceptional case goes to trial by jury. And of these exceptional cases, in only
two of every hundred is this [insanity] defense raised. Does anyone believe that this
percentage measures the actual significance of gross psychopathology to crime? Let him
visit the nearest criminal court or penitentiary ifhe does. Clearly this defense is a sop to
our conscience, a comfort for our failure to address the difficult arena of psychopathol-
ogy and crime.
Morris, Psychiatry and the Dangerous Criminal, 41 So. CAL L. REv. 514, 519 (1968).
It should be noted that the spirited legal and political dispute over the insanity defense has
centered on the optimal time for its introduction, not its relevance to disposition of criminal cases.
Even the draconian earlier drafts of S. 1, the proposed U.S. Criminal Justice Reform Act, would
have permitted the lemon-squeezer to introduce the insanity issue at trial, and other defendants to
proffer it on the question of treatment or sentence. Wales, An Analysis of the Proposalto Abolish'
the Insanity Defense in S. : Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 687 (1976). Thus, despite the
revolutionary connotation of the "abolish the insanity defense" slogan, such a defense would not
perish. It would merely be taken away from consideration by the jury (who would make only the
determination of whether the defendant committed the crime) and given to the sentencing judge
or to a mental health agency. See R. PEaKIuNs, supra note 6, at 885-88.
248. E.g., Schneider & Jordan, supra note 207, at 159-60. See also N.Y. Times, May 7, 1979,
§ A, at 1, coL 1.
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sory hospitalization. 249 The plea has therefore been characterized as a
"last resort" to be employed when self-defense claims are precluded.2 50
Nevertheless, proof of insanity in some cases provides the most
accurate explanation for a domestic homicide not triggered by immi-
nent danger to the defendant. A unique aspect of intrafamily battery is
that a class of victims is terrorized and repeatedly injured over a long
period of time, with psychological as well as physical trauma
resulting.251
Moreover, evidence of defendant's mental state may be relevant
not only to acquittals "on the grounds of insanity" but also to an unen-
cumbered acquittal because of a defect in the state's case. The effec-
tiveness of such evidence has been unduly curtailed by imprecise
analysis of the prosecutor's duty to prove all the mental elements of the
crime.
L Defnitional Contours
M'Naghten's Case 1 2 was a comprehensive attempt to grapple with
the protean nature of the term "insanity." An English jury acquitted
the defendant of murder on the basis of medical evidence that he was
suffering from delusions. In answer to questions posed by the House of
Lords after the acquittal, the M'Naghten judges stated that in order to
maintain a defense of insanity
it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the act,
the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from
disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he
was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what
was wrong.25
3
This cognitive test (with many variations in emphasis) has been
adopted in the majority of American states.254 Although a finding of
legal insanity would constitute an excuse25 5 and therefore shield a bat-
249. See notes 255-56 and accompanying text infra. In those instances where the wife is the
defendant, counsel have been concerned that valid self-defense pleas may be discounted because
of a stereotyped view of violent women as insane (whereas violent men are assessed on a case-by-
case basis). Schneider & Jordan, supra note 207, at 150.
250. Schneider & Jordan, supra note 207, at 160.
251. See notes 74-79 and accompanying text supra.
252. 10 CL & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843).
253. Id. at 210, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722. The responses of the judges were subsequently printed
together with the report of the case. Note that knowledge that the act was wrong refers not to
defendant's personal moral code, but his ability to understand that his crime is one condemned by
society.
254. R. PERINS, supra note 6, at 863 n.70. The cognitive approach centers on what defend-
ant knew or understood, rather than on the ability to control behavior.
255. Id. at 33, distinguishes justifiable from excusable homicide: "Homicide is justifiable if it
is either commanded or authorized by law .... Homicide which is neither commanded nor
authorized by law is excusable if committed under circumstances not involving criminal guilt."
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tered spouse who commits a conjugal homicide against criminal re-
sponsibility and punishment, defendant would remain subject to civil
commitment in a mental hospital. 256 However, such a finding is not the
sole basis on which a spouse who suffered from a disordered mental
state at the time of the slaying may obtain an acquittal.
Let us posit a state in which the prosecution is under a duty to
prove intent to kill in first degree murder cases, and the accused is re-
quired to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not
"know the nature and quality of the act he was doing." Does the de-
fendant who is too disoriented to be aware of his actions intend to kill?
Once some proof of this mental state is produced, what is required of
the prosecutor? The Supreme Court has recognized the possible colli-
sion of burdens and at vastly different points in its history has per-
formed both regulation and bypass surgery to meet it.
In Davis v. United States57 the nineteenth-century Court focused
on the general principle that conviction of a serious crime required
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of mens rea, or a culpable mental-
ity-32 8 The burden therefore rested on the prosecution to demonstrate
that a defendant accused of murder was sane enough to distinguish
between right and wrong.
A "guilty mind" continues to be a requirement for conviction in
homicide cases, but the concept has lost its amorphous character. Leg-
islatures have developed narrowly defined mental elements such as in-
tentionally, knowingly, recklessly, negligently." 9 Within this modem
framework, what constitutional standard governs prosecutors who must
counter evidence of a disturbed mental state falling short of insanity
but nevertheless probative of defendant's lack of mens rea?
The question was rather casually dispatched by the Supreme
256. In twelve states and in the District of Columbia, commitment for treatment is mandatory
after an acquittal on grounds of insanity; in all other jurisdictions, commitment is discretionary.
W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 4, at 317; MODEL PENAL CODE, § 4.08(1) (Tent. Draft No. 8,
1958); Comment, Compulsory Commitment Following a Succesful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U.L.
REv. 400, 411 n.8 (1961); Note, The Insanity Defense: The NeedforArticulate Goals at the Acquit-
tal, Commitment, andRelease Stages, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 733, 735 n.1l (1964).
257. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
258. Id. at 484. See also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952), which held that
criminal liability without a showing of mens rea was improper where the defendant was charged
with one of the "infamous, common-law crimes." Id. at 252. In contrast, the Court discussed
offenses that were "not in the nature of positive aggressions or invasions, with which the common-
law so often dealt, but are in the nature of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it
imposes a duty." The Court remarked that "legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of
policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element." Id. at 255-56. See Henkin, supra note 30,
at 68, 70.
259. E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(l)-.25(2) (McKinney 1975); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18,
§ 2501 (Purdon 1973).
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Court in Leland v. Oregon,26 ° where a challenge under the due process
clause was levied at a state rule requiring that the defense of insanity
must be proven by the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.2 61 The pri-
or Davis holding, which would have required the prosecutor to demon-
strate defendant's sanity, was dismissed as establishing "no
constitutional doctrine. ' '2 62 However, the Court affirmed a more so-
phisticated constitutional demand: the state must prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt every statutorily created element of the offense
charged.2 63 The Oregon scheme survived under this standard because
the burden of showing that the accused acted "purposely" and "with
premeditated malice" remained on the prosecution. 26
In its operational analysis, the Court assumed that the prosecutor
and the defendant could each have a burden in relation to the same
facts. The accused must introduce evidence of his disturbed mental
state at the time of the crime;265 the prosecutor must show that despite
this evidence, the required mens rea was present. As the trial judge had
instructed the jury, the proof of defendant's insanity must be weighed
in regard to defendant's ability to premeditate, deliberate, or form a
260. 343 U.S. 790 (1952). Davis remains the law for federal prosecutions, while Leland gov-
erns state cases.
261. Leland had been sentenced to death after a jury found him guilty of first degree murder.
Oregon law required a defendant to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt and made
"morbid propensity" no defense. The Supreme Court noted that approximately twenty states still
required that the accused establish his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence or an
equivalent measure of persuasion; Oregon was unique in utilizing an even more stringent stan-
dard. 343 U.S. at 798. Two possible rationales for placing this burden on defendant have been
proposed: (1) where evidence of insanity is relevant to the determination of guilt, the state is
entitled to continue to rely on the presumption of sanity after introduction of defendant's evidence
because otherwise the prosecution would be required to prove a negative; and (2) where evidence
of insanity is irrelevant to the determination of guilt, and the prosecution need not prove sanity to
establish guilt, defendant's evidence of insanity is admissible only to assess the severity of punish-
ment or course of treatment. Note, Constitutional Limitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of
Insanity to the Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 B.U. L. Rav. 499, 503 (1976).
262. 343 U.S. at 797. Davis was characterized as a mere procedural rule for the federal courts.
Id. at 798.
263. Id. at 799.
264. Id. at 794. For first degree murder, the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
premeditation, deliberation, malice, and intent. Second degree murder required a showing of
malice and intent, but without deliberation and premeditation. Manslaughter was defined as a
killing without malice or deliberation, but upon a sudden heat of passion caused by a provocation
sufficient to make the impulse irresistible. Id. at 793-94.
265. The prosecutor commences each case with the convenience of a presumption that the
defendant is sane. H. WEmoFEN, MENTAL DISORDER As A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 214 (1954);
Orfield, Burden of Proofand Presumptions in Federal Criminal Cases, 31 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 30,
46 (1963). The burden rests on the accused "to produce some evidence that will impair or weaken
the force of the legal presumption in favor of sanity." Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of
Justice" Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1300 n.3 (1977). Once he
produces such evidence, however, there is a contested issue and the loss falls on whichever party
has the burden of persuasion. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 4, at 313.
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purpose; if he lacked such an ability he must be acquitted of the correl-
ative charge even if he was not found to be insane.266
2 Implementation of the Constitutional Demand
A crucial portion of the Leland decision has been amputated by
misinterpretation. Trial and appellate courts have tended to focus
solely on the permission to retain statutes placing the burden of prov-
ing insanity on defendants. The direction as to the prosecutor's duty to
prove each statutorily defined mental element beyond a reasonable
doubt has either been ignored entirely267 or given a vapid mention that
failed to compare the particular manifestation of insanity that was
claimed to the particular mens rea that was required.2 68
Presume that a conjugal homicide has been committed by a bat-
tered spouse in New Jersey, where the homicide law requires inter alia
proof that the killing was committed purposely or knowingly. 269 The
state's insanity test includes both the "right-wrong" and the "nature
and quality" aspects of M'Naghten.270 The defendant introduces evi-
dence of disturbed mental state at the time of the slaying. The out-
come of the prosecution may depend not only on the cogency of
defendant's insanity claim but on its theme.
If the facts coincide with State v. Guido,27 for example, defense
266. 343 U.S. at 794-95.
267. See, ag., State v. Mytych, 292 Minn. 248, 194 N.W.2d 276 (1972); Phillips v. State, 86
Nev. 720, 475 P.2d 671 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 940 (1971); Nilsson v. State, 477 S.W.2d 592
(Tex. 1972).
268. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 516 F.2d 910, 911 (8th Cir. 1975), in which the court held:
so long as the trial court charged the jury that it was the state's burden to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every element necessary to constitute the crime of first degree murder,
there would be no constitutional violation of due process of law even though the appel-
lant was required to maintain the burden on the issue of his insanity defense.
See also Phillips v. Hocker, 473 F.2d 395 (9th Cir. 1973); Rivera v. State, 351 A.2d 561 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1976).
269. New Jersey's present statute defining murder reads in part:
a. [Ciriminal homicide constitutes murder when:
(1) The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or
(2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death;...
b. Murder is a crime of the first degree....
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1981).
270. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-1 (West 1981). See, e.g., State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 68, 152 A.2d
50, 66 (1959).
271. 40 N.J. 191, 191 A.2d 45 (1963). The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed defendant's
conviction of murder in the second degree and 24-year minimum sentence, primarily on the
grounds that the trial judge had improperly intervened in the prosecution in a manner that could
have prejudiced the jury's approach to the factual issues. For example, the judge had allowed the
state to present its thesis that defendant had killed her husband to prevent his finding out that she
was pregnant by another man, despite a lack of any evidence that she even knew she was pregnant
at the time or that she had ever had an extra-marital liaison. The court asked unnecessary ques-
tions that aided the state's case; restated portions of defendant's testimony that placed her in an
unfavorable light; and sustained the prosecutor's berating of defense counsel and witnesses. Id. at
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counsel may effectively invoke the Leland directive to prosecutors. De-
fendant Adele Guido was married to a professional fighter who had left
her after the birth of their daughter and was living with another wo-
man. While he refused to support his wife or their child, he resented
her efforts to divorce him. His pursuit of her, and his continuing at-
tacks and threats, led to a final confrontation in which he insisted that
she go with him to Florida. Later in the course of the evening, defend-
ant shot and killed him. Her plea centered on lack of capacity to un-
derstand the nature of her acts. It was not that she believed the
homicide was morally right; rather, she was unaware that she was kill-
ing at all. Even if she were unable to prove that she was insane, her
disorientation would counter the prosecution's claim that she acted
purposely or knowingly.272
Contrast this to the facts in State v. LePaolo,273 where defendant
testified that he had killed his former girlfriend because he heard God's
voice commanding his deed.274 Defense psychiatrists testified that he
suffered from schizophrenia. This evidence indicates that although de-
fendant was unable to comprehend that his act was wrong, he was
aware that he was slaying the victim and intended to do so.275 This
kind of insanity plea, in which defendant concedes the intent to kill,
does not conflict with the mental elements that the prosecutor must
prove.
Thus, the trial court's threshold step in implementing Leland is to
determine whether or not the insanity evidence adduced bears a "nec-
essary relationship" 276 to the existence of the mental state described in
New Jersey's homicide law. If such a relationship is demonstrated, de-
197-203, 208 & n.2, 191 A.2d at 49-51, 54 & n.2. The New Jersey Supreme Court did not address
the question of prosecutorial burden, but it is unclear whether this was the result of defense coun-
sel's failure to raise the issue or the court's preoccupation with other trial errors.
272. At the time the case was tried, the conviction for murder in the second degree required
proof of intent, while first degree murder required proof of premeditation. State v. Anderson, 35
N.J. 472, 497, 173 A.2d 377, 389 (1961).
273. 34 N.J. 279, 168 A.2d 401 (1961).
274. His victim was a former girl friend, and he believed that since they had engaged in illicit
relations, their sin could be expiated only if both were destroyed.
275. New Jersey's former murder law included any kind of "willful, deliberate and premedi-
tated killing." NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:1 13-2 (West 1969). Cf. the present law set out in part in note
269 supra, which uses the words "purposely" and "knowingly."
276. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 705-06 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). In Mulla-
ne,, absence of provocation was found to be part of the state's definition of murder, and therefore
due process was offended by a rule requiring the defendant to prove that the killing had occurred
on sudden provocation. The state scheme was constitutionally defective because a mental element
in the homicide law was wholly identical with the affirmative defense burdening the accused. Id.
at 691-92, 703-04. The concurring opinion noted in distinguishing Leland that while "evidence
relevant to insanity as defined by state law may also be relevant to whether the required mens rea
was present, the existence or nonexistence of legal insanity bears no necessary relationship to the
existence or nonexistence of the required mental elements of the crime." Id. at 705-06. See also
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fense counsel should request that the prosecutor's burden be explained
to the jury in concrete terms. Even the well-intentioned charge by the
trial judge in Leland was aptly described by the dissent as a "farrago of
generalities" that the jurors could not folow. 277
Using the Guido facts as a base, a charge could be formulated as
follows:
In order for you to find the defendant guilty of murder in the second
degree, the people must have established to your satisfaction from all
the evidence in the case that the defendant, when she shot and killed
the deceased, acted purposely or knowingly. The defendant and de-
ceased's own daughter by a former marriage have testified that he in-
jured defendant on several occasions and that police aid was requested.
Defendant's employer has stated that the deceased repeatedly
threatened defendant. Now, the defendant has testified that on the day
that the shooting occurred, the deceased took a weapon from his travel-
ling bag and said that he would use it on their child if defendant re-
fused to leave the baby and go to Florida with him. He then fell asleep
in the livingroom. Defendant states that she took the gun into another
room with the intention of committing suicide. Abandoning this idea,
she returned to the livingroom to put the weapon back into the suitcase
but seeing the deceased, she shot him several times. Psychiatrists ap-
pointed by this Court to examine defendant later testified on her behalf
that at the time of the shooting she was suffering from a disease of the
mind not amounting to a psychosis, but which rendered her unable to
understand the nature and consequences of her actions. The People's
psychiatrists disagreed with this conclusion, and testified that defendant
had reached a severe disorganizing state of anxiety but that her reason
was not impaired. The burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that defendant acted purposely or knowingly remains at all times on
the State. In determining this question, it is your duty to take into con-
sideration defendant's mental condition and all factors relating thereto,
whether or not you find her legally insane.
Guido is an appropriate model precisely because the evidence con-
cerning defendant's mental state may not have met her burden of dem-
onstrating insanity. Yet the proof may have been sufficient to create a
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977); Rivera v. Delaware, 429 U.S. 877, 879-80 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
277. 343 U.S. at 806 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The judge had stated to the jury:
I instruct you that the evidence adduced during this trial to prove defendant's insanity
shall be considered and weighed by you, with all other evidence, whether or not you find
defendant insane, in regard to the ability of the defendant to premeditate, form a pur-
pose, to deliberate, act wilfully, and act maliciously; and if you find the defendant lack-
ing in such ability, the defendant cannot have committed the crime of murder in the first
degree.
I instruct you that should you find the defendant's mental condition to be so affected or
diseased to the end that the defendant could formulate no plan, design, or intent to kill in
cool blood, the defendant has not committed the crime of murder in the first degree.
Id. at 794-95.
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fatal weakness in the state's case: a reasonable doubt as to her mens
rea.27 8 Under such circumstances, superficial treatment of the Leland
mandate may have substantial consequences.
The location and weight of burdens of proof in a criminal case
directly affect the likelihood of acquittal.279 On the question of estab-
lishing insanity, the risk of nonpersuasion may be placed on defendant
Guido; she loses that avenue of acquittal if the jury is not convinced by
her claim.280 On the question of intent or "purpose," however, she
would have only the relatively lighter burden of bringing forward the
mental state evidence;28'1 it is the prosecutor who bears the risk of non-
persuasion and loses all avenues of conviction if the jury has a reason-
able doubt as to his version of such evidence.282
Since the prosecutorial responsibility stems from the Constitution,
it would apply even in a jurisdiction that repeals the insanity defense
and precludes any partial defense of "diminished capacity. ' 28 3 A con-
stitutional mandate is neither the product of state largesse nor subject
to state contraction.284
C. Manslaughter: The Impefect Defense
If neither self-defense nor evidence of a disoriented mental state
dictates acquittal, what weight should be given to the deceased's prior
conduct when a previously battered spouse commits homicide? There
is a superficial symmetry in the response that a charge of manslaughter
is- a midpoint between discounting all sanction and exacting the full
278. Acquittal following the prosecution's failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
would never require mandatory hospitalization. Although it would be within the state's discretion
to commence a civil commitment proceeding, this would be less likely where there has been no
insanity finding by a jury, particularly if defendant is no longer dangerous. See note 256 and
accompanying text supra.
279. Inre Winship, 397 U.S. 358,363 (1970) (the Court emphasized that the reasonable doubt
standard that must be met by the prosecution is "a prime instrument for reducing the risk of
[factually erroneous] convictions.... The standard provides concrete substance for the pre-
sumption of innocence... whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of. . .our criminal law' ").
Innocence encompasses not only alibi defenses but also instances where psychiatric evidence
shows that defendants lacked the explicit mental components established by the legislature to
define culpability.
280. NJ. STAT. ANN. §2C:4-1 (West 1981); R. PlnMius, supra note 6, at 883 n.89.
281. The presumption of sanity could arguably include the presumption that defendant was
not disoriented, proof of disorientation should therefore be introduced by the defense. See note
265 supra.
282. As the Supreme Court held in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [defend-
ant] is charged." See cases cited note 276 supra.
283. See note 247 supra and note 292 infra for discussions of the insanity defense and dimin-
ished capacity. Even without those defenses, psychiatric evidence would remain admissible be-
cause of its relevance to the intent question.
284. U.S. CONsT. art. VI., cl. 2.
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penalty.2 85 Acceptance of an imperfect defense creates no "open sea-
son" on spouses, but nevertheless demonstrates that this defendant is
not as bad as one who kills for the insurance money. Closer scrutiny
indicates that the symmetry is somewhat askew.
Manslaughter is peculiarly applicable to killings that are provoked
by external events. A, driven into a passion by the sudden discovery of
his wife's adultery with B, shoots B as he is fleeing from the house. A is
regarded as an appropriate candidate for mitigation because the cir-
cumstances would tend to deprive a reasonable man of self-control
(even though the reasonable man would not resort to homicide).286
Physical persecution is the ultimate provocation. If Jones beats
Smith not once but several times and makes it clear that he will con-
tinue to do so whenever he pleases, we advise Smith thus: If you act
out your fear and rage by killing when you are not in imminent danger,
perhaps you should not be regarded as a murderer. We will certainly
charge you with manslaughter, however, because you could have been
protected by legal rather than illegal means.
If the victim of the attacks is Mrs. Jones, however, this advice
misses the mark. A dual burden may rest on Jones' wife-fear that
past beatings will repeat themselves and increase in severity287 and the
tacit exemption of domestic violence from the reach of the assault
statutes.
In cases of homicide by a battered spouse, judges and juries are
therefore combining ingredients that do not coalesce into a serviceable
recipe. Killing must be deterred (penalty required); human frailties
must be given some recognition (mitigation appropriate); self-help was
the only help (acquittal not permitted, conviction not palatable). In-
stances of jury nullification of a judge's manslaughter charges reflect
the legal system's uneasy effort to accommodate the purposes, rather
than solely the letter, of the homicide laws.
285. "[Manslaughter is an intermediate crime, which Hes half-way between the more serious
crime of murder, at the one extreme, and, at the other extreme, justifiable or excusable homicide,
which is not criminal at all." W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 4, at 571.
The legislative range of homicide grades generally encompasses (in descending order of sen-
tence length) first and second degree murder, and voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. First
degree murder may include some or all of these types: premeditated intent-to-kill, killing by a
reckless act evincing a depraved indifference to human life, killing in the course of certain danger-
ous felonies. Second degree murder often involves unpremeditated murder, or death resulting
from the intent to commit serious bodily harm. Id. at 562, 568. Particularly relevant in the con-
text of domestic killings is the category of voluntary manslaughter: an intentional homicide com-
mitted under circumstances that mitigate, but fall short of justifying, the crime. See, e.g., N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKINNEY 1975).
286. R. PERKINS, supra note 6, at 55; State v. Watkins, 147 Iowa 566, 569-70, 126 N.W. 691,
692 (1910); State v. Fiske, 58 Nev. 65, 75, 70 P.2d 1113, 1116 (1937).
287. See notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra.
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. The Signftcance of Provocation
Homicide is far from unique in grading its component crimes in
accordance with the blameworthiness of the offender. However, the
degrees established within such offenses as arson or larceny generally
correspond with statutorily listed aggravating factors-the potential
danger posed by the conduct and the degree of injury actually result-
ing. Thus arson is punished more seriously when the defendant inten-
tionally starts a fire at a time when he knows that a nonparticipant in
the crime is in the building; 8 the dividing line between grand and
petit larceny depends upon the amount the thief stole.289 The defend-
ant's emotional state is not a statutory concern.29 ° The fact that the
victim of the arsonist or thief may have enraged the defendant by un-
deniably provocative conduct, is irrelevant to the grading system.
By contrast, the issue of provocation is often central to the assess-
ment of a homicide. Since most statutory schemes incorporate mitiga-
tion by abstract reference,291 the judiciary's task has been to identify
the circumstances that will qualify as extenuating. While mere stupid-
ity, irascibility or timidity are not valid as mitigators, more complex
variations of these states have been recognized in manslaughter cases.
Leniency may be extended if defendant's capacity to perceive reality is
substantially limited292 or if the killing is triggered by a serious and
recognizable provocation.293
288. Eg., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 150.10-.15 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
289. Eg., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.25-.30 (McKinney 1975).
290. The creation of the voluntary manslaughter category, without a "voluntary larceny" ana-
logue, reflects a historical difference between the mandatory death sentence imposed for murder
under English common law and the flexibility left to the courts in non-homicide cases, where the
punishment could be mitigated if there were extenuating circumstances. The creation of a differ-
ent grade of homicide-manslaughter-which was detached from capital punishment, provided a
midpoint between acquittal and death. ROYAL COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1949-53 RE-
PORT 52-53 (1953).
291. Eg., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54a (West Supp. 1981); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25
(McKinney 1975). Both sections permit mitigation from second degree murder to manslaughter
on the basis of extreme emotional disturbance, but do not list examples of what might consitute
such a disturbance.
292. "Diminished capacity" must be distinguished, in concept and consequences, from the
insanity defense. As indicated at notes 252-53 and accompanying text supra, the insane defendant
is not generally held responsible for any crime if he fails to understand the nature and quality of
his act or that it was wrong. One who manifests an abnormal mental condition short of insanity
(or who is voluntarily intoxicated) may still be charged with a lower grade of homicide. Homicide
committed by a voluntarily intoxicated defendant may be treated as second degree murder or as
manslaughter. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 4, at 345. The status of the diminished capac-
ity defense is entirely within the discretion of the legislature. Some jurisdictions permit it as a
complete defense; others preclude it. Recent Developments." Diminished Capacity-Recent Deci-
sions and an Anal yicalApproach, 30 VAND. L. REV. 213, 215-20, 222-24 (1977).
293. The defendant must demonstrate the severity of the provocation, the lack of a reasonable
opportunity for the passion to cool, and the proportionality of the retaliation. W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTT, supra note 4, at 572, 573; R. PERKINS, supra note 6, at 54.
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2. . Prior Pattern of Conduct as Provocation but not Jusftfcation
Blackstone characterized beating and wounding as second only to
murder and mayhem in the hierarchy of human disasters;294 at com-
mon law a violent, painful blow, with fist or weapon, was a "legally
sufficient" provocation for homicide.z95 Since a single assault occur-
ring shortly before the homicide is adequate as a mitigator if it inflicts
substantial pain or injury, a series of such assaults is all the more likely
to vitiate the self-control that blocks an impulse to kill.2 96 Even if the
latest battery in the series was not severe, a well-grounded fear that the
latest will not be the last clearly merits consideration as a basis for re-
ducing murder charges to manslaughter. Yet trial courts have not been
noticeably alert to this implication of the common law view.
Jury instructions in battered spouse cases have tended to treat the
evidence as though only the moments before the slaying were relevant.
A boilerplate charge that "the provocation must be of such character
and so close upon the act of killing that for the moment the defendant
could not be considered the master of her own understanding" scarcely
enlightens the jury as to how repeated infliction of trauma on the de-
fendant is to be assessed.
297
294. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
295. W. LAFAvE & A. Scorr, supra note 4, at 574. Another permissible basis for mitigation
would be a scuffle commenced byA that results in B's use of excessive and deadly retaliation. IfA
resorts to deadly force in response, self-defense is inapplicable because A was not free from fault
in bringing on the struggle. However, B's escalation is grounds for reducing the charge to man-
slaughter if A kills him. d. at 574, nn.14-17.
296. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 4, at 574; R. PERINS, supra note 6, at 60, 66; Cf
People v. Borchers, 50 Cal. 2d 321, 325 P.2d 97 (1958) (a history of provocatory behavior provided
evidence that defendant acted in heat of passion in killing victim); Commonwealth v. Colandro,
231 Pa. 343, 80 A. 571 (1911) (a series of threats by the victim against the defendant was evidence
that defendant's fear may have caused him to kill the victim).
297. State v. Lamb, 71 N.J. 545, 550, 366 A.2d 981, 984 (1976). See also People v. Welborn,
242 Cal. App. 2d 668, 676, 51 Cal. Rptr. 644, 649 (3d Dist. 1966); State v. Guido, 40 N.J. 191, 209,
191 A.2d 45, 55 (1963).
Decisions on provocation as a series of acts, outside the context of repeated assaults, have
been mixed. One of the most notorious, but least celebrated, examples is State v. Gounagias, 88
Wash. 304, 153 P. 9 (1915), where defendant was the helpless victim of an act of sodomy by the
deceased. Thereafter, defendant was continually tormented by the words and gestures of those to
whom the deceased had related the incident in detail. The cumulative reminders of the original
trauma finally enraged the defendant to such an extent that he rushed to deceased's house and
killed him. It was held that no mitigation was appropriate because there had been no new acts of
provocation by the deceased himself; thus defendant was no longer in a heat of passion, as there
had been an adequate "cooling otf' period after the sodomy. The court did not credit the fact that
the continuing taunts would not have occurred but for deceased's relating the facts to others de-
spite defendant's pleas to tell no one. Accord, In re Fraley, 3 Okla. Crim. 719, 109 P. 295 (1910)
(defendant unsuccessfully argued that the sudden sight of deceased, who had killed defendant's
son a few months earlier, had produced a new passion based on the old wrong). Other courts have
concluded that repeated acts of provocation may finally cause an emotional explosion, and that
the cooling time should begin to run from the "last straw," not from the earlier and perhaps more
serious acts. R. PERKINs, supra note 6, at 67.
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Appellate courts have begun to correct such charges, 298 as well as
to reverse trial courts that refuse to submit the manslaughter question
to the jury despite proof of prior attacks by the deceased. State v.
mUdo 299 exemplifies such a reversal. Commenting on defendant's sec-
ond degree murder conviction and twenty-four-year minimum sen-
tence, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held:
[A] course of ill treatment which can induce a homicidal response
in a person of ordinary firmness and which the accused reasonably be-
lieves is likely to continue, should permit a finding of provocation. In
taking this view, we merely acknowledge the undoubted capacity of
events to accumulate a detonating force, no different from that of a
single blow or injury.
Recognition of this "detonating force" as a basis for reducing the
period of imprisonment has not led the judiciary to discount the dis-
tinction between provocation and self-defense. Even if the essence of
the provocation plea is fear, the higher standard set in self-defense
cases requires the belief of immediate danger to be reasonable as well
as honest.301 The assumption underlying the reasonableness require-
ment is that if Mrs. Jones (of our prior hypothetical) shoots her hus-
band while he is asleep, this would be at worst a calculated killing of an
undeserving person. At best, it would reflect an erroneous conclusion
that homicide was the only way of extricating herself from continuing
persecution. Despite the comfortable logic and venerable lineage of
this distinction between provocation and justification, however, juries
representing the community conscience 30 2 have failed to adhere to the
298. Reversal followed the inadequate charge in State v. Lamb, 71 N.J. 545, 366 A.2d 981
(1976).
299. 40 NJ. 191, 191 A.2d 45 (1963).
300. Id. at 211, 191 A.2d at 56.
301. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note 4, at 583; see text accompanying notes 241-42 supra.
Trial courts have sometimes displayed unwarranted obtuseness in rejecting proof that a deceased's
vicious pattern of conduct, taken as a totality, justified resort to self-defense. An example is State
v. Seelke, 221 Kan. 672, 561 P.2d 869 (1977). Deceased was described as a "mean drunk" who
was often violent towards his wife. Just prior to the killing, deceased had sexually abused and
severely beaten defendant and was threatening to kill her and her babies. The Supreme Court of
Kansas reversed defendant's second degree murder conviction on the grounds that the trial court
had erred in not including a charge of involuntary manslaughter in its jury instructions. Although
the appellate court mentioned defendant's self-defense claim (which would have been a complete
defense), its opinion concentrated largely on elements of provocation, mitigation, and voluntary
and involuntary manslaughter. Contrast these facts with a case where provocation rather than
self-defense could properly be found. In People v. Berry, 18 Cal. 3d 509, 556 P.2d 777, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 415 (1976), the deceased, a 20-year-old woman less than half her husband's age, had taunted
defendant for weeks with stories of her affair with another man, demands for a divorce, and
alternate demands and refusals to have sexual relations with him. The California Supreme Court
reversed defendant's conviction of murder in the first degree because the trial court had refused to
instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, based upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion
resulting from deceased's long course of provocatory conduct.
302. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (lst Cir. 1969).
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expected formula in some conjugal homicides.
3. The Doctrine of Jury Nulljfcation
Jury deviation from judicial instruction in interspousal cases raises
critical issues concerning the feasibility and propriety of control over
verdicts. Should the deviation be deterred, for example, by establishing
sanctions against "erring" jurors?" 3 Is the phenomenon of jury inde-
pendence a regrettable example of lawlessness or a legitimate corrective
for the prior refusal to enforce assault statutes against domestic
violators?
a. Juror Freedom to Acquit
As Judge Learned Hand has observed:
The institution of trial by jury-especially in criminal cases-has its
hold upon public favor chiefly for two reasons. The individual can for-
feit his liberty--to say nothing of his life-only at the hands of those
who, unlike any official, are in no wise accountable, directly or indi-
rectly, for what they do, and who at once separate and melt anony-
mously in the community from which they came. Moreover, since if
they acquit their verdict is final, no... [defendant] is likely to suffer of
whose conduct they do not morally disapprove; and this introduces...
into the enforcement of law ... the mollifying influence of current
ethical [considerations]. 3"
This lack of accountability, which includes the prerogative of re-
porting a final decision without giving reasons for it, was a slow and far
from coincidental development in Anglo-American legal history. Con-
sider the early forms of control over English jurors. A party who lost a
case could convene a larger jury to review the facts de novo; if the
second jury disagreed with the first, the members of the original jury
could be attainted-a most unpleasant form of reversal:
All of the first jury shall be committed to the King's prison, their
goods shall be confiscated, their possessions seized into the King's
hands. Their habitations and houses shall be pulled down, their wood-
land shall be felled, their meadows shall be plowed up and they them-
selves forever thenceforward be esteemed in the eye of the law
infamous.305
303. An "incorrect" acquittal may not, of course, be remedied by retrying the defendant. U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
304. United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1942).
305. J. FORTESCUE, DE LAUDmBUS LEGUM ANIEm, ch. 26 (c. 1468) (S.B. Chrimes trans. &
ed.), quoted in T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY'OF THE COMMON LAW 131 (5th ed. 1956).
The rationale for tli severity was that as originally conceived, the jury arrived at-its decision on
the basis of facts personally known to its members rather than after sifting the testimony of wit-
nesses. Thus an incorrect verdict was regarded as perjury. Id. Although attaint was rarely used
in criminal cases and fell into disfavor by the fifteenth century, other techniques for controlling
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Although an acquittal is not only a conclusive finding on the facts
but also a conclusive application of the law to the particular case at bar,
controls over acquittals came to be recognized as more pernicious than
the possibility of a "wrong" verdict. While improper conviction could
constitute creation of a new rule of law operating as an ex post facto
penalty, no parallel consequence flows from giving a verdict of not
guilty its full effect.30
What are the practical consequences of this power in prosecutions
of battered spouses who kill their assailants? To what extent do laymen
arrive at dispositions that differ from those of a professional judiciary?
Comprehensive empirical evidence in conjugal and other cases, match-
ing a massive sample of jury verdicts with a report from the trial judge
in each case as to the disposition he would have made on the same
facts, indicates a rather significant range of disagreement. 0 7 Overall
verdict figures for manslaughter and for murder prosecutions show that
the jury was more lenient in twenty-nine percent of the trials.30 8 Inter-
spousal homicide dispositions exhibit the same general trend,30 9 al-
though no percentage comparisons with nonfamilial prosecutions are
available.
The divergence between judge and jury indicates that the court's
charge to the jurors has either 1) provided sufficient latitude for the
juries were developed and the judiciary assumed the power of punishing jurors for rendering
incorrect as well as corrupt verdicts. M. KADISH & S. KADISH, DiSCRErION To DISOBEY 45, 46
(1973) (citing W. FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 192-214, 259-98 (n.p. 1852) and P. DEV-
LIN, TRIAL BY JURY (1956)). If an acquittal of a criminal defendant was regarded as manifestly
against the evidence, jurors could be called into the Star Chamber, imprisoned until they con-
fessed their error, fined, or otherwise humiliated. See T. PLuCKNETr, supra, at 133 (referring to
jurors "made to wear papers in Westminster Hall" (quoting R. CROMirON, AUTHoRiTiE ET Ju-
RISDICTION DES COURTS DE LA MAJESTIE DE LA ROYGNE, f. 32b (n.p. 1594))).
The celebrated Bushell's Case, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670), terminated this
control over acquittals. The members of the jury, who had refused to give a verdict against Wil-
1am Penn and William Mead for preaching to an unlawful assembly, persisted in their refusal
despite being locked up without food for two days and fined. M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra, at
46. Indeed, four of the jurors spent months in prison. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to
Say No, 45 So. CAL. L. REv. 168, 168 (1972). On habeas corpus review, it was held that the jury
was not required to follow the direction of the court. T. PLuCKNETr, supra, at 134.
306. As Lord Devlin has commented: "Whenever there is a trial by jury, the condemnation
must be by a judgment which is both lawful and the judgment of the country. If his countrymen
condemn a man and they exceed the law, he shall go free: if the law condemns him and neverthe-
less his countrymen acquit, he shall go free." P. DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 90-91 (1956), quotedln
M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 305, at 47. Convictions can be set aside, as can the verdicts
of civil juries. Id. at 46.
307. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURy (1966).
308. Juries were more lenient in 35% of the cases, judges in 6%. The authors of the study
subtracted the cases in which the judges were more lenient for a "net jury leniency" of 29%. Id. at
69. The study reached no conclusion as to whether or not the judge's disposition would have been
more appropriate.
309. Id. at 202-03, 231-36.
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variance, or 2) unsuccessfully exhorted application of the pertinent law
to the salient facts.31 ° Where the case is not a close one from the evi-
dentiary standpoint, acquittal is likely to stem from resistance to the
limitations imposed by the court's statement of the law.31'
This hypothesis of resistance is applicable to acquittals in the do-
mestic violence context, which involve jury handling of self-defense
and provocation pleas.312 About one-third of the judge-jury disagree-
ments in crimes of violence turn on the self-defense issue.313 Particu-
larly significant is the class of cases in which one component of the self-
defense requisites is missing:
The victim has been a[n] . . . aggressor, has threatened serious -
harm, and the defendant's violence is in response to violence initiated
by the victim. What causes the judge and jury to disagree is that in
each of these cases, at the time the defendant acts, the threat of violence
is no longer immediate enough to satisfy the legal rule.314
Compassion for a wife protecting herself against an assaultive hus-
band is explicitly noted as a factor in acquittals,315 as is a general find-
ing that juries are reluctant to convict where the defendant was
"punished enough" by being beaten or suffering other misfortunes.
316
Thus, the jury's disagreement317 is often influenced by a normative
judgment about the circumstances that warrant violent self-help and
the appropriate legal limitations on self-defense.318
b. Justifying the Jury's Power
How can an uncontrolled exercise of the prerogative to determine
both law and fact be upheld? Enter the doctrine of jury nullification, a
phoenix that has survived a series of fiery executions. This doctrine
would grant jurors the power to acquit on the basis of their own con-
sciences, regardless of the judge's instructions on the law.319 John Ad-
310. In 34% of the cases, divergence occurred because of factual disputes, in 42% because of
disputes over values and facts, and in 24% because of values alone. See id. at 163-65. The trial
judge is, of course, precluded from directing a verdict of guilty. M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra
note 305, at 52.
311. H. KALvEN & H. ZEISEI., supra note 307, at 164 n.2.
312. See N.Y. Times, May 7, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 1. It should be noted that although several
recent acquittals in domestic homicides were based on acceptance of insanity pleas, see note 210
supra, disagreement in insanity cases is rare, H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 307, at 330.
313. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 307, at 221. This group of cases comprises five
percent of the total sample of judge-jury disagreements.
314. Id. at 223.
315. Id. at 202-03.
316. Id. at 106.
317. It should be noted that in most cases, the jury's rejection of the law is not necessarily a
conscious or explicit choice. Id. at 165.
318. Id. at 221 n.l, 223.
319. Trials for seditious libel were the genesis of nullification debates both in England and the
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ams noted in his Diary for February 12, 1771, that "the common
people... should have as complete a control, as decisive a negative, in
every judgment of a court of judicature" as in other governmental
decisions.32o
By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the United States
Supreme Court had held that because of the paramount value of uni-
formity and predictability in the law, the jury does not have the right,
even if it possesses the power, to discount the court's instruction:
Public and private safety alike would be in peril, if the principle be
established that juries in criminal cases may, of right, disregard the law
as expounded to them by the court and become a law unto them-
selves.... [Tihe result would be that the enforcement of the law
against criminals... would depend entirely upon juries uncontrolled
by any settled, fixed, legal principles.32 1
Despite the coup de grace from the judiciary,322 the question of
whether jury nullification serves a permissible or even indispensable
function in the criminal justice system has continued to be disputed.
Dean Roscoe Pound has termed "jury lawlessness" an essential "cor-
rective" in legal administration.3a Wigmore reached substantially the
same conclusion without invocation of controversial phraseology:
Law and Justice are from time to time inevitably in conflict. That is
because law is a general rule (even the stated exceptions to the rules are
colonies. See, ag., The King v. Shipley, 99 Eng. Rep. 774 (K.B. 1784); Libel Act of 1792, 32 Geo,
3, c. 60, § 1; Howe, Jwies as Judges of CriminalLaw, 52 HARv. L. REV. 582, 583-88 (1939). At the
1735 prosecution of John Peter Zenger, a New York printer of a newspaper whose content was not
approved by the British mayor, the jurors were advised by prominent counsel Andrew Hamilton
that they had "the right beyond all dispute to determine both the law and the facts." They were
exhorted to "see with their own eyes, to hear with their own ears, and to make use of their own
consciences and understandings in judging of the lives, liberties or estates of their fellow subjects."
J. ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENOER 78,93 (S.
Katz ed. 1963). While this concept was repudiated in England, Howe, supra, at 583-84, the right
ofjuries in criminal cases to nullify court instructions on the law was widely accepted in America
during the pre-Revolutionary era and indeed for forty years after the adoption of the United
States Constitution. M. KADIsH & S. KADISH, supra note 305, at 48; Scheflin, supra note 305, at
174.
320. 2 LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 225 (C.F. Adams ed. 1856). Another factor sup-
porting nullification was the minute differential in legal training and experience between judges
and juries of the period. U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCE-
MENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROcEDURE No. 8, at 27 (1931).
321. Sparf& Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 101-02 (1895). See also United States v.
Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (D. Mass. 1835). It has also been held that since the jury has no right to
nulfify, it must not be instructed as to its power to do so because such an instruction would in-
crease the instances where such power is exercised. United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1006
(1969). See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 307, at 498.
322. For a summary of contemporary federal and state rulings on jury nullification, see
Scheflin, supra note 305, at 201-23.
323. Pound, Law in Books andLaw in Action, 44 Am. L. REv. 12, 18-19 (1910).
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general exceptions); while Justice is the fairness of this precise case un-
der all its circumstances....
Everybody knows this and can supply instances. But the trouble is
the law cannot concede it....
Now this is where the jury comes in. The jury, in the privacy of its
retirement, adjusts the general rule to the justice of the particular case.
Thus the odium of inflexible rules of law is avoided, and popular satis-
faction is preserved...
And that flexibility could never be given by judge trial.32 4
Other commentators have suggested that nullification is appropriate in
particular categories of cases where normal prophylactic devices such
as prosecutorial discretion and leniency in sentencing will not be
utilized.32 5
c. NulUMfcation as a Corrective
Are conjugal homicides a category in which the correctives nor-
mally inherent in the criminal justice system have failed to operate?
Prosecutorial discretion is seldom used when a killing falls outside the
meticulous imperatives of self-defense,32 6 and on occasion is not exer-
cised even where these imperatives seem to have been satisfied.327
However, truncation of a homicide inquiry at the initial stage may be
the least appropriate adjustment mechanism available. In contrast, le-
niency by the sentencing judge may be the most appropriate measure
countenanced by the rules of the system, where the sentence accorded
is based on a record showing the deceased's prior assaults on the
defendant.
Yet, such clemency by trial judges has been conspicuously rare. In
People v. Eleuterio,328 for example, no jury trial took place because the
324. Wigmore, A Program for the Trial ofa Jury, 12 AM. Jun. Soc. 166, 170 (1929).
325. Sax, Conscience andAnarehy: The Prosecution of War Resisters, 57 YALE REV. 481,483,
488, 493 (1968). This article focuses upon prosecutions involving passive resistance to unjust laws,
i.e., challenge to the traditional authority of government officials. The government may have
implicated itself so deeply in an unwise policy that popular repudiation in a forum "more immedi-
ately available... than the ballot box" is necessary. Id. at 494. Old examples, such as the
fugitive slave laws, are added to the modem one of draft resistance. Id. at 483-93. See also
Kunstler, Jury Nullocation in Conscience Case; 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 71 (1969).
326. See note 210 supra.
327. A recent example is the case of Pattie Schaeffer, who stabbed her husband as he was
choking her and attempting to push her out of a fifth-story window. The Bronx District attorney
presented the case to a grand jury, even though he believed "[t]here is a strong possibility that this
is a case of self-defense." The grand jury refused to indict. N.Y. Post, Aug. 21, 1980, at 13, col.1.
328. 47 A.D.2d 803, 365 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1975). See also People v. Jones, 191 Cal. App. 2d 478,
12 Cal. Rptr. 777 (2d Dist. 1961); State v. Seelke, 221 Kan. 672, 561 P.2d 869 (1977); State v.
Lamb, 71 NJ. 545, 366 A.2d 981 (1976); State v. Guido, 40 N.J. 191, 191 A.2d 45 (1963); State v.
Thomas, 64 Ohio App. 2d 141, 411 N.E.2d 840 (1979); State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559
P.2d 548 (1977), discussed at note 227 and accompanying text .supra.
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defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter,329 but an extensive
presentence hearing was held before a judge. The appellate court sum-
marized the facts as follows:
[Aippellant was the child of divorced parents and.., her father
was an alcoholic who was chronically unemployed. At the time of this
killing she was 25 years of age, had an above average I.Q. and had
attended college. She had been married to the decedent for five years
and has two infant daughters.... [The decedent worked only irregu-
larly and the support of the family was left largely to appellant....
[Her husband] had physically assaulted her frequently. She tried on
several occasions to leave him but he refused to permit it. Shortly
before the killing she left decedent, moved to Watertown and instituted
divorce proceedings. Decedent followed her and insisted that she ter-
minate the divorce action. Fearing injury to herself and her children
she allowed him to move in with the family again. . . .On the night of
the killing decedent and appellant argued again about separating. De-
cedent refused to do so, verbally abused her and struck her in the face.
He then got his .22 caliber pistol, cleaned it and placed it on his pillow
next to him before going to sleep. During the night appellant awoke
and using her husband's gun fired two shots into his head. She then
drove to the police station with the gun and turned herself in.33o
The trial court imposed an indeterminate sentence of up to twelve
years, despite medical testimony that appellant needed psychiatric
treatment on an outpatient basis rather than institutionalization.33'
Such a sentence is unusually long in light of the presence of commonly
accepted mitigating factors such as protection of the family and ex-
treme provocation, and the absence of such aggravating factors as prior
criminal activity or killing for "kicks. 332
Neither prosecutorial nor sentencing discretion aided Eleuterio. If
329. Defendant had preliminarily entered a plea of not guilty to second degree murder, but
had changed her plea to guilty of the lesser charge of manslaughter in the first degree upon the
advice of her counsel. Record at 1, People v. Eleuterio, 47 A.D.2d 803, 365 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1975).
She was represented by the same counsel who had defended her husband against an assault
charge stemming from a particularly severe beating she had received. When the judge pointed out
this anomaly and asked defendant whether she wished to proceed, counsel answered the question
affirmatively for her. .d. at 22-23.
330. 47 A.D.2d 803, 365 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1975).
331. Record at 54, 62, 91, People v. Eleuterio, 47 A.D.2d 803, 365 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1975).
332. Eleuterio's sentence was reduced to a four-year maximum on appeal. 47 A.D.2d 803,
803, 365 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95 (1975). The Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Sentencing and Cor-
rections Act lists the following as aggravating factors:
If appropriate for the offense, aggravating factors, if not themselves necessary elements
of the offense, may include:
(1) the defendant has a recent history of convictions or criminal behavior,
(2) the defendant was a leader of the criminal activity;
(3) the offense involved more than one victim;
(4) a victim was particularly vulnerable;
(5) a victim was treated with cruelty during the perpetration of the offense;
(6) the harm inflicted on a victim was particularly great;
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she had chosen a jury trial and the court had given a standard self-
defense charge, would acquittal have been an appropriate substitute for
governmental clemency? 333 Professors Mortimer Kadish and Sanford
Kadish suggest that while the judge's instructions are obligatory upon
the jurors, that obligation is not absolute; the jury "considers whether
literal adherence to the judge's instructions will advance or impede the
goals of criminal justice as well as the institutional and background
ends of the society more generally." 334 Analysis of these societal pur-
poses could focus on whether Eleuterio is a "bad" person who should
be punished, deterred from future crimes, or restrained by being incar-cerated. Or, even in the absence of any need for treating or restraining
this defendant, would conviction be essential as general deterrence to
other potential wrongdoers.
The jury may of course answer these questions without differenti-
ating this case from a nondomestic slaying.335 The victim provoked the
homicide by his prior unlawful conduct; the defendant is a sympathetic
one who has never committed a prior crime and is unlikely to commit a
future one. Yet the judge's instructions would preclude acquittal be-
cause the shooting occurred while the victim was asleep; a valid self-
defense plea requires a demonstration of imminent danger. If the jury
disregards the charge it may arguably be satisfying the system's goal of
(7) the offense was committed to gratify the defendant's desire for pleasure or
excitement;
(8) the defendant has a recent history of unwillingness to comply with the conditions of
a sentence involving supervision in the community; and
(9) any other factor consistent with the purpose of this Article and the principles of
sentencing.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM LAW COM-
MISSIONERS' MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 3-109 (Approved Draft 1978), quoted
in Perlman & Stebbins, Implementing an Equitable Sentencing System: The Uniform Law Commis-
sioners' Model Sentencing and CorrectionsAct, 65 VA. L. REV. 1175, 1275 (1979).
333. Unencumbered freedom to acquit is preferable to Argus-eyed surveillance of jury con-
duct. See note 305 and accompanying text supra. Nevertheless, the fact that the power to render
such a verdict is lodged in the jury tells us very little about whether a particular exercise of that
power is justified. It should be noted that there are practical consequences flowing from the
might-right distinction in this context. See note 321 and accompanying text supra, discussing the
judicial rationale for refusing to instruct jurors that they have the power to nullify.
334. M. KADISH & S. KADISH, supra note 305, at 60-61. This remarkable work, which well
repays a complete reading, concludes that the jury's function is neither clerklike nor discretionary.
The jurors have a recourse role and may consider that role's "entire structure of means and ends
before making a judgment on which end or ends shall prevail and which yield." Id. at 61-62.
Recourse roles "enable their agents to take action in situations where the role's prescribed ends
conflict with its prescribed means, including grants of discretion, broad or narrow. Recourse roles
... establisho] conditions under which agents may be justified in undertaking actions that depart
from role requirements." Id. at 35.
335. Cf. Commonwealth v. Colandro, 231 Pa. 343, 80 A. 571 (1911) (deceased had been
threatening to kill defendant for a period of several months and defendant shot him first on the
appointed day).
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justice to this defendant, but endangering the principle of general de-
terrence to others who have been similarly provoked.
However, a unique additional factor must be considered in conju-
gal homicides--a factor anticipated in the prior discussion of the pre-
sumptions underlying self-defense standards.336 How are acquittals to
be assessed if defendants have been deprived as a class of legal protec-
tion against decedents' prior assaults?
Wharton, one of the foremost authorities on the common law, sets
forth the circumstances under which the immediate danger criterion
normally required for self-defense may be irrelevant:
Of course the rule just stated, that an attack cannot be anticipated
by a private person who could have recourse to the law for this pur-
pose, presupposes that the law gives machinery by which, if my life is
threatened, I can cause the arrest of my expected assailant. Suppose,
however, the law gives no such machinery?337
The question is answered thus:
It has sometimes been said that if A's life be made wretched by the
reckless and desperate enmity of B,. . . whom no other process can be
used to check, then A is excused in taking this violent but only possible
way of saving his own life, by sacrificing that of B. But it is otherwise
where there is opportunity to invoke the interposition of the law.338
The common law distinction set forth by Wharton is clear-cut.
The rule that A must wait till the expected attack occurs is dependent
upon the availability of legal redress. If there is no such redress, ' is
not obliged, breaking his usual employments, to hide from B," but may
arm and take action in advance of Bs next assault.339
Contemporary law precludes self-help against anticipated domes-
tic violence even where police and judicial assistance is withheld.
When this impasse is broken by a battered spouse who kills, does ac-
quittal supply the court relief envisioned by Wharton's analysis?
It might be argued that in light of this common law authority
judges in domestic homicide cases should provide a modified instruc-
tion on self-defense, replacing the imminent danger requirement with
the certainty of harm in the future34° and that if such modification is
not made, jury nullification is justified.
336. See Part UI, Section A supra.
337. F. WHARTON, A TREATSE ON CRIMINAL LAW 460, § 487a (9th ed. 1885) (lst ed. Phila-
delphia 1846).
338. Id. at 458-59, § 487.
339. Cf. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *184 (presuming that legal assistance is always
available). See also note 246 and accompanying text supra.
340. See notes 141-44, 241-46 and accompanying text supra. In contrast, the Model Penal
Code suggests that certainty of harm on the present occasion should be a permissible basis for self-
defense. See note 243 supra.
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This approach is too indiscriminate to deal with, a wide range of
potential variables. These variables may be introduced in the follow-
ing dialogue between two speakers, Alpha (the proponent of the the-
ory) and Beta.
Alpha: "Assume I am an abused spouse. If the police will not arrest
my assailant and the unlawful attacks are increasing in severity, can't I
act on Wharton's rationale?"
Beta: "Why not take action when the next attack actually occurs?
Aren't you just suggesting that it's proper to kill to obtain peace of
mind?" 341
Alpha: "Let me add a few more facts, then. I can only ward off my
assailant successfully if I am armed and aware that he is about to
attack."
Beta: "The law permits you to arm in advance when an assault is
reasonably anticipated. 342
Alpha: "Suppose the attacks have always commenced while I was
asleep. Or suppose instead that I have left my spouse, but I know that
he will pursue me343 and perpetrate an ambush attack? The ambush
situation may be just what Wharton had in mind."
Beta: "Have you been persistent in seeking police aid?3 " If your
spouse were in jail, you would be protected without any necessity for
self-help."
Alpha: "This is one of the numerous cases where they didn't re-
spond.345 Or let's say that they did, but no court action was ever initi-
ated, or that the judge refused to impose any jail sentence despite the
341. Cf. People v. Lombard, 17 Cal. 316 (1861) (fear of danger at some future time insuffi-
cient to sustain self-defense plea); State v. Schroeder, 103 Kan. 770, 176 P. 659 (1918) (same); R.
PERKINs, supra note 6, at 994.
342. R. PERKINS, supra note 6, at 58. Such preparation is permitted if unaccompanied by an
intention to provoke a confrontation. Defense counsel should be aware, however, that a prosecu-
tor might argue that this conduct constituted "lying in wait"-which is prohibited. See Eisenberg
& Seymour, supra note 73, at 42.
343. "In the most extreme cases husbands have kept their wives and children prisoners, or
have tracked their fleeing wives across the country to continue their assaults, or have made threats
against the lives of their wives' parents or the children should the wives attempt to escape."
Fields, Myefe Beating: Government Intervention Policies and Practices, in U.S. COMM'N ON CiviL
RIGHTS, BATrERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 228, 265 (1978). See State v. Guido 40
NJ. 191, 191 A.2d 45 (1963), discussed at note 271-72 and accompanying text supra; People v.
Eleuterio, 47 A.D.2d 803, 365 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1975), discussed at notes 328-32 and accompanying
text supra. See also MCNuLTY, THE BURNING BED: THE TRUE STORY OF FRANCINE HUGHES-
A BEATEN WIFE WHO REBELLED (1980) ("I'11 find you wherever you go and when I do it won't be
pretty. I'll kill you inch by-inch." (quoting the threats made to Francine Hughes (see note 210
supra) when she sought escape from a battering husband)).
344. Cf. People v. Eleuterio, 47 A.D.2d 803, 803, 365 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95 (1975) (police were
called, and restrained decedent as he was whipping defendant with the buckle end of a large
leather belt).
345. See Part I, Section B supra. Pattie Schaeffer, who killed her husband as he was pushing
her out of a fifth-story window, see note 327 supra, had called the police on scores of occasions in
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history of prior injuries." '3 4 6
The dialogue illustrates that any self-defense modification pur-
porting to envelop all such homicides would be functionally deficient.
Even exceptions to basic principles must have general applicability,347
and conjugal cases are points along a continuum rather than a mono-
lithic category. Two distinct and impermissible results would therefore
follow if the trial judge's charge dispensed with the imminent danger
requirement in these prosecutions but retained it for all others. Frag-
mentation of the self-defense standard would undermine the deterrent
inherent in the proscription against homicide. It would also raise sig-
nificant equal protection problems, since certain killings included in the
"forgiven" range would be indistinguishable in all material respects
from nonfamilial provocation cases.348
If the judge cannot alter the standard, can the jury ameliorate its
application? Acquittal in anticipatory slayings cannot be justified
merely because of defendant's status as a battered spouse. Perhaps an
instance where each of the Alpha variables are satisfied might present a
discrete basis for nullification, at least as the lesser of two evils. Ulti-
mately, both the spirit and the letter of the criminal law require that the
jury be removed from this dilemma. Nullification is an undesirable
counterbalancing device, which occurs after a slaying that might have
been prevented. As long as domestic assault victims are excluded from
legal redress and resort instead to homicide, the juror in the subsequent
prosecution will find himself in the reluctant position of Charon ferry-
ing the defendant from a private Hades to one provided by the state.
CONCLUSION
Since the passing of frontier justice, restraint and punishment of
assaults has been a state rather than an individual function. If the gov-
ernment abdicates this role as to one class of victim, several conse-
quences follow. Equal protection strictures are violated by failure to
vindicate the interspousal exception. Such vindication does not flow
the six months preceeding the stabbing, urging them to enforce a court order barring him from
entering her Bronx apartment. In a newspaper interview she stated:
I've been taking beatings from my husband for months because the police don't help
me.... I've called the police over and over again, but they'd never arrest him. They
told me if they locked him up, he'd just be out in an hour. I have to blame the police; if
only they'd have locked him up, this wouldn't have happened.
N.Y. Daily News, Aug. 22, 1980, at 20, col. 1. Lt. Andrew Rosenzweig, speaking for the local
precinct, said that "it would be the duty of an officer to make an arrest in any case in which a court
protection order is violated. 'It might be possible that the situation would be resolved without an
arrest on one occasion,' he said. 'But on several different occasions? No way."' Id. at col. 4.
346. See notes 57, 141-44 and accompanying text supra.
347. See text accompanying note 324 supra.
348. See Part I, Section B(2) supra.
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from an assailant's right of domestic privacy, which would encompass
only consensual activities that are not injurious to physical safety.
When victims fail to secure protection by negotiating with police and
prosecutors, they may commence an omnibus lawsuit seeking enforce-
ment of constitutional and statutory rights. Defendants in some of
these suits have entered into a detailed settlement agreement creating
an administratively feasible remedy. If no agreement is reached, an
effective judicial decree is preferable to a finding of mootness based
merely on official assurances that the past policy will be discontinued.
At best, such assurances will be conscientiously implemented by the
administration that has agreed to them; at worse, plaintiffs-with no
binding court order to invoke-will recommence the process with new
affidavits or will resort to unlawful self-help.
Where government refusal to enforce the law results in homicidal
retaliation against a recidivist assailant, the phenomenon ofjury nullifi-
cation makes its entrance. Although unduly restrictive interpretation
of self-defense and insanity pleas may be corrected by the analysis sug-
gested in this Article, the facts in some conjugal cases will sustain only
the mitigating defense of provocation. Yet the jury in such a case, re-
ceiving an instruction from the trial court that virtually precludes ac-
quittal, may discount that instruction where a defendant has been the
object of an unremedied persecution and is not presently dangerous.
Thus, the criminal justice fabric is unravelled at both ends. Police
protection and judicial services are unlawfully withheld from one cate-
gory of assault victims. When the victim is transmuted into the slayer,
the jury steps out of bounds to compensate for the original deprivation.
Both erosions have regrettable implications for the critical criminal law
goal of deterrence. The compensatory mechanism, however, would not
be called into play if the legislature's designation of assault as a crime
were recognized by the executive and the judiciary:
When the court will not insist that legal rights be implemented by
normal legal remedies, or when the executive will not back up the
courts in the normal way, I think the typical citizen hardly feels he is
dealing with the 'law' at all. He cannot show respect for a law that does
not respect itself ....
349. C. BLACK, JR., THE OCCASIONS OF JUSTICE 151 (1963). This comment by Professor
Charles Black was made in the context of Southern resistance to desegregation.
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